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ABSTRACT
Deadly, inter-ethnic group conflict remains a threat to international security in a
world where the majority of armed violence occurs not only within states but in the most
ungoverned areas within states. Conflicts that occur between groups living in largely
ungoverned areas often become deeply protracted and are difficult to resolve when the
state is weak and harsh environmental conditions place human security increasingly
under threat. However, even under these conditions, why do some local conflicts between
ethnic groups escalate, whereas others do not? To analyze this puzzle, the dissertation
employs comparative methods to investigate the conditions under which violence erupts
or stops and armed actors choose to preserve peace. The project draws upon qualitative
data derived from semi-structured interviews, focus group dialogues, and participant
observation of local peace processes during field research conducted in six conflictaffected counties in Northern Kenya.
Comparative analysis of fifteen conflict episodes with variable outcomes reveals
the conditions under which coalitions of civic associations, including local peace
committees, faith-based organizations, and councils of elders, inter alia, enhance
informal institutional arrangements that contain escalation. Violence is less likely to
escalate in communities where cohesive coalitions provide platforms for threatmonitoring, informal pact making, and enforcement of traditional codes of restitution.
ii

However, key scope conditions affect whether or not informal organizational structures
are capable of containing escalation. In particular, symbolic acts of violence and the use
of indiscriminant force by police and military actors commonly undermine local efforts to
contain conflict. The dissertation contributes to the literatures on civil society and
peacebuilding, demonstrating the importance of comparing processes of escalation and
non-escalation and accounting for interactive effects between modes of state and nonstate response to local, inter-ethnic group conflict.
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INTRODUCTION

In August of 2012, in Tana River County of rural, Northeastern Kenya, a clash
between Orma and Pokomo communities over land and grazing rights caused twenty-five
fatalities. Over the next four months, the conflict escalated and spread across the county
through multiple towns, leading to 160 casualties and over 15,000 internally displaced
persons (IDPs). In contrast, in July of 2014, a clash between Pokot and Turkana
communities over land rights in Turkana County triggered inter-ethnic group violence
with 15 fatalities. The conflict, however, stopped short of further escalation. These
conflicts represent a larger puzzle related to inter-ethnic group conflict in areas of limited
state presence: Why do some local conflicts between ethnic groups escalate whereas
others do not?
Although total levels of global armed conflict declined significantly after 1991,
the majority of armed conflict today occurs within states rather than between them (see,
Themnér and Wallensteen 2014).1 Armed conflicts between rebel movements and states,
such as the current conflicts in Syria and Iraq, remain major global problems. Non-state

1

For detail on the persistence of intra-state conflicts see also, James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity,
Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No.1 (February 2003).
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conflicts2 between groups divided along identity lines are persistent threats to
international security, as well. As Sundberg et al. show, “the numbers of state-based and
non-state conflicts have converged since 2000” (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012, 354).
According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), non-state conflict causes, on
average, 4,000 fatalities per year across many regions of the world. The spectrum of
cases includes inter-tribal clashes in Pakistan, fighting in India between Hindu and
Muslim communities, identity-based conflicts in Lebanon and Iraq, as well as clashes
between Muslim and Christian groups in Nigeria (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012,
355).3
The problem is global. Non-state conflict, however, concentrates in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Between 1989 and 2008, 74% of total fatalities related to non-state conflicts (or
58,940 deaths) occurred in states in Sub-Saharan Africa (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz
2012, 357). In 2014, half of the top 15 states that experienced intra-state conflict were in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic,
Libya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo were the most severe cases (see, Themnér
and Wallensteen 2014). India was the only state outside of Sub-Saharan Africa in the top
six most severe cases. In Somalia, Sudan, and DR Congo, non-state conflict led to more
fatalities than conflict between the state and armed rebel groups. Across all of these

2

The UCDP definition is as follows: “The use of armed force between two organized armed groups,
neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year,”
see: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/
3

The global death toll due to conflict between social groups from 1983 – 2014 is over 80,000. Pew Forum
data analysis indicates identity-based violence with religious dimensions increased over the past six years,
reversing a historical downward trend (see, Pew Research Center 2014).
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cases, the problem is related directly to state fragility,4 or the absence of formal state
institutions with capacity5 to provide basic security and public goods (Hendrix 2010;
Bertocchi and Guerzoni 2012).
Global and regional armed conflict trends make Kenya a critical case study of
sub-state fragility with persistent non-state conflict. UCDP data indicate that over the past
15 years Kenya experienced roughly 6,000 fatalities due to non-state violence.6
Compared to its neighbors—Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda, Kenya is the most
stable country in the Horn of Africa. The country has achieved relatively consistent
economic growth, and marked improvements in governance performance (see, World
Bank 2015). Notwithstanding positive economic and political outcomes, similar to other
rapidly growing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa such as South Africa, Ghana, and
Nigeria, Kenya remains vulnerable to inter-ethnic group conflict due to sub-state
fragility. The more severe cases, such as South Sudan and DR Congo, experience both
state-based7 and non-state conflict, making the two phenomena difficult to distinguish.
Kenya, in contrast, has not experienced state-based conflict, yet continues to
experience high rates of inter-ethnic group conflict, especially across the Northern rural

4

Conceptually, state fragility refers to the absence of state authority, capacity, and legitimacy, or the state’s
failure to provide security, rule of law, and basic services for citizens.
5

On measuring state capacity, see, Hendrix, Cullen. 2010. “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and
Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 47 (3): 273–85. See
also, Bertocchi, Graziella, and Andrea Guerzoni. 2012. “Growth, History, or Institutions What Explains
State Fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa?” Journal of Peace Research 49 (6): 769–83.
6

The number is closer to 8,000 according to SCAD data.

7

The UCDP definition is as follows: conflict between, “government and non-governmental party.”
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periphery8 also known as the Arid and Semi-arid Lands (ASALs).9 The map below
portrays the relatively high rate of armed violence across the counties of Northern Kenya.
Figure 1: Kenya’s Counties by Level of Armed Violence Volatility10

Source: Small Arms Survey 2012
8

For overviews of the concept of core-periphery cleavages and civil wars, see, David Mason, “Insurgency,
Counterinsurgency, and the Rational Peasant.” Public Choice (1996) 86 (1-2); Susan Olzak,
“Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization,” Annual Review of Sociology 9 (January 1996): 355–74; and, Sidney
Tarrow, “Inside Insurgencies: Politics and Violence in an Age of Civil War,” Perspectives on Politics 5
(2007): 587–600.
9

Seventy-five percent of the landmass of Kenya is classified as Arid and Semi-arid Land (ASALs), with
harsh climatic and environmental conditions not conducive to sustainable agricultural production. These
areas of the country are also the poorest regions in the country. The ASALs have the highest poverty, the
lowest human development scores. Up to 80% of the Kenyan population living across the ASALs lives on
less than one dollar per day (World Bank 2015). The ASALs lack modern infrastructure, and have very
few, if any, government services. The lack of state capacity and formal security institutions generates
conditions conducive to high levels of armed violence.
10

Map source: Wepundi, Mannasseh. 2012. Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in
Kenya: An Assessment. Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, 39.
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However, patterns of violence vary significantly at the local level. This is common for
intra-state conflicts. In the Greek civil war, riots in India, the war in Bosnia, and interclan clashes in Somalia, violence escalated in some areas yet not others, even with similar
demographic features and conflict pressures (Kalyvas 2006; Varshney 2002; Ron 2000;
Shortland, Christopoulou, and Makatsoris 2013).11 The Kenya context is no exception.
Under very similar conflict pressures, some inter-ethnic group conflicts escalate to
include acts of mass collective violence, while others do not.
One part of the puzzle of intra-state conflict in deeply divided African states is
related to group motivations for engaging in violence. Why some actors choose to use
increasingly severe forms of violence against rival ethnic groups is a key question.
However, explaining why some conflicts escalate and others do not involves a more
complex question related to patterns of response, or the warning-response problem
(George and Holl 1997).
Even in the most remote regions of what was once called the Northern Frontier
District (NFD), a broad spectrum of actors including local civic groups, peacebuilding
committees, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and government agencies respond
to inter-ethnic group conflicts in attempts to prevent mass atrocities. Local peace
committees with linkages to District Peace Committees (DPCs) are in place even in very
remote locations across Northern Kenya. It is not inevitable that collective violence will
escalate in the absence of formal state policing. Early warning, rapid response, and
preventive operations coordinated through non-governmental organizations and local

11

Shortland et al. use innovative satellite imaging of light emissions to show variation in local violence
patterns in Somalia.
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civic associations may contain it (George and Holl 1997; Carnegie Commission 1998).
Therefore, why some responses to outbreaks of violence contain12 escalation and others
fail to do so is also a critical part of the puzzle.

Patterns and Consequences of Ethnic Violence
The study finds that the relationship between modes of state and non-state
response to local inter-ethnic group conflicts affect patterns of escalation. In the absence
of state authority, capacity, and legitimacy, coalitions13 of civic associations limit
escalation across multiple inter-ethnic group conflicts. Persistent insecurity due to substate fragility triggers the formation of cohesive,14 albeit highly informal, organizational
structures for communal protection and rapid response to outbreaks of violence.
Containing the escalation of conflict rarely hinges upon one particular organizational
structure. Containment depends upon relationships among multiple civic associations that
align with a particular long-term peacebuilding agenda, or align with resisting threats
from particular violent actors. Local peacebuilding coalitions commonly contain

12

Following the insights of Lake and Rothchild, fully resolving and eliminating inter-ethnic group conflict
under conditions of state fragility, extreme human insecurity, and inter-group fear and mistrust is not
possible; however, containing it is possible (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 203). The containment concept
relates to the pressures external organizations and actors use to prevent violence from escalating or
spreading. The study also deals with the concept of restraint, or internal pressures that prevent armed actors
from engaging in violence, such as fear of consequences, or a “mutually hurting stalemate,” inter alia
(Horowitz 1985; Zartman 2001).
13

The coalition concept refers to relationships among civic associations that are “deliberately constructed,”
yet operate, “independent of formal organizational structures” (Stevenson, Pearce, and Porter 1985, 256 –
257).
14

Cohesion, building from Pearlman’s conceptual framework includes two observable characteristics: 1)
unified local elites, and 2) the presence of local institutions (formal or informal) with clearly articulated and
accepted rules for conflict prevention (Pearlman 2011; Pearlman and Cunningham 2012).

6

escalation through the establishment of informal threat-monitoring networks, providing
multiple platforms for preventive negotiation and pact making, and enforcing traditional
codes of restitution. In otherwise hostile environments, coalitions comprised of diverse
combinations of civic organizations play significant roles in containing the escalation of
inter-ethnic group violence.
However, the study also finds that a set of particular conditions affects the extent
to which informal organizational structures are capable of containing escalation. In
conflicts where state actions undermine trust between local organizations and militia
leaders, coalitions commonly fail to contain escalation. Highly symbolic acts of violence
and the use of indiscriminant force by police and military actors create windows for
conflict escalation and undermine the preventive efforts of local civic groups. In this way,
the relationship between modes of state and non-state response explains variable patterns
of escalation and non-escalation across non-state conflicts in Kenya’s rural periphery.
The study analyzes fifteen conflicts across six counties in Northern Kenya,
including Mandera, Marsabit, Isiolo, Samburu, Turkana, and West Pokot. The
dissertation addresses the critical problem of collective action to contain violence. Prior
research, such as Rothchild’s research on ethnic bargaining, recognizes the role of the
state in formulating strategies to manage inter-ethnic group conflict across various SubSaharan countries (1995). However, the dissertation looks at the relationship between
state and non-state responses to ethnic conflict to account for interactive effects among
various modes of response. Extant studies of collective violence compare episodes of
escalation with other episodes of escalation (Kiernan 2009; Semelin and Hoffman 2009;
Goldhagen 2009; Valentino 2013). These forms of comparative analysis focus on drivers
7

of collective violence, often overlooking the dynamics of containment and restraint
(Straus 2012). They also overlook empirical evidence from cases in which conditions are
rife for escalation, but mass atrocities do not occur.
Empirically, the study makes two main contributions to the field. First, the
dissertation demonstrates the importance of comparing episodes of escalation and nonescalation and adds case study evidence to the research program on sub-state violence
dynamics (King 2004; Straus 2012). Second, the study also contributes to the literature
on statebuilding and peacebuilding. Conflict that begins in periphery areas, like the
current cases of Mali and the Central African Republic, can quickly transform into largescale civil war. The prevention of social conflict requires better understanding of
conditions that help constitute relatively secure communities in otherwise highly insecure
environments. Very few studies address the ways in which state actions and civic actions
may compliment or compromise one another within processes of conflict prevention.

Escalation and Containment of Ethnic Violence
According to Fearon and Laitin, intra-group policing is the key mechanism that
prevents conflict between ethnic groups from erupting and spiraling out of control
(Fearon and Laitin 1996). The theory posits that conflict rarely escalates because in the
day-to-day each community polices itself to avoid the high cost of violence for the larger
group. Evidence from Kenya challenges this approach. Intra-group policing, alone, may
not be sufficient to contain escalation. Within the rural periphery, armed youth militias
travel long distances, operate largely undetected outside of their home territories, and
cross international boundaries through shifting inter-ethnic group alliances. To contain
8

escalation, it is likely that multiple groups, organizations, and actors need to be involved.
Without basic forms of inter-group policing and collective action among multiple civic
organizations, escalation may be more likely.
Civil society theories also provide a plausible explanation of why some interethnic group conflicts escalate and others do not (Varshney 2002; Paffenholz 2010). Case
study research related to civil society theories tends to analyze the relationship between
specific types of associations and violence prevention, such as trade associations in India
and Nigeria (Jha 2008; Meagher 2007), churches and faith-based organizations in
Rwanda (Longman 2009), and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in
Eastern Europe and East Timor (McMahon 2007; Robinson 2009). Focusing on specific
types of associations does not capture the empirical reality of what civil society looks like
on the ground in conflict-affected communities. Even in small villages in the most remote
regions of Northern Kenya, there is commonly a set of diverse organizations engaged in
responding to outbreaks of violence. This gap in the literature motivates analysis of the
main factor—cohesive coalitions. The study contributes to the civil society literature
through analysis that accounts for the strengths of civic coalitions involved in preventive
action, as well as their limitations.
A third major approach in the literature on sub-state conflict claims political elites
and ethnic entrepreneurs determine whether or not violence escalates. Fearon and Laitin
identify elite theory as the most dominant narrative (Fearon and Laitin 2000). Political
elites, some suggest, decide whether or not to arm local militias and incite ethnic
constituencies to engage in collective violence, or decide whether or not to allocate state
resources to protect certain ethnic groups over others (Bates 2008; Boege, Brown, and
9

Clements 2009). For example, Wilkinson argues political elites in India protect minority
groups from acts of violence only when the majority ethnic group depends upon the
minority group to win an election (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Wilkinson 2006).
Violence, from this perspective, is an instrument for gaining political support and
personal power. When political parties and their leaders have little to lose from violence,
or a lot to gain, escalation may be more likely (Gagnon 2006; Laitin 2007).
Elite theory explains a number of conflict events in the Kenya context. For
example, evidence suggests political elites played direct roles in escalating post-election
violence in Kenya in 2007-2008. Elite theories, however, do not fully explain sub-state
variation. In some cases, there is evidence of elites escalating violence for political or
personal gain, but in others, there is not. Most importantly, in some cases, political elites
play significant roles in preventive responses and peace processes to contain conflict.
Overall, predominant theories of sub-state, inter-ethnic group violence explain
variation in relation to political entrepreneurs who draw upon and exacerbate identitybased grievances, the absence of integrated civic organizations, and the failure of formal
state policing. This particular combination of stress factors contributes to relatively
higher levels of armed conflict in the periphery region of Kenya, yet, under all of these
conditions, patterns of escalation are variable and large-scale acts of collective violence
remain rare. This study, therefore, critiques the capacity of theories of sub-state ethnic
violence to explain variation in patterns of conflict escalation across Northern Kenya.

10

Methods
The structure of the analysis for the study includes country-level assessment of
the Kenya context, as well as comparing sub-state, inter-ethnic group conflicts. Four
methods are used: case studies, analytic narratives, process tracing, and structured,
focused comparison (Bates 1998; George and Bennett 2005; Bennett and Elman 2006).
Following Brass’s methodological approach to the study of ethnic violence in India,
conflict narratives draw significantly upon local interpretations and viewpoints on
escalation dynamics (Brass 1997). Each case study investigates informants’ claims to
identify the most plausible explanations of why conflict did or did not escalate in
particular situations. Process tracing of state, civic, and communal responses to outbreaks
of conflict allows for assessment of the relationship between state and non-state efforts to
contain violence. In each case, conflict events, corresponding responses, and critical
outcomes are recorded and then subjected to comparative analysis.
The counterfactual problem is inherent in the research question. How is it possible
to know with confidence whether or not particular preventive actions caused further
violence not to happen? As Rubin describes, “The problem of counterfactual hypotheses
is endemic in social science and policy, both of which deal with nonreplicable events. It
is not peculiar to or uniquely prominent in the problem of conflict prevention” (Rubin
2002, 211). Solving the research puzzle requires comparative analysis of positive cases
where escalation occurred, alongside negative cases where escalation did not occur but
easily could have due to the presence of conditions that commonly trigger escalation.
There are two methodological strategies for testing hypotheses through case study
analysis—counterfactual thought experiments to rewrite histories imagining how
11

outcomes would change in the absence of particular factors, or comparing similar
historical cases (Fearon 1991). Rather than constructing counterfactual narratives, the
study matches historical cases that share most similar conditions. To gauge the extent to
which cohesive civic coalitions may or may not contain escalation, most similar cases are
matched and used, as Levy describes, to compare “worlds that are as close to each other
as possible” (Levy 2008).
All of the cases provide evidence of actors engaging in observable actions
intentionally selected to contain conflict and prevent further escalation (Rubin 2002). The
first set of cases analyzes escalatory dynamics in the absence of preventive intervention
through civic coalitions, or conflict outcomes that result from the absence of the primary
variable under investigation (Fearon 1991). The second set of cases assesses conflict
outcomes with the presence of a cohesive coalition of civic associations involved in
significant preventive efforts (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Case studies analyze the
ways in which collective efforts impact conflict outcomes across multiple settings. As a
third test of the cohesive coalition concept, the final set of cases includes mixed
outcomes. Civic organizations had success in containing violence in past conflicts, but
then collapsed due to various pressures. In sum, to facilitate comparative analysis,
conflict episodes are matched and grouped in three sets: cases of escalation with minimal
preventive action, cases in which preventive intervention contained violence, and cases in
which preventive intervention failed to contain violence.

12

Table 1: Case Studies
Escalation
1. Turkana: Turkana – Samburu Range War (1996 – 1997)
2. Samburu: The Baragoi Massacre (November 2012)
3. Samburu: The Maralal Riots (October 2013)
4. Turkana: The Todonyang Massacre (May 2011)
5. Marsabit: The Moyale Clashes (2012 – 2013)
Limited Escalation
6. Samburu: Nyrio Mountain Corridor: Turkana – Samburu (2012 – 2014)
7. Marsabit: Sarimo Settlement: Gabra – Turkana (2010 – 2014)
8. West Pokot: Turkwel Gorge and the Motorcycle Murders (2014)
9. Turkana: Oil and Ethnic Riots (2012 – 2014)
10. Isiolo: Post-election Peace (2013 – 2014)
Recurring Escalation
11. Marsabit: Turbi Massacre (2002 – 2005)
12. West Pokot: Pokot – Turkana Range War (2013 – 2014)
13. Isiolo: The Isiolo Triangle (2008 – 2012)
14. Mandera: Garre – Murule (2005 – 2008)
15. Mandera: Garre – Degodia Clashes (2013 – 2014)
In order to select and assess sub-state conflict events for the study, I initially
conducted two months of state-level field research engaging over 35 national and
international organizations involved in security governance and peacebuilding in Kenya.
During the first stage of field research, I noted conflict events and locations where
peacebuilding and security actors identified variation in terms of escalation and nonescalation, as well as variation in the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of preventive
responses coordinated through local organizational structures.
Next, I conducted an additional four months of field research across six counties
in Northern Kenya. Working with at least one and sometimes two research assistants in
each county, I engaged over 300 research participants in interviews and focus group
dialogues, and in the form of participant observation. Accompanying peacebuilding
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actors during responses to clashes provided access to observational data related to
informal practices used for rapid response and preventive bargaining. Interviews and
focus group discussions, ranging from one to four hours in length, were semi-structured.
A standardized questionnaire guided each conversation with intervening questions asked
to clarify key points and allow actors to speak in depth about issues related to their
particular area of expertise (Berry 2002). Perspectives and insights derived from
interviews and focus group discussions were triangulated against data from a variety of
international organizations’ reports, news articles, scholarly publications, and policy
documents related to each conflict under analysis (Höglund and Öberg 2011).
Using field research findings as a foundation, conflict narratives follow a common
format. The format includes assessment of the conflict context, patterns of response, key
outcomes, and conclusions. In each case, context analysis identifies parties to the conflict,
major conflict events and historical grievances, and causal factors described by local
informants and conflict assessments for each case. Proximate conflict triggers for the
initial shift from latent to deadly conflict are identified. Using insights from first-hand
sources, where available, the section on patterns of response describes as accurately as
possible the dynamics of state, civic, and communal responses following the initial
outbreak of conflict. Narratives draw upon interviews with leaders of peacebuilding
organizations, local political leaders, and security actors involved in responding to the
threat of escalation in each case.
The conclusion section identifies preliminary findings regarding conditions
related to escalation or containment. The cases do not identity all of the possible
conditions that could play a role in the conflict; rather, the goal of each narrative is to
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identify specific components of each episode relevant to the theoretical argument under
investigation—the relationship between state actions, informal peacebuilding coalitions,
and patterns of escalation.
Overview
Chapter one assesses the extent to which prevailing theories are useful for
explaining variation in patterns of escalation, and why some responses to outbreaks of
inter-ethnic group conflict may be more successful than others in containing it. Overall,
research on ethnic violence focuses heavily on formal institutions such as state-based
rules for inclusion and integration, and the extension of bureaucratic peacebuilding
institutions to the local level. Informal rules and social organizations, however, are
pervasive and equally important for conflict analysis. The chapter justifies the coalitions
concept and forwards hypotheses related to the potentially significant role of civic groups
that operate outside of formal organizational structures.
Chapter two analyzes drivers of ethnic conflict in the case of Kenya, and the
historical transformation of state responses to the escalation of inter-ethnic group conflict.
In particular, it analyzes how prior modes of state intervention shape current logics of
conflict among communities in the periphery region, and how state institutions designed
to prevent inter-ethnic group conflict affect local protection strategies. In areas of limited
state presence, the qualities of prior state interventions affect armed actors’ strategies as
well as operating conditions for civic organizations.
Chapter three presents narratives of five conflicts that escalated in the rural
periphery of Northern Kenya. Each case accounts for contextual analysis of conditions
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that contributed to the outbreak of conflict, corresponding responses, and conditions
contributing to escalation or non-escalation. The cases show how escalation occurs across
multiple cases in the absence of local organizational structures to monitor threats and
support pact making based on customary forms of restitution.
Chapter four compares conditions for limited escalation, or the containment of
inter-ethnic group conflict. Five episodes portray conditions that contribute to the
outbreak of conflict, corresponding responses, and outcomes. The cases show the most
prominent mechanisms through which informal coalitions of local civic groups restrain
armed groups and limit rapid, asymmetrical violence when inter-group conflict is on the
brink of escalation.
Chapter five assesses and compares cases in which local peacebuilding
organizations failed to contain violence. In these cases, collective peacebuilding efforts
had prior success in containing conflict yet conflict re-escalated. In this chapter, there is
further evidence of local associations effectively containing violence. However,
additional patterns are evident. Coercive state actions and acts of symbolic violence
trigger escalatory dynamics that are to contain difficult for local civic groups.
Chapter six draws comparative findings from the study, articulates how the
findings contribute to the research on non-state violence, and explains why some interethnic conflicts escalate, whereas others do not. The conclusion summarizes key findings,
describes limitations of the research, and articulates implications for Kenya, divided
societies in Sub-Saharan Africa, and non-state conflicts, more broadly.
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CHAPTER ONE: ETHNIC CONFLICT IN FRAGILE CONTEXTS

The Cold War era global upsurge in ethnic conflicts—from the late 1960s through
the early 1990s—gave rise to extensive research on the causes of conflict between
identity-based social groups. As a result, there is a strong foundation for identifying
potential root drivers of ethnic conflict at multiple levels of analysis (Horowitz 1985;
Brass 1997; Kaufman 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Varshney 2003).15 Predatory elite
behavior is the most prominent narrative (Bates 1982; Allen 1999; Herbst 2000;
Lemarchand 2011; Bates 2008; Boone 2014). State failure and fragility, minority
exclusion, and horizontal inequalities are also dominant theoretical approaches (Gurr
2000; Barkan 2012; Bates 2008; Laitin 2007; Stewart 2008; Wimmer, Cederman, and
Min 2009). State fragility and elite behavior, in particular, clearly help explain why rural
Northern Kenya is vulnerable to more frequent outbreaks of armed violence than
Southern Kenya. However, the concepts of state fragility and elite predation are
misleading.
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For example, Horowitz’s seminal psycho-social theory identifies four necessary conditions for the onset
of deadly ethnic violence: 1) a history of intergroup hostility that provides a contextual motivation for
killing; 2) a social sanction or moral justification for killing, usually signaled by support from in-group
elites; 3) the presence of a precipitating event, such as rumor or small scale violent episode that sparks
group mobilization, and; 4) the reduction of group inhibitions against killing, or the lowering of constraints
including the absence of police forces (Horowitz 2001).
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Conflict analysis, especially across states in Sub-Saharan Africa, leaves the
impression that ethnic conflict is a normal phenomenon. Empirically, even in the most
remote and largely ungoverned areas of the world where theories predict the highest
levels of vulnerability to ethnic conflict, episodes of conflict that escalate to include mass
collective violence are still quite rare (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Straus 2012). The
conditions thought to predict conflict between identity-based groups are more prevalent
than the outcome. Many small-scale social conflicts are contained before they escalate
and transform into wars. What are the conditions, therefore, that contain conflict between
ethnic groups in largely ungoverned regions of the world? Why does collective violence
not escalate, when conditions are rife for allowing it to escalate?
Chapter one has three main sections. The first section defines foundational
concepts used in the study. The second section reviews sets of literature most relevant to
the research question—why do some local inter-ethnic group conflicts escalate while
others do not? The review analyzes plausible factors and mechanisms that may contain
violence under conditions of sub-state fragility in order to identify gaps and unresolved
debates in the literature. The third section proposes a theoretical explanation for variation
in patterns of violence based on the main propositions—the interactive effects between
state and non-state modes of response to local conflicts.

Conceptual Orientation
The dependent variable in the study is the escalation of non-state conflict.
Escalation can occur rapidly or over longer periods of time, but it always includes a shift
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in distinct aspects of a crisis (Zartman 1989, 9). Escalation is the extent to which the
nature of conflict changes in intensity and severity of tactics, which initially includes a
shift from latent conflict to armed violence with increased competition in risk taking
(Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim 1994; Licklider 2005; Kahn 2009). Other forms of evidence
associated with escalation include the shift to increasingly violent tactics such as
targeting women and children, burning homes, or destroying resources that belong to
particular ethnic groups (Carment and James 1996; Horowitz 2001; Lobell and Mauceri
2004; Colaresi 2007).
Resilience, in contrast, refers to the absence of increased competition in risk
taking. The resilience concept has many critics due to its broad use across multiple
disciplines including ecology, engineering, and psychology, inter alia. Within peace and
conflict analysis the concept often lacks of clarity of meaning due to its use in a wide
range of policy documents from international organizations such as the African
Development Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).16 However, in this
study, the concept simply refers to successful instances in which communities resist
pressure to resort to violence following the onset of conflict (see also, Carpenter 2014;
Ryan 2012). As Menkhaus describes, resilience occurs when escalation is a potential
outcome due to increasing pressures for groups to resort to violence, yet the use of lethal
force is limited (Menkhaus 2013, 4).
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See, for example, the major OECD peacebuilding policy document titled, “Concepts and Dilemmas of
State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience,” (2008), at:
http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/docs/41100930.pdf
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Conflicts analyzed in the study occur between non-state groups, and do not
include pogroms or civil wars. In other words, groups involved have no direct control
over state military forces and the state is not a direct, active participant in the initial
conflict. Representatives and agents of the state are potential third parties to the conflict,
however, especially following initial outbreaks of violence.17 Violence refers to the
empirical, physical definition, in which groups engaged in conflict choose to use lethal
force to gain control over a contested resource, which aligns with Galtung’s classic
definition of visible armed violence—as opposed to cultural violence or structural
violence (Galtung 1969).
The significance of ethnicity as a cause of conflict is essentially contested in the
literature. Alesina and Sambanis, among others, argue ethnic diversity—measured
through degrees of ethno-linguistic fragmentation—does not affect the likelihood of
conflict escalation (Reilly 2001; Alesina et al. 2003; Habyarimana et al. 2009; Sambanis
and Shayo 2013). Therefore, in this study, ethnic identity limits the scope of the
dependent variable rather than operating as an explanatory factor.
Conceptually, identity is a social category to which individuals are eligible for
membership, and ethnic means eligibility for membership is based upon decent-based
attributes18 that are real or believed (Chandra 2006). Ethnicity is a socially constructed
sense of collective belonging. It provides a platform to differentiate groups and mobilize
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See UCDP definitions of “non-state” conflict at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#Nonstate_conflict
18

Decent based refers attributes that are genetic, cultural, historically inherited, or acquired such as a last
name or tribal markings (see, Chandra 2006).
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individuals for collective action (Lake and Rothchild 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2000).
Ethnic identity, in other words, becomes a conflict driver when groups feel threatened
and identity becomes a common rallying point. In sum, conflicts analyzed in the study
occur between non-state groups with a shared communal identity, and grievances are
related to ethnic affiliations (Horowitz 2001).

Theoretical Foundations
The following section critiques theoretical arguments relevant to the puzzle of
why violence escalates in some cases, yet not others. The literature related to this
problem falls into three general categories: state fragility, civil society associations, and
informal institutions. The review of extant literature serves as the foundation for the
analytical framework used for case study assessment and comparative analysis. It
identifies gaps and unresolved debates in the literature to build a case for the need for
further inquiry into interactions between modes of state and non-state responses to
contain inter-ethnic group conflicts. In particular, there is a lack of consensus on the
conditions under which civic associations and informal institutional arrangements are
able to effectively contain violence that is related to political and economic transition.
There is also a lack of consensus across the literature regarding whether or not
coercive or non-coercive pressures are most necessary for containing inter-ethnic group
conflicts. In other words, is the threat of the use of deadly force necessary to reduce the
likelihood of conflict escalation, or are non-coercive pressures capable of preventing
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violence from spiraling out of control? This problem relates to theories of restraint versus
constraint.
Some theories suggest violence stops mostly due to internal pressures that
restrain armed groups from escalating a conflict. Rational calculation of the cost of
violence for a particular group, the fear of consequences, or reaching a “mutually hurting
stalemate,”19 for instance, may reduce the likelihood of escalation (Horowitz 1985;
Zartman 2001; Collins 2009). In contrast, other theories are based on the fundamental
assumption that violence stops due to external pressures, or forces that restrict the ability
of armed groups to use violence, such as pressures from elders and militia patrons,
peacebuilding associations and civic organizations, or from state institutions. These
debates are addressed throughout the literature review.
Sub-state Fragility, Ethnic Conflict, and Coping
A dominant theory in the literature on ethnic conflict is that the modern
bureaucratic state is the most necessary constraint—without it, conflict is likely to
escalate. Weak states have ineffective policing systems, which, in Fearon and Laitin’s
terms, yields low capacity to cauterize small scale conflicts before they turn into wars
(Fearon and Laitin 1996). In other words, state authority and a monopoly over the use of
violence are necessary for preventing the escalation of violence (Weber 1968). The state
fragility argument is related to Cohen and Felson’s general theory of collective violence
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According to Zartman, whether or not external third party mediation contains escalation depends upon on
the interests of conflict parties, not on the neutrality or legitimacy of the mediator, per se. Whether or not
violence escalates depends upon whether or not both parties have reached a mutually hurting stalemate
(Zartman and Rasmussen 1997). Conflict will continue to escalate, Zartman suggests, until both parties are
locked in a situation in which they both perceive further stalemate will lead to catastrophe.
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as a social process that occurs in space and time under three conditions, including the
presence of motivated actors, the presence of suitable targets, and the absence of capable
guardians (Cohen and Felson 1979).
Where the state is not a capable guardian, ethnic security dilemmas may take root
(Posen 1993; Herbst 2000; Putzel 2005; Kaufman 2006). Militias and warlords often step
into governance vacuums to provide authority and communal security where the state
cannot. In the case of Northern Kenya, this is a common phenomenon. Across the
northern periphery there is very minimal state authority, capacity, and legitimacy. Substate fragility creates conditions conducive to severe poverty and human insecurity
(Kumssa, Jones, and Williams 2009). Ethnic militias operate in this context as the first
line of defense for communities. Under conditions of rapid environmental change,
intensive inter-group competition occurs over increasingly scarce resources (Collier and
Hoeffler 2004; Butler and Gates 2012; Hendrix and Brinkman 2013; Mine et al. 2013).
Empirically, however, even with very similar conflict pressures across a broad
region, the state’s capacity to contain conflict may vary across different sub-state settings
within areas of limited state presence.20 One approach to this problem is the construction
of ideal types of stateness, or various forms of governance that emerge under conditions
of state fragility (Migdal 1988; Desch 1996; Allen 1999; Laitin 2007; Risse 2013). For
example, Stanislawski makes a case for three types of limited statehood, para-states,
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Defining limited statehood, Risse states, “in those parts of the country in which central authorities
(governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce rules or in which the legitimate monopoly over the
means of violence is lacking, at least temporarily” (Risse 2011: 5).
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quasi-states, and criminal enclaves. Each type may vary in terms of state capacity to
contain local inter-ethnic group conflict (Stanislawski 2008).
Criminal enclaves, for example, tend to be corrupt, undemocratic, and sustained
through illicit economies with linkages to international criminal networks. Theoretically,
this type of sub-state structure may be more prone to violence than others. Violence
escalates if ethnic out-groups threaten to undermine illicit economic activities or the
authority of local warlords. Militias operating under these conditions also are more likely
to use violence against both ethnic competitors and state police forces (Bayart, Ellis, and
Hibou 1999; Bunker 2012). In short, from this perspective, violence is a tool warlords
and local powerbrokers use to protect criminal economies (Sullivan and Bunker 2002;
Bollig, Schnegg, and Wotzka 2013).
Prior research on the Kenya context relates to this approach. Early writers called
Northern Kenya a bandits kingdom (Farson 1953). Contemporary conflict analysis of the
region suggests not much has changed. Eaton and Bollig et al., for example, argue
violence escalates most often and most severely in relation to commercialized banditry.
Politicians, corrupt security actors, and government administrators benefit from local
conflict through corruption, patronage, and high value bribes. Local militias, therefore,
may use violence against ethnic out-groups that threaten criminal economies (Osamba
2000; Eaton 2008b; Bollig, Schnegg, and Wotzka 2013). The extent to which
commercialized banditry has taken root across northern Kenya, however, is not clear.
While there have been reports of political support for criminal activities across Northern
Kenya, this issue may be over exaggerated (Eaton 2008b).
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Brass’s research on sub-state conflict in India takes state fragility as the starting
point for classifying riot prone versus non-riot prone areas. He argues that some areas are
more prone to ethnic violence than others due to the direct absence of state security
forces. The absence of formal policing allows for the rise of a class of actors called riot
specialists who build and maintain organized social networks of armed actors who keep
inter-ethnic tensions tense. Riot specialists organize violent attacks at opportunistic
moments, including during democratic and economic transitions, elections, and in areas
of states where anonymity is possible (Brass 1997). Theoretically, Brass’s argument
implies ethnic violence has an urban bias. He suggests it is more difficult to operate as an
anonymous killer in a rural area than in an urban area, making violence more likely to
escalate in urban settings. The Kenya context questions this approach. Rural regions of
Northern Kenya are more prone to recurrent violence escalation than urban areas. This
implies communal strategies to maintain and protect the anonymity of armed actors may
play an important role within conflict dynamics.
Critics of state fragility arguments claim the absence of the state is not the most
important factor that explains why inter-ethnic group conflict escalates in some areas area
not others. Rather, the presence of the state and the actions of state representatives may
be more critical. Horowitz, for example, argues ethnic violence is not random. It is
usually well organized. Organized, large-scale acts of ethnic violence often require the
resources of the state (Horowitz 1985). Saideman and Zahar, more recently, build upon
this insight. They argue governments are the biggest threat to their own citizens. State
actors may play critical roles in determining whether or not intra-state conflict escalates
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(Saideman and Zahar 2008). For example, case study evidence from Fjeld’s comparative
research on sub-state conflict dynamics in Nigeria supports this approach. She finds that
local violence escalates more often in relation to “sins of commission” at the hands of
state actors, including patronage politics and abusing political office for amassing
personal wealth, rather than “sins of omission” in failing to provide security or public
goods (Fjelde 2009).
Approaches that highlight state actions identify sets of specific behaviors that can
implicate the state as a direct or indirect cause of inter-ethnic group violence. Even in
highly ungoverned periphery regions with very limited state capacity, local inter-group
conflicts often have links to national level conflict dynamics (Mamdani 1996; Albert
2001; Kalyvas 2006). For instance, Cedarman et al. argue that state’s use of
discrimination and favoritism of particular ethnic groups over others can deepen ethnic
divisions and grievances at the local level, increasing the likelihood of escalation
(Mamdani 1996; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). Redrawing internal district
borders based on ethnic identity (Donnan 1999; Greiner 2013), prebendalist state elite
behavior, and identity-based rent-seeking may have a similar effect (Joseph 1983; Lewis
1996; Le Billon 2003). State responses to sub-state conflicts may deepen inter-group
grievances and increase pressure for communities to resort to violence.
More directly, military support for one ethnic community over another within a
local conflict, often for the purpose of consolidating political support can trigger largescale inter-group violence (René Lemarchand 1972; Steeves 1997; Valentino 2013). In
some cases, the issue may not be direct military support for one community over another,
26

but rather disarmament campaigns in one community and not another. Unequal
disarmament may increase fear among minority groups of adequate protection and thus
trigger escalation (de Figueiredo and Weingast 1997). Similarly, Bell et al. argue the
state’s use of coercive force against citizens, such as disappearances and human rights
abuses, may increase the likelihood of escalation (Bell et al. 2013).
Overall, the state fragility literature and its critics reveal that state responses to
local ethnic conflicts vary significantly across time and space. The state is not a
homogenous actor. The general concept of state fragility does not capture the empirical
reality of how state actors respond, on the ground, to prevent escalation across various
inter-ethnic group conflicts. Lawson and Rothchild’s concept of state coping, therefore,
serves as a conceptual foundation for the analysis. State actors often adjust strategies
under conditions of institutional weakness and insecurity—factors common across
modern African states (Lawson and Rothchild 2005; see also, Jackson 2002; Boone
2003). State coping, theoretically, generates local-level variation in strategies the state
employs to try to contain escalation of inter-group conflict. State responses may cause
violence to escalate in some cases yet prevent it from escalating in others.
In the study, therefore, state responses to communal conflicts are conceptualized
as ad hoc, experimental attempts to improve security and prevent inter-group conflicts
from escalating under harsh and uncertain conditions. It is critical to try to account for
variation in patterns of state approaches to local conflicts in different settings across the
rural periphery. In particular, in the Kenya context, shifts in the larger regional political
economy have increased state interest in local security for the purposes of protecting
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resource extraction and international investment in some previously marginalized areas,
but not others. Explaining why some conflicts escalate and others do not in the Kenya
context, therefore, requires accounting for variable patterns of state response to intergroup conflicts in particular areas of the Northern periphery.
Civic Organizations, Ethnic Conflict, and Coalitions
A second set of literature related to the study of variation in patterns of local
conflict focuses on civic organizations and violence prevention efforts. However, there is
no consensus on the conditions under which civic groups are or are not capable of
containing escalation. The major gap in the literature is related to the problem of scope
conditions and intervening factors that cause variation in the capacity of civic
associations to contain violence more or less so than others. Under conditions of state
fragility, to what extent can civic groups contain violence? Kalyvas’ seminal study of
sub-state conflict merely states, “we know little about how [local organizations] operate”
(Kalyvas 2006, 110). Recent research tries to fill this gap.
Across multiple studies and methodological approaches, four mechanisms now
stand out as the most plausible channels through which civic associations contain
violence. First, civic groups may incentivize inter-group or “crosscutting” cooperation
and help overcome collective action dilemmas. Second, they may provide information to
conflict parties and the state necessary for early warning and effective preventive
response. Third, they may leverage international support and help increase capacity and
resources available for conflict prevention efforts. Finally, they may even change norms
among armed groups. Civic groups may encourage armed groups to adopt non-coercive
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conflict management tactics that help reduce the likelihood of escalatory dynamics. The
following section addresses research on civic organizations and violence prevention,
assessing the range of processes through which civic organizations may succeed or fail to
contain violence.
Civil society approaches build from Putnam’s research on civic associations and
democracy. He theorizes dense associational networks create social capital, or norms of
inter-group trust that increase the likelihood of collective action (Putnam, Leonardi, and
Nanetti 1993). In other words, civic groups increase “bridging” among ethnic groups and
decrease “bonding” within ethnic groups (Colletta et al. 2000). Applied to ethnic conflict,
the theory implies strong civic associations lead to higher levels of inter-group trust.
Inter-group trust then serves as the foundation for high-risk collective action necessary
for effective violence prevention. Civil society organizations that integrate ethnic groups
may increase willingness among citizens representing different ethnic groups to intervene
in crisis situations to contain violence in the absence of state security (Kalyvas, Shapiro,
and Masoud 2008; Druckman and Olekalns 2011).
Varshney finds evidence to support this theory in urban settings in India. HinduMuslim violence was more intensive in communities lacking crosscutting business
associations, labor unions, political parties, and voluntary community organizations. In
areas with crosscutting organizations, during periods of rising tension, pre-existing
associational frameworks were conducive for rapid collective action. They shared
information about conflict dynamics with state authorities, quelled the spread of rumors
and hate speech, and improved informal community policing (Varshney 2002, 9 – 10).
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Overall, Varshney’s theory implies that in settings where civic groups tend to segregate
local ethnic groups, conflict is more likely to escalate.
The ongoing research program on civil society and sub-state violence now
includes multiple methodological approaches to identify key mechanisms that link civic
groups to variable conflict outcomes. Most studies use case study methods (Barkan 1994;
Belloni 2001; Orjuela 2003; Imobighe 2003; Paffenholz 2010), some use mixed methods
(Kaplan 2013; Murdie 2014), and a few recent studies use large-N data (Nilsson 2012;
Bailer, Bodenstein, and Heinrich 2013). Within the literature, the range of potential
mechanisms linking civic groups and conflict outcomes is now far broader than the three
main processes Varshney identified in the India case. The research program now focuses
on the specification of what civic associations really do, on the ground, to contain
violence during inter-ethnic group conflicts.
Most civil society studies analyze specific types of organizations. Business
associations, churches and faith-based organizations (FBOs), NGOs, INGOs,
transnational human rights networks, and political parties, in particular, all may play
positive roles in containing conflict. Varshney’s research focused on the positive role of
crosscutting business associations, similar to Jha, who analyzed medieval trading towns
in India and found that ethnic groups engaged in trade tended to form business
associations that helped prevent inter-group conflict (Jha 2008). Similarly, in the case of
Colombia, when civil war broke out, a local peasant workers’ association served as a
platform for communities to negotiate with armed actors. The institution improved
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monitoring of the behavior of armed actors and improved the transparency and credibility
of information about local crises, effectively limiting acts of violence (Kaplan 2013).
Religious organizations, some argue, dampen violence by changing social norms
around the use of violence. For example, Fein argues that during the holocaust where
local churches were engaged in regular, active opposition to Jewish persecution, violence
was less common than in areas without church presence (Fein 1979). Similarly, in the
Rwanda case, Longman suggests Christian churches failed to condemn violence at the
state level, creating a window for mass collective violence (Longman 2009). At the same
time, in some small pockets of Western Rwanda local churches actively condemned
violence through peace messaging campaigns. Peace messaging and norm change around
the use of violence may lead to lower levels of casualties in particular communities (see
also, Frank 2002; Imobighe 2003; Morton 2008; Sisk 2011).
NGOs, INGOs, and transnational networks may play a similar role as religious
organizations and FBOs in changing norms around the use of violence during conflict
and share information about local conflict dynamics across broad networks of civic
associations. In some cases, there is case study evidence that they helped communities
develop capacity to use non-coercive or nonviolent tactics to contain violence. McMahon,
for example, argues networks of transnational NGOs in Eastern Europe in the 1990s
helped dampen conflict (McMahon 2007). In areas where violence could have erupted,
transnational NGO networks were heavily involved in peace messaging, providing direct
support for nonviolent social movements, and financing inter-ethnic group negotiations.
Similarly, information sharing may have played a role in stopping genocide in the East
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Timor case. International journalists gained internal access to the conflict through local
NGOs and CSOs. This allowed for sharing of information on the conflict that improved
the effectiveness of peacebuilding responses (Robinson 2009).
Beyond information sharing, and providing support for local peacebuilding
efforts, the inclusion of civic organizations in peace negotiations may be a key
mechanism for violence prevention. Nilsson’s analysis of global data on peace
agreements, for example, claims violence is less likely to re-escalate if peace processes
include civic organizations.21 NGOs and INGOs may play lead roles in bargaining
processes, threat monitoring, and holding spoilers accountable for the use of violence
within local conflicts (Murdie 2009; Murdie and Davis 2012). Civic associations can
provide eyes of the ground for identifying culprits of violence, reducing the anonymity of
armed actors, and raising the cost of engaging in violence (Brass 1997).
While there is a significant amount of case study evidence that suggests civic
organizations tend to play positive roles in preventing violence, the role of NGOs and
INGOs remains highly contested in the literature on peacebuilding. Many scholars argue
NGOs and INGOs, across multiple cases, have had a very minimal or even negative
impact on local conflict dynamics. Autesserre, for example, claims the behaviors of
international peacebuilders commonly deepen cleavages between external actors and
communities in conflict (Autesserre 2014). In the Nigeria case, she suggests INGOs
involved in peacebuilding do not help contain violence.
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The relationship between inclusivity and stable peace echoes the findings of Chenoweth and Stephan
2011.
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Denskus and Eaton find evidence of other mechanisms that prevent INGOs from
having a positive impact on local conflict. Elite capture of civic groups and communal
perceptions of corruption, bias, and inequality among INGOs involved in local peace
processes are dominant explanations of peacebuilding organizations (Denskus 2007;
Eaton 2008a; Autesserre 2014). Similarly, Smock, Pearlman, and Richmond hypothesize
that overly bureaucratic solutions to localized conflict often decrease the effectiveness of
grassroots peace processes (Smock 1997; Pearlman 2011; Pearlman and Cunningham
2012; Richmond 2013). The imposition of externally developed solutions for local, interethnic group conflict may undermine the efforts of more organic, ground-up
peacebuilding processes (Mamdani 1996). Only domestic processes, many argue, can
truly contain local conflict. In short, critics suggest civil society organizations regularly
fail to contain violence. It may be more rare for civic groups to develop capacity to
prevent complex inter-group conflicts from escalating than much of the literature of civil
society organizations suggests.
The civil society literature also includes analysis of political parties as a key type
of civic associations that plays a role in processes of local ethnic conflict prevention. The
literature is linked to larger debates around formal state institutions for political
contestation and inter-ethnic cooperation, also known as the long-running
consociationalism (Lijphart 1969; Lustick 1979; René Lemarchand 2007; Selway and
Templeman 2012) versus centripetalism debate (Sisk 1995; Lake and Rothchild 1996;
Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Reilly 2001; Large and Sisk 2006). These arguments focus on
formal, constitutional incentive structures for political parties. Whether or not parties
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choose to divide ethnic groups by playing the “ethnic card,” or unite ethnic groups in the
pursuit of political power may impact whether or not ethnic violence is likely to escalate.
For example, in contrast to Varshney’s argument regarding crosscutting civic
groups in the India case, Wilkinson argues that political parties and associated elites
actively protected minority groups from acts of violence only when a larger ethnic group
depended upon a smaller minority group to maintain a coalition necessary to win an
election (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972a; Wilkinson 2006). In other words, whether or not
violence is used against particular groups depends upon electoral dynamics and political
calculations of the value of minority group support. These theories imply political parties
have authority to mobilize and command armed actors and determine whether or not
violence escalates between particular ethnic groups around electoral cycles. When
political parties and their leaders have little to lose or a lot to gain from violence,
escalation may be more likely (Laitin 2007; Gagnon 2006).
This perspective, quite prevalent in the literature on African politics assumes
ethnic entrepreneurs regularly mobilize ethnic constituencies to engage in collective
violence (Bates 2008; Hesselbein, Golooba-Mutebi, and Putzel 2006; Boege, Brown, and
Clements 2009). With minimal state authority and weak justice systems to hold power
political actors accountable, political actors have both greater capacity for, and fewer
disincentives against, organizing ethnic groups and instigating inter-communal conflicts
using violent tactics for the purpose of gaining political power. Elites competing for
power may engage in ethnic outbidding, or, in other words, appeal to ethnicity as most
important issue for the masses (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972).
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In sum, whether or not local violence escalates, from this perspective, depends
upon the interests of political parties. Parties may manipulate ethnic identity and draw
upon inter-ethnic grievances in order to gain or maintain access to local political power.
This explanation is critical for the Kenya context, as some of the most severe episodes of
violence in Northern Kenya have occurred in the run up to, or just after local elections.
The process of devolving power to the local level in Kenya, many analysts argue, may
ethnic conflict to become for intense around contests for local political power in regions
that historically have not had relevance for national elections.
Local militias and vigilante groups are the final major type of civic group
analyzed in the literature on civic organizations and ethnic conflict (Meagher 2007;
Meagher 2012). Weinstein and Wood analyze various militia organizational structures
that can vary in terms of using violent or nonviolent action against rival groups
(Weinstein 2007; Wood 2014). Similar to Olson’s theory of the stationary bandit,
analyses of militia organizations claim whether or not violence escalates depends upon
the relationship between the community and local militias (Olson 1971). For example,
Weinstein argues opportunistic militia groups are more likely to escalate violence against
local communities. They do not require support from the community to survive, and tend
to be more fragmented and less capable of preventing militia members from using
violence against rival communities to extract resources.
Bunker suggests an alternative theory—armed groups with links to illicit markets
require support from the local population and are thus more likely to use violence against
out-groups that challenge their authority (Sullivan and Bunker 2002; Bunker 2012). In
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sum, theories of militia behavior imply the drivers of escalation or non-escalation relate
to the internal organizational structures of armed militias. From this perspective, in
contrast to the larger literature on civic associations, the capacity of a militia to restrain
its own potentially violent actors is more critical than the capacity of local civic groups to
mobilize to contain the escalation of violence.
Overall, the civil society literature provides a broad set of potential explanations
and mechanisms for explaining why violence escalates in some cases, and not others.
Local civic organizations may incentivize inter-group cooperation through crosscutting
social networks, or monitor conflict dynamics and provide information to conflict parties
and the state to improve policing. They may leverage international support and use
external resources for preventive diplomacy. They may even alter norms at the local level
and change the behavior of armed groups. However, there are four gaps in analysis of the
relationship between civic groups and patterns of ethnic conflict.
First, by focusing on cases with very specific types of associations, the literature
does not capture the empirical reality of what civil society often looks like on the ground
in conflict-affected communities. Even in very remote and largely ungoverned regions in
conflict-affected countries, multiple civic organizations engage in responses to contain
violence. Rarely do conflict settings include only one type of organization. There is a
very high level of institutional multiplicity, even in remote settings such as Northern
Kenya. This insight serves as a conceptual foundation for the coalitions concept. In areas
prone to insecurity, informal civic coalitions and other local, informal institutional
arrangements may form and play significant roles in containing escalation.
36

Conceptually, according to Stevenson et al. coalitions are “deliberately
constructed, [yet] independent of formal organizational structures” (Stevenson, Pearce,
and Porter 1985, 256 – 257). Empirically, many civic associations at the local level in the
Kenya context are informal organizations, as opposed to formal organizational structures
(Opalo 2011). The coalitions concept allows for assessment of cooperation among
various civic organizations involved in preventive action in a conflict setting. It also
provides a conceptual foundation for inquiry into the extent to which cooperation among
civic associations cuts across ethnic boundaries. The presence or absence of a cohesive
coalition of local peace actors may affect whether or not local associations are able to
contain escalation.
Second, the literature assumes civic associations predominantly use non-coercive
or nonviolent forms of pressure to contain escalation. The primary mechanisms across the
literature are non-coercive forms of pressure designed to change the behavior of armed
actors, including monitoring threats, information sharing, spoiler accountability and
transparency, or teaching and supporting non-coercive or nonviolent conflict resolution
strategies. However, evidence from conflict cases across the Kenya context raises a
question—is it accurate to classify civic organizations as largely non-coercive, nonviolent
actors?
In some settings in Northern Kenya, civic associations directly and indirectly
support local militias and extend their capacity to use or threaten to use deadly force
against rival groups. For example, in the Nyrio Mountain corridor (see chapter 4), civic
organizations contain escalation largely through their ability to expand communal support
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for a broad network of local militias. Civic groups improve access to information about
threats provide organizational support for militias to respond more rapidly and directly to
threats and warnings of impending attacks. In this case, the contribution of local civic
organizations is not in fostering crosscutting, inter-group cooperation as Varshney’s
theory suggests, but in improving the capacity of local militias to exert coercive force as a
deterrent.
Third, the literature on civil society and ethnic conflict presents a paradox. Some
research on inter-ethnic group violence suggests the experience of conflict itself can
improve civic capacity to contain future violence. For instance, Bellows and Miguel
found in Sierra Leone that communities impacted most by violence during the war were
more likely than communities not impacted “to attend community meetings…join local
political and community groups, and…vote” (Bellows and Miguel 2009, 1145). The most
conflict-affected communities had higher levels of civic engagement and thus higher
potential for collective efficacy, or communal capacity to contain and regulate intergroup conflict (Sampson and Wikstrom 2008). Communities often bear the highest costs
of violence, which may create incentives for civilians to develop collective solutions to
reduce insecurity.
In short, this approach suggests crisis may help communities overcome collective
action dilemmas and adopt new strategies for preventing violence. In line with this logic,
many arguments about the efficacy of civic associations claim prior experience in
organizing preventive responses increases the likelihood of future success. A primary
assumption of Varshney’s theory is that prior organizational experience creates social
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frameworks that then serve as platforms for mitigating conflict between ethnic groups
before it escalates (Varshney 2002). In other words, under conditions of state fragility,
civic organizations develop skill sets that, over time, allow for more effective preventive
action. Local coping and the formation of informal institutions may lead to stronger intercommunity ties, and strategic innovations that can dampen violence. In sum, this
approach suggests state fragility creates conditions for resilience via the strengthening of
civic groups and informal institutional arrangements.
Variation across the Kenya context allows for examination of this claim,
especially in areas where collective efforts of local organizations were successful in
containing prior inter-group conflicts in the past, but then violence re-escalated (see,
chapter 5). For example, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee is cited
commonly as a case of successful civic-led prevention (Menkhaus 2008; Odendaal 2013).
However, violence re-escalated in the region in 2012 and 2014. Varshney’s theory does
not account for factors that can cause well-organized civic coalitions to fail to contain
violence, even after they have been successful in the past (Meagher 2012).
The Kenya context indicates even the strongest and most effective civil society
groups may face critical limitations, which indicates a gap in knowledge related to scope
conditions for effective violence prevention through non-state organizational structures.
Civic groups may be able to contain some types of violence yet not others. Civic groups
also may be prone to threat – response dilemmas similar to state-level policy makers
(George and Holl 1997). Even with adequate information about possible threats, civic
groups may not have adequate incentives to take risks necessary to preemptively
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intervene in local conflicts. Moreover, in some cases, state elites may directly work to
undermine the capacity of civic associations. Ethiopia’s Charities and Societies
Proclamation, for instance, does not allow local organizations to share information
openly about local conflict dynamics, which has implications for peacebuilding efforts
along the Kenya – Ethiopia border (see, chapter five). In other cases, previously effective
civic association break down following state-led policing or military interventions that
use indiscriminant violence against communities.
Overall, non-state actors and civic associations have a broad range of tools that
may contain escalation and limit the spread of collective violence in some cases, but fail
to do so in others. It is not clear what causes such broad variation in the extent to which
civic associations may or may not prove capable of containing conflict. In any given
conflict setting, some civic organizations may have more capacity than others to
coordinate effective interventions to contain escalation. The track record of civic
organizations is not perfect, and prior success does not ensure future success. The Kenya
context provides a large range of cases in which to assess the relative efficacy of different
civic coalitions and preventive interventions, as well as the factors that hinder effective
preventive responses.
Informal Institutions, Ethnic Conflict, and Communal Adaptation
A third school of thought in the literature claims the principal conditions that
affect patterns of inter-ethnic group violence are not related to the state’s ability to police,
or civic associations’ ability to build peace, but to informal institutional arrangements
specific to particular conflict settings. Informal institutions are unwritten conventions or
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codes of behavior that evolve over time (see, North 1990). As Helmke and Levitsky state,
informal institutions22 are, “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created,
communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and
Levitsky 2004, 727). For example, in some communities in Northern Kenya, following
deadly clashes elders negotiate communal restitution or “blood payments” to support
aggrieved communities and reduce the likelihood of violent retribution (Chopra 2009).
Context-specific institutions at the communal level of analysis may impact whether or not
violence escalates.
This theoretical perspective contradicts the bulk of research on ethnic conflict that
focuses on formal institutional arrangements for containing inter-ethnic group conflict
(Horowitz 1985; Posner 2005; Laitin 2007). Assessment of formal institutions overlooks
informal customs, traditions, or adaptive rule systems that may create disincentives for
violence within inter-ethnic group conflicts. Informal institutional arrangements tend to
result from communal adaptation to high levels of human insecurity. Menkhaus, for
instance, states, “local communities are not passive in the face of state failure and
insecurity, but instead adapt in a variety of ways to minimize risk and increase
predictability in their dangerous environments” (Raeymaekers, Menkhaus, and
Vlassenroot 2008, 75). This is the fundamental assumption of what Meagher coins the
“strength of weak states premise” (Meagher 2012)— vulnerable communities, in some
cases, may be as innovative and strategic as armed militias. Communities may adapt

22

In Helmke and Levitsky’s conceptual orientation, informal institutions are rooted in “shared
expectations” rather than “shared values,” which means they may or may not be rooted in culture. Culture
might “reinforce or undermine particular informal institutions” (727).
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preventive, informal institutions to maximize protection and reduce the likelihood of
collective violence (Hesselbein, Golooba-Mutebi, and Putzel 2006).
The concept of preventive adaptation is most common in research on
environmental vulnerability (Taylor and Mackenzie 1992; Eriksen, Brown, and Kelly
2005; Eriksen and Lind 2009). However, the concept has important implications for the
study of sub-state ethnic conflict. As McAdam states, “lacking [formally]
institutionalized power, challengers devise techniques that offset their powerlessness”
(McAdam 1983, 735). Conceptually, adaptation focuses on context specific protection
strategies and informal rule systems that communities devise for protection under
conditions of insecurity, the threat of violence from ethnic competitors, and the absence
of state security (Hesselbein, Golooba-Mutebi, and Putzel 2006).
There is evidence for communal adaptation in periphery regions in Somalia and
Somaliland leading to informal institutional arrangements that contain inter-ethnic group
conflict. In particular, elders and religious authorities collaborated with militia leaders to
form informal policing units, enact customary modes of conflict resolution, and even
provide basic public services within conflict-affected communities (Menkhaus 2008). In
these cases, traditional authorities, including elders and imams, devised new informal
institutional arrangements to resolve inter-group conflicts. This had a dampening effect
on inter-group violence even in the absence for formal security and justice institutions.
Ayittey and Meagher find evidence of similar outcomes in South Sudan and Nigeria—
indigenous institutions serve as the foundation for the emergence of new community
protection systems that improve resilience to violence (Ayittey 2006; Meagher 2012).
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The literature on peacebuilding, therefore, generally indicates there is a positive
relationship between informal institutions and communal resilience (Edwards 1985;
Malan 1997; Boege 2006). Supporters of the so-called post-liberal peace paradigm argue
local, informal conflict resolution approaches are more effective than external, formal
approaches for preventing violence within traditional societies. Richmond, Kumar, and
Chandler, for instance, claim indigenous conflict prevention practices play critical and
under-analyzed roles in preventing inter-group violence (Richmond 2010; Kumar 2011;
Richmond and Mitchell 2011; Chandler 2013). Murithi, MacGinty, and Akinwale present
case study evidence from local peace processes in Ghana, Nigeria, and South Sudan to
support this theory (Murithi 2008; MacGinty 2008; Akinwale 2010).
In the absence of effective and legitimate state institutions in largely ungoverned
periphery regions, traditional conflict mediation processes may play important roles in
determining whether or not conflict escalates following initial acts of inter-group
violence (Hydén 2006). Traditional conflict resolution processes commonly provide
groups with access to channels for bargaining outside of corrupt, inefficient, and high
cost justice systems common across Sub-Saharan Africa. Customs and codes of behavior
embedded in community-level social expectations about compensation, fairness, and
social support for communities affected by violence may dampen stabilize inter-ethnic
relations and reduce the likelihood of escalation.
Conflict resolution scholars argue the unique qualities of traditional conflict
resolution processes lead to more positive outcomes than mediation processes led by
external state-based peacebuilding organizations or INGOs. Theoretically, rather than
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using coercive pressures or threats to get conflict actors to the negotiation table,
traditional modes of mediation tend to rely upon elders as legitimate local authorities and
trusted conflict mediators (Rothchild 1995; Zartman 2000; Lederach 2012). Buur and
Kyed, for example, argue state-led peace processes are often short-term and ad hoc,
whereas traditional peace processes are long-term and based on consensus building.
Elder-led peace processes, they suggest, are more effective than state-led processes
because they use legitimate rules for negotiation and have high levels of communal
participation and inclusivity. These qualities of traditional peacebuilding may increase
the stability of local agreements (Buur and Kyed 2007).
In Lederach’s terms, elders play critical roles in containing inter-ethnic group
violence because they are able to function as “insider-partial” mediators. Elders tend to
have personal stakes in conflict outcomes (Wehr and Lederach 1991). The insider partial
concept aligns with Fearon and Laitin’s theory of interethnic cooperation. Elders and
traditional conflict mediators may function as powerful information brokers with,
“specialized knowledge of actors, members, and personality types within the group”
(Fearon and Laitin 1996, 731). Local information brokers play significant roles in
reducing uncertainty following conflict triggers, often decreasing the probability of
escalation.
Communal adaptation and the emergence of context-specific informal
institutional arrangements, therefore, are plausible explanations for why conflict escalates
in some cases, but not others. Ethno-specific peacebuilding institutions or context
specific preventive adaptations may affect whether or not armed actors choose to escalate
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conflict. Analysis of the relationship between communal adaptation and patterns of
conflict escalation, therefore, is a key level of analysis for the study.
The literature on traditional conflict resolution and informal institutions has
critics. Similar to civil society theories, the primary unresolved debate is related to scope
conditions. In particular, to what extent can traditional, informal peace processes, or
“local infrastructures for peace,” (Lederach 2012) contain modern forms of violence and
inter-ethnic group conflict? Recent research on conflict dynamics in Kenya, in particular,
suggests that informal institutions and customary modes of conflict prevention may no
longer function as effective controls or checks against violence.
Prior research on conflict dynamics in Kenya challenges the assumptions of the
strength of weak states premise. In contrast to a broad set of literature on indigenous
peace processes, Adano and Wittsenberg argue traditional modes of conflict prevention
often fail to contain modern processes of inter-group conflict in periphery regions. The
actual contribution of informal conflict prevention processes maybe overstated (Adano et
al. 2012). For example, Duffield, Boege and Chapman argue traditional conflict
resolution practices are increasingly ineffective. Heavily armed, highly cohesive youth
militias no longer follow traditional codes of conduct or respond to traditional forms of
social authority (Duffield 1997; Mkutu 2001; Turton 2003; Boege 2006; Chapman and
Kagaha 2009).
From this perspective, elders once had control over youth militias and consistently
helped limit the use of indiscriminant violence. Elders shared experience with militias on
assessing threats, effective scouting, and calculating low-risk opportunities for defensive
45

attacks or acts of banditry. However, the integration and rapid modernization of periphery
regions, the proliferation of small arms, increasingly severe human insecurity, and the
emergence of powerful warlords with wealthy patrons living outside of conflict zones
may, in fact, undermine the effectiveness of informal and traditional modes of conflict
prevention.
In short, some analysts claim the experience of elders used to be a check against
indiscriminant acts of violence. Now, however, young warlords have more wealth and
power than elders, making militias more likely to use indiscriminant violence against
rival out-groups to increase power, territorial control, and wealth. Without the control of
elders, heavily armed youth, with little experience in warfare, may be more likely to use
deadly force to steal resources from rival ethnic groups, even killing women and children
in the process. These acts of violence may increase the likelihood of escalation. They are
less calculated, more deadly, and an affront to traditional cultural norms about how
violence should be used, and who or who should not be a target. From this perspective,
the state may be necessary for solving the enforcement dilemma (Brosché and Elfversson
2012). Without the state acting as a third party and threatening to use violence to enforce
local pacts, informal institutions may have very little power to affect patterns of
escalation (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim 1994).
Many analysts of conflict dynamics in Northern Kenya follow this logic. Mirzeler
and Young, inter alia, claim pastoralist warfare has become a capitalistic form of
resource extraction. Rising prices for livestock and land drive groups to use increasing
severe forms of violence against ethnic out-groups for individual economic benefit
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(Krätli, Swift, and England 1999; Bates 1999; Mkutu 2001; Mirzeler and Young 2000).
In other words, leaders of militia groups in the periphery are modern robber barons
(Collier 2000). Violence escalates when ethnic militias choose to target neighboring
communities for personal gain, putting their own communities at risk of further violence.
This theory suggests marginal returns are higher for militia groups with more weapons,
less aversion to the use of deadly violence, and less attachment to the larger ethnic
community. Escalating inter-group violence, from this perspective, is the outcome of
rational maximizing, economic behavior among militias trying to maintain and gain
wealth in periphery regions (Gelsdorf, Maxwell, and Mazurana 2012).
The same logic informs a recent wave of small arms research across Northern
Kenya and other ungoverned areas of fragile states in Sub-Saharan Africa (Mkutu 2003;
Weiss 2004; SRIC 2006; Ndungu 2009; Wepundi 2012). This line of research is based on
the assumption that the proliferation of small arms is a key explanation for escalation.
Cameron et al. state, “Since the availability of modern firearms, [informal] processes for
mitigating escalation have become eroded, causalities have become higher, and cycles of
revenge, often indiscriminate, have become more common” (Cameron, Weatherbed, and
Onyiego 2013, 4). Modern forms of pastoralist violence and new forms of weapon
technology provide ethnic groups with more power to threaten the existence of other
groups leading to increasingly severe ethnic security dilemmas (Mirzeler and Young
2000).
This narrative, however, may not be accurate, especially based on the logic of
restraint within inter-ethnic group conflicts. The presence of advanced weapons
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technology in traditional pastoralist societies may limit the deadliness of inter-ethnic
attacks and reduce the likelihood of escalation. With advanced weapons, youth militias
become smaller and more risk averse, with knowledge that potential enemy groups are
also well armed (Eaton 2008a). In other words, even if customary forms of authority are
not as capable of controlling youth militias, the proliferation of more and more modern
weapons may restrain ethnic militias from using violent force by increasing fear among
armed groups of the consequences of escalating violence. This logic aligns closely with
prior studies of escalation that contend internal calculations of the potential cost of
violence to armed actors affect whether or not conflict escalates (Zartman 1989; Zartman
2001; Morgan et al. 2008, 34 – 36).
Overall, the literature on informal institutions serves as the foundation for analysis
of how community level adaptations may affect the actions of youth militias following
violent attacks, and thus affect patterns of conflict escalation. In many conflict settings
formal institutions have very little influence upon the daily lives of citizens, leaving
informal institutional arrangements as the most important rule systems shaping intergroup interactions (Chirot and McCauley 2010). Informal institutions remain critical for
understanding patterns of conflict.
Whether or not unique forms of communal adaptation and customary mechanisms
for conflict prevention contain escalation requires further investigation (MacGinty 2008).
In particular, local adaptation may include forms of tactical innovation to increase the
capacity of local militias to use or threaten to use deadly force as the primary foundation
or communal resilience, rather than non-coercive strategies, such as traditional conflict
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resolution processes, preventive bargaining and informal pacts, or informal codes of
restitution.
Assessing State, Civic, and Communal Responses to Local Conflicts
Across the three sets of literature, the key unresolved problems are all related to
scope conditions. When do state actions accelerate or contain local, inter-ethnic group
conflict? To what extent do informal communal protection strategies accelerate or
contain conflict? In particular, there is a lack of clarity on the conditions under which
civic may or may not have the capacity to contain forms of inter-group violence that
presently affect communities in ungoverned periphery regions.
Explaining why some conflicts escalate and others requires addressing state
actions, civic coalitions, and informal communal adaptation. These three concepts justify
a levels-of-analysis approach to study patterns of escalation across various conflict
settings. The approach also aligns with Carment and James’ insight that, “ethnic conflicts
are multifaceted and dynamic phenomena. The analysis of ethnic conflict should focus on
the development of models based on theories of multiple causation” (Carment and James
1996, 1). Similarly, Straus proposes that the study of ethnic violence should clearly
articulate the ways in which processes of, “escalation and restraint can be seen to work in
tandem” (Straus 2012, 345). Conditions that restrain escalation, and the factors that
breakdown and undermine restraints are as critical for understanding process of interethnic violence as the core drivers.
As the conceptual basis for structured, focused comparison, in each case, after the
initial outbreak of conflict, patterns of response related to state actors, civic
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organizations, and communal adaptations are addressed, and then linked to conflict
outcomes. Based upon the conceptual framework outlined, the following questions are
the foundation for empirical inquiry across the cases:
1.

Following an initial outbreak of violence, how did local civic associations
respond to the incident? What were the effects, if any, on the subsequent
process of conflict escalation or restraint?

•

What, if anything, happened after the initial conflict between the groups?

•

Is there evidence that local, civic, and/or state responses restrained conflict
actors from engaging in further attacks, or resolving the initial conflict
trigger? Or, is there evidence that responses contributed, in meaningful
ways, to the continuation of conflict and further acts of violence?

•

Is there evidence that particular types of responses were more or less
effective than others in resolving the crisis following the initial outbreak
of conflict?

More specifically, the proposed causal mechanisms, key conditions, and
interactive effects mapped out in the section above for explaining escalation or nonescalation are analyzed within each episode, using questions that reflect the most critical
set of factors and interactions.
2.

How did conflict actors react to preventive responses? What were
particular courses of action that followed? Why did the conflict escalate,
or not escalate?
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•

What actions did local associations in the area undertake in response to the
initial outbreak of conflict? To what extent did civic associations
cooperate while engaging in preventive responses?

•

Was the coalition of local peacebuilding organizations able to maintain
cohesiveness and stability following the outbreak of violence? Was the
coalition of actors able to maintain cohesiveness and stability following
state intervention?

•

Was the coalition able to support community actors in using non-coercive
strategies to respond to violence? What types of bargaining processes were
initiated, and to what effect?

•

Did the state deploy security forces in response to communal violence, or
not? Did state actors elect to cooperate with particular civic groups within
the local peace coalition, or not?

•

Is there evidence of militias adopting new strategies in relation to
particular state actions? Did state actions undermine or compliment local
approaches to the conflict?

Regarding the problem of how to compare a broad range of strategies for
containing local inter-group conflict, Rothchild proposes a typology distinguishing
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coercive from non-coercive modes of state response (Rothchild 1995).23 The two
categories, with minor amendments, provide a framework for analysis of the state, civic,
and communal responses to violence. After conflict occurs, actors typically respond with
coercive or non-coercive measures to attempt to contain escalation.
Conceptually, structural prevention strategies are employed prior to the outbreak
of crisis to try to deal with root drivers of conflict. Categories of structural preventive
strategies include early warning, preventive diplomacy, sanctions, inducements, and
military force. Operational prevention strategies are employed following a crisis. The
main types of operational preventive action include mediation, messaging, and assistance
(Carnegie Commission 1998). The following typology of preventive actions derived from
the literature on conflict prevention in general and conflict prevention in Africa,
specifically, serves as a tool for identification and comparative analysis of various types
of strategies used by different actors to contain violence across cases in Northern Kenya.

23

Rothchild conceptualizes bargaining as the opposite of violence. Violence eliminates all opportunities for
group bargaining and imposes the will of one group for control over another. From this perspective,
limiting escalation requires securing opportunities for inter-ethnic group bargaining and negotiation. The
key causal mechanism Rothchild identifies that contains violence is the “moral norm of reciprocity.” Where
groups share this norm, it operates as the foundation for inter-group bargains and conflict reduction, but
without this shared norm, extreme fear emerges increasing the likelihood of violence (Rothchild 1995).
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Table 2: Types of Preventive Action
Level of
Analysis
State

Coercive

Non-coercive

Outcomes

•
•
•

Sanctions
Inducements
Police/Military
Force

•
•
•

Messaging
Mediation
Assistance

•
•
•

Escalate
Contain
Re-escalate

Civic

•
•
•

Sanctions
Inducements
Militia Support

•
•
•

Messaging
Mediation
Assistance

•
•
•

Escalate
Contain
Re-escalate

Local

•
•
•

Sanctions
Inducements
Militia Force

•
•
•

Messaging
Mediation
Assistance

•
•
•

Escalate
Contain
Re-escalate

Coalitions and Conflict Trajectories
While there are multiple theories relating a broad spectrum of potential causes of
escalation or restraint within communal conflicts, the study proposes a narrow set of
specific factors and scope conditions to explain why violence escalates in some cases but
not others. The following section proposes a theory to explain variation across conflict
cases that share a high risk of escalating under conditions of sub-state fragility.

Logic of Escalation in Fragile Settings
The core features of conflicts within periphery settings that make violence likely
to escalate between groups are as follows. Following a deadly attack, a targeted group
faces a critical decision juncture: to use coercive or non-coercive means to respond to
acts of aggression. Not responding at all puts the group at risk of further threats, and high
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levels of poverty undermine the capacity of group to absorb the loss of property.24 Noncoercive response, or, more specifically, initiating a process of bargaining and conflict
mediation with an assumed culprit, requires sending emissaries to acquire adequate
information about the identity of culprits, their location, and motivations.25
In remote periphery regions with limited state presence, the risks associated with
initiating mediation processes are significant. Emissaries sent to negotiate may be
targeted by attackers or other armed groups operating in the region, or even threatened or
targeted by civilian actors within the out-group community committed to protecting the
identity of armed actors (see also, Eaton 2008b).
Indirect means of attaining information following an attack are also high risk.
Attaining information through personal relationships risks causing a contact to risk ingroup trust, or, at worse, face the threat of violence for sharing information with an outgroup. In areas where ethnic communities are highly skilled in protecting the individual
identity of armed assailants following acts of aggression, violence is increasingly likely
to escalate between ethnic groups. Uncertainty surrounding the identity of individual
culprits increases the likelihood of indiscriminate violence against an entire group.
Considering the high risk associated with pursuing and gathering accurate
information necessary to initiate a bargaining process following a deadly attack,
indiscriminant violence against proximate members of the rival ethnic group becomes a
lower risk option for deterring further acts of aggression. Absent channels for bargaining

24

Asfaw Kumsaa, UNCRD, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 18, 2014.

25

Halkano Bukuno, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 21, 2014.
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with ethnic militias and their intermediaries, aggrieved groups are more likely to engage
in acts of organized violence against members of the opposition identity group who were
not directly involved in the initial act of violence.

Cohesive Coalitions
Cohesive civic associations may support preventive actions that alter this logic,
and thus reduce the likelihood of escalation. Providing secure spaces and opportunities
for groups to negotiate informal rules for compensation and restitution is a key
mechanism for containing and preventing escalatory dynamics. Local coalitions may
increase access to conflict information, increase access to platforms for inter-group
bargaining, and provide support for non-coercive communal protection strategies at the
village-level. Cohesion, building from Pearlman’s conceptual framework, includes two
observable characteristics, including unified local civic leaders, and the presence of
institutions, formal or informal, with clearly articulated and accepted rules for conflict
prevention (Pearlman 2011; Pearlman and Cunningham 2012).
Effective coordination of preventive action does not have to be institutionalized,
such as in formal District Peace Committee systems, but can be highly informal and
action based. Unity among diverse civic associations and effective preventive action may
occur where groups organize and mobilize around shared interests. Prevention capacity,
therefore, depends upon alignment among multiple civic associations around a particular
cause, or upon alignment with resisting the threat of attack from a particular violent actor.
Where informal coalitions of civic organization improve threat monitoring, provide
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platforms for inter-group bargaining and pact making, and enforce informal codes of
restitution, violence may be less likely to escalate.
Hypotheses
•

Escalation is less likely when a cohesive coalition of civic groups is
present.

•

Escalation is more likely when a coalition of civic groups is not present.

•

Escalation is more likely when a coalition of civic groups breaks down.

Informal coalitions of local civic groups, including CBOs, FBOs, LPCs, elders’
networks, and youth militia leaders, inter alia, can, in some cases, prevent escalation.
Coalitions restrain violence escalation by engagement in coordination of preventive
actions including monitoring, threat response, routinized negotiation, immediate crisis
response, and limiting interference and meddling by external actors interested in
exacerbating conflict for economic or political gain. When coalitions break down and
become fragmented, monitoring is limited, crisis response is not rapid or adequate to
restrain mobilization for retribution, and external meddling is more likely.
Coalitions provide local actors working to protect communities with more complex
institutional platforms for inter-ethnic group bargaining. Different types of civic
associations engage in different types of bargaining processes, such as faith-based
reconciliation strategies, or local peace institutions and inter-group dialogues. While
approaches may vary in strategies for conflict prevention, in the absence of crosscutting
civil society organizations, these processes, at least, increase opportunities for bargaining
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and informal pact making between armed groups. Cohesive coalitions allow for the
proliferation of platforms for inter-group bargaining, which can limit escalation.

Scope Conditions
In areas of limited statehood, local, informal coalitions help to routinize
monitoring and bargaining processes. However, as mentioned above, even under
conditions of state fragility the actions of representatives of the state can impact coalition
cohesion and stability. In line with the logic described above, state responses to outbreaks
of communal violence may either undermine or compliment coalition cohesion. Proposed
scope conditions include the use of indiscriminant force by police and military forces and
symbolic acts of violence. These two conditions may undermine preventive efforts of
civic organizations and create windows for conflict escalation.
Hypotheses
•

Escalation is more likely when coercive state responses cause local
peacebuilding coalitions to collapse.

•

Escalation is less likely when state responses strengthen and compliment
local coalitions.

Political and economic interests condition state responses to local violence. The
value of an area for particular state development strategies, political support and
mobilization, and national security interests shape state responses to outbreaks of
communal violence in any given locality. These interests impact not only whether or not
the state will respond, but also how it will respond to initial outbreaks of inter-ethnic
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group conflict. Whether or not the state uses coercive or non-coercive tactics to contain
local violence, I argue, is shaped by the following logic. Investment in, and the
deployment of, well-trained security actors in remote periphery areas is very high cost.
Choosing to work through local voluntary institutions and informal coalitions already
established at the local level is very low cost, even if potentially sub-optimal in terms of
ensuring a monopoly over violence. Security outcomes may not fully improve by
channeling state support and resources to local civic organizations, but state actors may
choose sub-optimal behaviors during processes of coping with high levels of uncertainty
and insecurity.

Conclusion
Within literature related to containing local ethnic violence, the majority of
theories situate agency for whether or not collective violence occurs at the level of the
state, with political elites, or with militias. These approaches operate under the
assumption that armed actors are most innovative and important actors to determine when
outbreaks of mass armed violence will or will not occur within an ethnic conflict.
However, dynamics of restraint may counteract state actions, elite actions, or the actions
of armed militias are not well accounted for. In some cases, civic associations may be as
well organized as armed actors in developing strategies to contain acts of violence.
Prior studies have identified a range of potential contributions of civilian actors
and organizations to process of violence restraint. However, this study advances the
literature on civil society and ethnic violence by articulating key conditions that can both
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support or undermine communal peace actions. In short, prior research over-exaggerates
state fragility, under-exaggerates the capacity of communities to adapt and develop
unique informal organizational arrangements to contain conflict, and largely overlooks
critical interactive effects between state actions, informal coalitions, and local adaptation
in shaping conflict trajectories.
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CHAPTER TWO: ETHNIC IDENTITY AND INSECURITY IN MODERNIZING
KENYA

To contextualize the conflicts under assessment in chapters three, four, and five,
the following chapter analyzes the dynamics of ethnic conflict and conflict prevention
strategies employed throughout different periods of Kenya’s history. The broader context
of Kenya as a developmental state is related to the informal organizational structures in
place to contain local violence. Historically, marginalization of the northern periphery
region was, in part, a measure to contain conflict between pastoralist and agriculturalist
ethnic groups. Long-term marginalization, however, created conditions conducive to substate fragility, high levels of human insecurity, and relatively high levels of armed
violence across a broad region with limited state presence. In the post-independence
period, the erosion of state legitimacy led to the mobilization of ethnic militias for
communal protection, and the emergence of a broad array of civic organizations that
function as primary providers of security and basic public goods across Northern Kenya.
Over the past seven years, changes in the regional political economy have led to a
policy reversal, with the state investing in and supporting the formation of more
formalized peacebuilding institutions across Northern Kenya. However, even though
there is a new set of formal institutions in place, communities continue to rely upon
diverse configurations of non-state organizations, community leaders, elders, and
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informal security actors who are not constitutionally mandated to provide local security.
As James N’dungu describes, “there are a lot of new rules on the books for conflict
prevention, but when you really look at how communities interact with the state to
govern local conflicts, the rules are quite different.”26 Contextual dynamics, specific to
Northern Kenya, affect both conflict dynamics and the efficacy of local peacebuilding
efforts.
State Formation and Sub-state Fragility
Ethnic fragmentation remains a persistent feature of Kenya’s post-colonial
political economy. Political and economic change generated conditions conducive for
inter-ethnic group conflicts. Political elites used monetary handouts, land allocation, and
even infrastructure, education, and health projects to secure support from particular
ethnic groups for the formation of dominant ethnic coalitions (Barkan 2012). There is
corresponding evidence that political elites, in order to maintain control of the state
apparatus, directly coordinated attacks against ethnic groups aligned with opposition
political coalitions (Branch 2011).
Identity-based cleavages persist in Kenya due to a long history of political
violence and prebendalism.27 Ethnic-based state resource allocation sustains social
cleavages even during larger processes of rapid modernization and democratization. In
Ruth Aluoch’s terms, “the success of any given community, economically, is tied to its
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James N’dungu, Saferworld, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 8, 2014.
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Prebendalism is Richard Joseph’s term. The concept describes political regimes in which state
representatives use government resources to benefit co-ethnic supporters (Joseph 1983).
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level of access to political power.”28 The following section maps the most persistent
social cleavages across Kenya, along with the policies various regimes employed to
contain inter-group conflicts that erupted under pressures related to state formation and
economic integration.
Colonial Strategies for Containing Local Violence
State formation in Kenya has a long history with roots in the Berlin Conference
and the Scramble for Africa in 1885. As early as 1895, the East Africa Company
constructed railroads to open the territory for economic development, which led to a mass
influx of European settlers starting in 1907 and the establishment of plantations and
ranches for large-scale agricultural production (Lonsdale 1977). During the first stage of
colonization over 350,000 Europeans, mostly from Great Britain, immigrated to Kenya.
A large majority of the population settled in the Central Highlands, the primary territory
of the Kikuyu (see map below). With European settlement concentrated in the Central
Highlands, government institutions also concentrated in the area. The first colonial
government called the Legislative Council maintained links between London and
Nairobi, and constructed bureaucratic structures to provide basic public goods, including
jails, schools, and livestock and agricultural management boards (Anderson 1986).
In contrast, in Northern Kenya, then called the Northern Frontier District (NFD),
the government established scattered military and administrative posts. The territory was
officially set apart as a “closed district.” Bureaucratic structures remained weak with little
authority, capacity, and legitimacy, especially among highly mobile pastoralist ethnic
28

Ruth Aluoch, NSC, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 24, 2013.
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groups. Without formal boundaries to determine the limits of state control, authority was
based on the extension of colonial military capacity (Herbst 2000). Within the regional
political context, the NFD was a buffer zone to prevent the expansion of the Ethiopian
empire under Menelik II (Zartman 1989, 114 – 118). British military posts across the
North functioned as an informal border defense to protect Kenya from Italian interests in
expanding the territory of Ethiopia southward (Fratkin and Roth 2006, 40).
Under these conditions, early writers called Northern Kenya a bandits kingdom
(Farson 1953). During this period, colonial authorities employed coercive, and in
Berman’s terms, terror-like tactics against civilian populations to project authority and
prevent inter-group conflict and violent clashes (Lonsdale 1977; Lonsdale and Berman
1979; Berman 1992). The British military imposed order through the use of coercive
force, or what the military called punitive expeditions. State-sanctioned violence against
pastoralist ethnic groups was a component of the early state formation processes. The
military threatened pastoralist groups, took livestock as a form of taxation, punished and
shamed of local leaders accused of involvement in attacks, and assassinated local leaders
who resisted colonial authorities (Berman and Lonsdale 1992).
Not all colonial governance strategies used coercive measures as the basis for
control, however. For groups such as the Turkana, Somali, Borana, Gabra, Rendille, and
Samburu there was a high level of encouragement of nomadic movement. In many areas
of Northern Kenya, the government established group ranches to separate conflicting
pastoralist groups. As long as pastoralist groups paid taxes, engaged in minimal intergroup conflict, and remained within the borders of designated grazing areas, the colonial
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government did not intervene (Fratkin and Roth 2006). In some cases, arrests and public
hearings were used to try suspected criminals. For example, as early as 1909, building
upon traditional rules of conflict resolution, the Collective Punishment Ordinance
required groups, as a whole, to pay for crimes of individuals from that group (Anderson
1986). This institution persists today within multiple local peace agreements and
customary codes of restitution.
Historical records describe colonial leaders’ interest in protecting the traditional
pastoralist lifestyle (Kochore 2013). This indicates an early motivation to protect
indigenous cultures and pastoralist livelihoods that were under threat from nascent
modernization and industrialization. This motive, however, contradicts early records of
administrators’ views toward the region. In archived letters from the period,
administrators posted to the NFD complained they were assigned positions as “museum
curators” rather than “civilized administrators” (Kochore 2013). In some cases, colonial
administrators were sent to government outposts such as, North Horr, Marsabit, Archer’s
Post, and Loiyangalani on Lake Turkana as a form of political exile. The areas had very
harsh living and working conditions compared to urbanizing town centers in the central
highlands.
An economic logic also shaped the colonial governance strategy for the region. The
projection of military authority protected the agricultural center from pastoralist groups.
The North was not viable for large-scale agricultural production, and thus not worth the
cost of investing in the development of bureaucratic structures needed to extract
economic resources (see also, Boone 2003). To maximize agricultural resource
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extraction, pastoralist groups were cordoned off within the closed frontier district to
protect more fertile land. The closed district designation prevented pastoralists from
migrating southward to more arable lands where European settlers had large-scale
agricultural schemes, especially in the fertile Mt. Kenya central highlands. As Rothchild
describes, a structure of European settler privilege shaped the deep and persistent coreperiphery cleavage in Kenya (Rothchild 1973). The early state structure served the
interests of European settlers, and prioritized the interests of a particular, foreign ethnic
group over the interests of indigenous groups.
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Figure 2: Kenya Ethnicity and Dialect Map29

Source: New World Encyclopedia 2015

29

Source: New World Encyclopedia, 2015. Available at:
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/File:Kenya_Dialect_map.jpg
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Overall, the structure of the early colonial state, and the nature of patron-client
relationships between colonists and indigenous groups set up conditions for inter-ethnic
group inequality. With the central highlands as the most productive region of the country,
following independence, European settlers allocated the most valuable land and
productive resources to the Kikuyu community. The Kikuyu community, therefore, had
greater initial access to state resources, educational opportunities, and capital not
available to other ethnic groups, especially compared to pastoralist groups of the northern
periphery.
These initial conditions created overlapping class and ethnic-based social divisions
across the country, or, in Stewart’s terms, deep horizontal inequalities (Stewart 2000;
Stewart 2008). The Kikuyu, over time, comprised the dominant elite based on access to
the most fertile land, early government capacity, and political control over the allocation
of both land and state resources. Targeting of Kikuyus across Kenya in 2007-2008 was
rooted within long-standing grievances among ethnic groups related to early colonial
structures.
Overall, colonial policies set up conditions for persistent inter-ethnic group
divisions and conflict over access to political power. At the same time, they set up the
pastoralist periphery as the most underdeveloped and marginalized area of the country.
With few roads, schools, and local government services human security30 is persistently
under great threat for the Samburu, Turkana, Pokot, Rendille, Gabra, Borana, Garre,
Murule, and Degodia communities of Northern Kenya. Under these conditions of sub30

For assessment of the relationship been human insecurity and inter-group conflict, see: (Kumssa, Jones,
and Williams 2009).
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state fragility, ethnic militias have proliferated to secure highly mobile, highly valuable
communal resources under harsh environmental conditions.

Opening a Closed District
The transition to independence in Kenya was less violent than many other
decolonization processes across Sub-Saharan Africa and other colonial states (Horowitz
1985, 4 – 6). Even though decolonization did not directly trigger mass ethnic violence,
the transition was intertwined with the Mau, Mau rebellion from 1952 – 1956 and the
Shifta War, from 1963 – 1967 (see, Branch 2009). In 1952, the Mau Mau, a Kikuyu
insurgent group, attacked British settlers in control of the largest and most fertile farming
areas around Mt. Kenya and Meru. During the same time period, Jomo Kenyatta was a
key leader of the Kenya African Union (KAU), a nonviolent independence movement.
Initially, colonial authorities presumed Jomo Kenyatta was a supporter of the Mau Mau
movement and thus imprisoned. He was later released in 1961.
In response to the Mau Mau insurgency, British authorities coordinated a military
campaign with over 15,000 troops (Barkan 2012). There is disagreement among
historians around the severity of the Mau Mau conflict and the number of fatalities.
Official documents from the colonial government indicate that there were 11,503
fatalities. David Andersen suggests 20,000 fatalities is a more accurate number
(Anderson 1986). Elkin’s archival work to get beyond official narratives and include
washed evidence finds that 70,000 or more people died during the conflict (Elkins 2005).
Eventually, the government defeated the Mau Mau in 1956 using extensive violence
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against civilians including mass detention camps and acts of torture to try to identify and
attain information about armed militias (see, Elkins 2005; Branch 2009).
Comparative research on the Mau Mau movement points toward a relationship
between local governance strategies and the escalation of inter-ethnic group conflict.
Mungeam’s research, for example, addresses the following puzzle: why did the Kikuyu
use violence against white colonial settlers, yet not the Maasai, who were a larger
majority group and well known for their warrior culture and military capacity (Mungeam
1970). He builds a case that the Kikuyu, as an agriculturalist ethnic group, had a different
standing relative to the projection of colonial authority than the Maasai, a pastoralist
ethnic group. The colonial government’s interest in the extraction of agricultural
resources caused the state to use more coercive and more violent state intervention in
agricultural areas, compared to pastoralist regions. Even though Maasai were better
organized for war than the Kikuyu, grievances against the colonial state were less severe
in the pastoralist periphery than in agricultural regions. In short, the violent Mau Mau
movement formed among the agriculturalist Kikuyu ethnic group due to deeper
grievances against the extractive and coercive colonial government structure.
After Jomo Kenyatta was released from prison in 1961, he became the first
president of the newly independent state in 1963. The process of independence in Kenya
triggered reformulation of state strategies for containing conflict in the northern
periphery. In 1962, one year prior to independence, the state established a new institution
called, the Northern Frontier District Commission. The Commission focused specifically
on the management of ethnic grievances and conflicts in the periphery during the political
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transition toward constitutional democracy. The primary challenge facing the commission
was a secessionist movement among Somali31 ethnic groups (Whittaker 2014). Public
sentiment among Somali ethnic groups across the NFD was in favor of territorial
secession from Kenya. Kenyan Somalis wanted the NFD to join greater Somalia.
However, in response to secessionist demands, in 1963, Jomo Kenyatta reportedly said,
quite harshly, “Let them pack their camels and go back to Somalia” (Kochore 2013).
The government did not grant Kenyan Somalis an opportunity for a popular
consultation on the issue of secession. The denial of autonomy triggered the escalation of
violence across the NFD. Starting in 1963, Somali shiftas attacked government posts. The
government response to shifta attacks included enforced sedentarization of pastoralist
communities and group detainment, the confinement livestock by the military, and
widespread civilian abuses to identify, track, and detain militants. The Shifta war lasted
from 1963 until 1967, when Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, led a team of
mediators that reached the Arusha Agreement (Thompson 2015).
Historians who analyzed the effects of state actions during the Shifta War found
that the conflict had a very deep and lasting impact on pastoralist communities across the
region. Communities in Northern Kenya still refer to the Shifta War as the “time of stop”
(Whittaker 2008). In an already fragile and marginalized environment, military
intervention destroyed all wealth in the area. The Shifta War exacerbated the process of
pastoralist sedentarization, and further undermined the livelihoods of pastoralist ethnic
groups (Fratkin and Roth 2006). There has not been another secessionist movement in
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Multiple Somali ethnic groups have resided for centuries within the current territory of the Kenyan state.
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Northern Kenya since the Shifta war. However, the war itself deepened the coreperiphery cleavage between the North and South and further undermined the legitimacy
of the GoK across the region.
Archival documents reveal Kenyan leaders referring to local political leaders from
Northern Kenya as “those secessionists.” The term shifta still operates as a slanderous
term against ethnic Kenyan Somali communities (Whittaker 2014). In terms of general
identity-based stereotypes, the North, to this day, remains, “the other Kenya,” and the
South, “the real Kenya” for most residents of the rural periphery. Ethnic groups in the
North have not formed an attachment to the larger Kenyan identity (Kisiangani 2014).
This condition is most severe in Northeastern Kenya, along the Somalia border. Somali
Kenyan youth were part of a major al-Shabaab attack against a University in Garissa,
Kenya in March 2015 (Sperber 2015). The rising rate of radicalism among pastoralist
youth, in general, and Kenyan Somali youth, in particular, is linked to the long history of
marginalization of Northern Kenya. Persistent grievances against both the state and
neighboring ethnic groups created pools of willing recruits for local ethnic militias, and,
more recently, for al-Shabaab.
Over the fifteen-year tenure of the Kenyatta regime, Kenya experienced rapid
economic growth. In general, most post-colonial states in Sub-Saharan Africa promoted
protectionism and socialist economic strategies. In contrast, the Kenyatta regime
maintained a high degree of economic openness and promoted a more liberal orientation
toward integration into the global economy. Liberal economic policy triggered rapid
economic growth, yet development concentrated in the Central Highlands and within
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urban centers. Critically, rapid economic development and urbanization did not reduce
ethnic fragmentation, as modernization theories predicted. Mazrui’s study of postindependence Kenya, for example, found that urbanization caused a decline in the
practice of unique ethnic rituals and customs, but “in the scramble for limited
opportunities and resources in cities and towns, the pull of ethnic loyalty has remained
strong. Ethnic behavior may have declined, but ethnic loyalty has remained strong”
(Mazrui 1998, 128).
For the Kenyatta regime, Northern Kenya had little to contribute to rapid
economic development. As a result, the area received minimal state investment and
public goods provision. This outcome aligns with Rothchild’s theory of ethnic bargaining
in developmental states. Outward looking national development policy tends to align with
the political marginalization of groups and regions with little capacity to contribute to
development of a modern market economy (Rothchild 1973). The direct categorization of
the Northern periphery as a “low potential area”32 correlated with a process of state
retreat (Kurimoto 1998). Government posts established under the colonial state were
abandoned and neglected during the Kenyatta regime, leaving the northern periphery with
even less contact with the center than during the colonial regime.
Under these conditions, leaders from principally agricultural regions had little
interest in allocating scarce government resources to rebuild defunct government
institutions and protect and support pastoralist livelihoods. Political elites from the
32

Low potential area is an official term within the, “Sessional paper No. 10 of 1965, African Socialism and
Its Application to Planning in Kenya,” which divided the country into “low” and “high potential” areas
(Kochore 2013). See, Government of Kenya (1965). Sessional paper No. 10 of 1965 African Socialism and
its Application to Planning in Kenya. Republic of Kenya, Nairobi.
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Central Highlands dominated the state system. Kikuyu elites under the Kenya African
National Union (KANU) controlled the first post-independence government. Technically,
Kenya was a democratic regime, but in practice, the regime was neopatrimonial
(Eisenstadt 1973; Erdmann and Engel 2007). In other words, political power consolidated
among a set of male political elites from the Kikuyu ethnic group, and state resources
were allocated to areas of the country where Kikuyu represented a majority of population
(Atieno-Odhiambo 2002). State support for education in the Kikuyu highlands, in
particular, set up conditions for Kikuyu dominance (Barkan 2012).
Directly after independence in 1963, the NFD remained an official no-go zone for
the government and outsiders. The government abolished the closed district policy in
1969. The end of the closed district policy impacted conflict dynamics across the region.
In many locations local elites and warlords controlled territory, while other pockets were
fully anarchic with no clear center of local authority. In particular, Kratli et al. describe
how the Northern periphery experienced rising levels of armed violence following the
end of the closed district policy. The state had authority over urban centers, but no
control over vast northern frontier (Herbst 2000). The introduction of outside interests,
cross-border dynamics, and large inflows of illegal arms increased tension and armed
violence between pastoralist groups in the region (Krätli, Swift, and England 1999).
With rising insecurity, the state had to develop a solution to prevent violence
among pastoralist groups from affecting and destabilizing the center (Stanislawski 2008).
New leaders of the state, therefore, faced a dilemma—how to govern an increasingly
insecure periphery with a lack of political legitimacy. The most severe inter-ethnic
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clashes occurred due to inter-ethnic group power imbalances. In situations where one
community with more weapons could overpower another community, violence escalated
rapidly. In response, the initial state solution was to restore and create an ethnic balance
of power among pastoralist ethnic groups through the allocation of arms to the Kenya
Police Reserves (KPR), also known as home guards.33 This informal policing strategy,
however, had unintended consequences. Arming citizens with no accountability to formal
policing institutions increased the availability of weapons across the area, and changed
the context of inter-ethnic conflict (Ndungu 2009). In sum, independence, the opening of
the North, and rising insecurity across a region with a high level of sub-state fragility
opened the door for, in Wulf’s terms, “outsourcing” peace and security functions to nonstate actors (Wulf 2005).

Ethnic Federalism and Local Violence
Following the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978, Daniel arap Moi assumed the
presidency. Regional conflict dynamics during the early years of Moi regime increased
pressures for inter-ethnic group conflict among pastoralist communities in Northern
Kenya. From 1978 – 1979, Idi Amin led Uganda into a short territorial war with
Tanzania. During the campaign, Amin received direct military support from Muamar
Qadahafi in Libya. Jackson and Rotberg, inter alia, argue the war was designed to divert
attention away from the increasing instability of Amin’s autocratic regime (Jackson and
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Following security reforms in 2010, the institution was renamed the National Police Reserves (NPR).
However, actors in Northern Kenya still refer to local informal police as KPR. For consistency, KPR is
used throughout the study.

74

Rotberg 1982). The regime collapsed very shortly after the failed war. In 1979, as
soldiers loyal to Amin fled from Uganda, they sold arms to pastoralist militias operating
along the Uganda—Kenya border. The collapse of the Amin regime, therefore, triggered
the first major wave of weapons proliferation across Northern Uganda and Northern
Kenya. The proliferation of weapons increased the intensity and deadliness of inter-ethnic
group clashes across what became known as the “Karamoja Conflict Cluster” (Mirzeler
and Young 2000).
Addressing the spike in inter-ethnic group conflict across the country, Moi
described ethnicity, “as the cancer that threatens to eat away the very fabric of our
nation” (Goffard 2012). During his tenure, however, inter-ethnic group tension and state
corruption were rife. The regime allocated state resources to particular ethnic groups to
consolidate political support and manipulated long standing inter-group grievances to
maintain access to power.
As Rothchild’s research suggests, ethnic bargaining remained the primary tool for
the maintenance of Moi’s hegemonic exchange regime—an authoritarian regime type
where the foundation of authority is based on elite-level ethnic pacts. This regime type
persisted across multiple African states even with the introduction of multi-party
democracy (Rothchild 1995). For example, Moi employed a political strategy to unify
previously disparate ethnic groups living in Western Kenya. Political elites emphasized
shared cultural attributes among the Keiyo, Kipsigis, Marakwet, Nandi, Pokot, Sabaot
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and Tugen to construct a large Kalenjin ethno-political identity (Lynch 2011; Branch
2011).34
The Kalenjin alliance flourished under the Moi presidency. State resources flowed
less to Kikuyu areas and more toward Kalenjin areas. Moi used the single-party state and
coercive tactics around electoral process to undermine and repress Luo and Kikuyu
opposition groups from contesting the regime (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 371). In some
cases, the state relocated entire Kalenjin groups to undeveloped areas in order to both
gain support and contain local, inter-ethnic group clashes. The Nandi, for example, were
relocated away from Luo dominated areas around Lake Victoria to more fertile areas
along the Rift Valley. Relocation decreased violence between Nandi and Luo
communities in the short-term, but set up conditions for more intensive inter-ethnic group
grievances over land ownership (Boone 2014).
After three years in the presidency, in 1981, Moi amended the constitution to
prevent the emergence of multi-party democracy. Under the majority of Moi’s tenure, the
Kenya African National Union (KANU) was the foundation for a single-party state. In
the late 1980s, facing increasing pressure from civil society groups and increasing
international pressure, Moi set up the Commission for Constitutional Reform of Kenya.
Chairman Prof. Yash Pal Ghai led the process of constitutional reform. The outcome of
the constitutional reform process was the repeal of single party state provision in the
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See, for further detail, Karega Munene, “Production of Ethnic Identity in Kenya,” in Kimani Njogu and
Kabiri Ngeta eds., Ethnic Diversity in Eastern Africa: Opportunities and Challenges. (Taweza
Communications, 2010): 41-53.
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constitution and the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1992 (Murunga and
Nasong’o 2007).
Multi-party politics had implications for local conflict dynamics in the northern
periphery. As Tablino argues, elections were the “only unifying national ritual” that cut
across the very deep center-periphery division (Tablino 1999, 137). Even though the area
was disconnected from the Kenyan economy and the larger national identity, ethnic
groups in Northern Kenya became involved in the national political system through
electoral processes.
Even with new constitutional rules allowing for inclusion and contestation among
multiple political parties, Moi won elections in both 1992 and 1997. Historians compare
Moi’s political strategies to colonial divide and rule practices that were used across
multiple African societies across Sub-Saharan Africa (see, Throup and Hornsby 1998).
For example, Moi introduced a policy in the early 1990s called majimboism, or
regionalism, that introduced a major national policy debate and intensified inter-ethnic
group conflict.
The policy was, in effect, a form of ethnic federalism (Branch 2011). It was based
on the idea that indigenes would maintain exclusive rights in local administrative areas
and control over communal resources, including land and property. The creation of home
areas for particular ethnic groups increased pressure for conflict across Northern Kenya
(Fox 1996). Population mobility among pastoralist communities clashed with the basic
premise of ethnic federalism. Starting under the Moi regime, majimboism35 triggered
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There is an unsettled debate in the literature on decentralization and ethnic federalism around whether the
institutional structure helps manage ethnic conflict, or foments ethnic conflict. Decentralization of power to
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conflict between ethnic groups, with violence directed against ethnic out-groups in local
political districts.
Historians of the Moi period argue that the introduction of multi-party politics
correlated with rising ethno-centrism and ethnic fragmentation in Kenya. Multi-party
politics created an overlap between land competition, political competition, as well as
competition for control over ethnic militias and crime syndicates that could be mobilized
during electoral cycles to use violence for political purposes. Contestation over land,
political positions, and militia allegiance played out in terms of ethnic divisions, which
deepened inter-ethnic group fragmentation. In parallel, research from the Moi period
focuses on predatory elites, the criminal state, and ethnic electoral competition as the
most significant drivers of conflict escalation (Steeves 1997; Klopp 2001; Anderson and
Lochery 2008; Mueller 2011). As Umaro Adano describes, “the state was the only visible
route to wealth, fame and glory. As such, fighting over access to state resources along
tribal lines was considered an entirely rational and legitimate pursuit” (Adano 2014, 3).
One of the largest acts of state-sanctioned violence in Northern Kenya also
occurred during the Moi era—the Wagalla Massacre. Human rights groups have accused
the government of massacring upwards of 5,000 Degodia on the Wagalla Airstrip on
February 10th, 1984. Some local accounts suggest the government carried out multiple
acts of torture and human rights abuses. Official reports indicate that the GoK mission
was a disarmament campaign to control Degodia militias engaged in clashes with Garre
smaller ethnic blocs is designed to better organize local governance and meet local demands for greater
autonomy. The process is designed to reduce inter-ethnic conflict. However, in some cases, ethnic
federalism increases ethnic competition. The construction small administrative units can create conditions
under which majority ethnic groups engage in ethnic cleansing to ensure full control group over the area.
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and Merule communities in the Northeastern Province. The state reports only 57 fatalities
during the operation (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2014).
The case is still under investigation. If reports on the event are accurate, the
Wagalla Massacre is the largest act of state-sanctioned violence against an ethnic group
in the history of Kenya. Like the Shifta War, the Wagalla Massacre had long-lasting
effects upon state-society relations in Northern Kenya. In particular, during the tenure of
the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) following ethnic violence in
2007-2008, debates surrounding the Wagalla Massacre led to withdrawal of the TJRC
commissioner, Bethuel Kiplagat. Kiplagat withdrew from the chairman position
following accusations that he was complicit in the massacre as a leading politician under
the Moi regime. The opposition party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), led by
Raila Odinga, used the Wagalla massacre to undermine credibility of the Kenyatta regime
and to build support for ODM in the Northeastern district during the lead up to elections
in 2013 (Gitari 2014).
The Development Frontier
The Moi era ended with new constitutional restrictions in place to prevent him
from running for a third term. In 2002, Mwai Kibaki won the national election with
backing from the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). Increasing polarization between
Kikuyu, Luo, and Kalenjin ethnic groups occurred under Kibaki regime. In particular, a
failed constitutional referendum in 2005 designed to limit the powers of the presidency,
also known as the Wako Draft, created a deep amount of mistrust and suspicion between
Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga (Murunga and Nasong’o 2007). After the failed
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referendum, Odinga organized a strong opposition movement among the Luo community,
deepening the division between Luo and Kikuyu communities in the lead up to the 2007
election.
The Kenyatta and Moi regimes directly excluded Northern Kenya from larger
national development planning. However, a major national policy shift took place during
Kibaki’s tenure that impacted inter-ethnic group conflict dynamics across the region.
With the expectation of a very close national election in 2007, ethnic constituencies in
Northern Kenya became relevant to national election outcomes. In particular, to garner
support from pastoralist communities, in 2007, the Kibaki regime established the
Ministry for the Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands (MDNKOAL).
The ministry focused on improving local security in Northern Kenya and supporting
livelihoods among pastoralist communities. Through the MDNKOAL, in the lead up to
the 2007 – 2008 election, the government allocated Northern Kenya more development
support than it had ever received.
In 2007, Raila Odinga ran against Kibaki’s incumbent regime. The election had
disastrous consequences. Mass post-election violence broke out during December 2007 –
January 2008. According to best estimates, post-election violence caused over 1,300
fatalities and 650,000 IDPs, including major massacres, church burnings, severe property
destruction, and human rights atrocities (UCDP 2015). Mungiki attacks directly targeted
Luo communities using severe forms of violence, including mass rape and executions.
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The major political parties in Kenya, including the Jubilee Coalition Alliance,36
ODM, and the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) are not explicitly ethnic
parties. This does not, however, limit ethnic identity from playing a major role within
processes of party formation and electoral competition. Even though national parties are
not explicitly ethnic, local political contestation is ethnic. In the absence of sufficient
state support for electoral campaigns, candidates running for office rely on their own
ethnic groups for resources to run campaigns. Local political contestants hold harambees
to collect donations and build local support networks. Political entrepreneurs working to
position themselves with political party structures gain the support of an entire ethnic
group, and then use that power base as leverage to form coalitions with other political
actors. Political parties in Kenya, therefore, function as ethnic coalitions that are
constructed through local processes of ethnic-based political mobilization (Lynch 2006;
Branch, Cheeseman, and Gardner 2010)
Two proximate factors, therefore, triggered the outbreak of mass violence in
Kenya in 2007 - 2008. Allegations and rumors that the Kibaki regime rigged the election
and the long period of time it took the electoral commission to announce the results
created uncertainty (Mueller 2008; Cheeseman 2008; Kanyinga 2009). At the same time,
long-term institutional decay and a lack of state control over local security actors created
a window for the rapid and severe escalation of post-electoral ethnic violence (Mueller
2008; 2011). Violence played out between the largest ethnic groups in the country,
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including the Kikuyu, Luo, and Kalenjin. The core-periphery cleavage in Kenya served
as a buffer for minority, pastoralist groups in the North against the 2007 outbreak of
election-related violence. Respondents described, “we were sitting at our TVs wondering
– what is happening in Kenya?”37
The first stage of response at the state level was the organization of an informal
group of national peace actors, led by Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat. The group
coordinated the initial response, drawing upon personal networks and experiences in
peace negotiations across Africa.38 Shortly following, the African Union (AU) set up a
formal Panel of Eminent African Leaders, led by Kofi Annan, to lead a national peace
process (see also, Lindenmayer and Kaye 2015). To coordinate the international
response, a new institution was established—the Kenya National Dialogue and
Reconciliation (KNDR) Commission. Negotiations among elites and external mediators
led to the formation of an peacebuilding agenda with four points of action for the
restoration of peace in Kenya, including immediate police deployment to contain
violence, addressing humanitarian crises, resolving the political crisis through
powersharing, and addressing inter-group grievances related to land, employment, and
impunity.
The escalation of ethnic violence in 2007-2008 left a deep imprint on social
divisions across Kenya. The major post-conflict policy document known as the Waki
Report, drawing on peacebuilding policies used during post-genocide experience of
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Rwanda, recommended local tribunals in conflict-affected communities. The
recommendation to set up structures to build peace from the ground-up, however, was not
adopted. Instead, the ICC took up the case. The ICC eventually indicted six political
elites for crimes against humanity in March of 2011, including Uhuru Kenyatta, Henry
Kosgey, William Ruto, Francis Muthaura, Joshua Arap Sang, and Mohammed Hussein
Ali.39 Evidence gathered for the ICC trial indicated political elites directly supported and
mobilized local youth militias that engaged in attacks against rival ethnic groups.
In response to the outbreak of post-election violence, in March 2008, the GoK
passed the National Reconciliation Accord Act. The Act included provisions for
powersharing. It restructured executive institutions to allow for a Prime Minster and two
Deputy Prime Ministers under a coalition cabinet called the Government of National
Unity. Under the powersharing government, in June of 2008, Kibaki launched Vision
2030. The goal of the strategy is for Kenya to attain middle-income status by 2030.
Targets are linked to the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The
development strategy has wide ranging implications for inter-ethnic group conflict and
peacebuilding efforts across Northern Kenya. Shortly thereafter, in 2009, the GoK passed
constitutional reforms designed to address conditions that led to violence in the prior
electoral cycle, and in 2010, a new constitution was passed through a national referendum
with 67% support. The Constitutional Implementation Oversight Committee (COIC) was
set up, increasing momentum for process of devolution and broad reform of institutions
across the country.
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In the final years of Kibaki’s tenure, due to new electoral rules enacted in 2010,
Northern Kenya again was relevant for national political campaigns. In the lead up to the
2013 election, political elites campaigned across the North more than in any other prior
electoral cycle. In line with increasing political relevance of the periphery, the GoK
articulated new state policies around reversing long-held policies of marginalization and
exclusion of Northern Kenya. Policy papers provide direct evidence of the recent
reversal. For example, Sessional paper no. 10 of 2012, states:
“The defining feature of Northern Kenya is its separation from the rest of the
country, which manifests itself in both physical and psychological ways. The
primary challenge is how to close this gap and achieve national integration in
terms that benefit the people of the region and the country as a whole” (GOK
2011, 12).
Critically, under Kibaki’s tenure, the remote hinterlands were no longer seen as
being of little importance to Kenya’s development strategy. The GoK set established new
policies and institutions to integrate the area into the Kenyan political economy.40 The
increasing political relevance of Northern Kenya is directly related to changes within the
larger, regional political economy (Shamaro 2014). Over the past seven years, Turkana
and Isiolo Counties, in particular, have become hubs for regional economic activity. Oil
exploration and production in Turkana, wind power production in Marsabit, and livestock
market expansion in Marsabit, Isiolo, and Mandera drive rapid economic transition.
Economic transition in Northern Kenya is linked to changes within the East
African economic context, including increasing cross-border trade, infrastructure
40
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construction, and major development projects, including Vision 2030, which is part of the
Lamu Port South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor project (LAPSSET). Mwai Kibaki,
Salva Kiir, and Meles Zenawi commissioned the LAPSSET project in 2012. Kenya
allocated 2.5 Trillion Kenya Shillings (KES) to the project, or roughly 30 billion dollars.
The project was designed to develop a transportation corridor linking South Sudan,
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda to the Indian Ocean for the purpose of exporting oil
supplies from across Eastern Africa. Principally, the LAPSSET project is designed to
construct a pipeline across the region to provide landlocked South Sudan an outlet for its
oil supply that does not run through Northern Sudan. With oil as a driver of long-running
civil conflict in Sudan, the LAPSSET pipeline would allow South Sudan to avoid
engagement with the authoritarian regime of Omar Bashir.
All four countries, however, have incentives for the successful implementation of
the LAPSSET project. Following its secession from North Sudan in 2011, landlocked
South Sudan needed an alternative, sustainable outlet for its oil production. Kenya
remains a key ally for South Sudan. Similarly, with the secession of Eritrea in 1991,
Ethiopia is also landlocked. Ongoing conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea undermines
the likelihood of cooperation around trade, leaving the state with a need for an alternative
link to the Indian Ocean for exporting goods. At the moment, Ethiopia maintains a strong
relationship with Kenya largely due to increasing regional cooperation under the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),41 and new agreements in place for
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Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda.
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Kenya to purchase power from Ethiopia. The Gibe III dam project,42 in particular,
includes large-scale hydropower development projects across Western Ethiopia to
support the LAPSSET project.
Kenya’s interest in the LAPPSET project is linked to its larger developmental
goal to become the gateway for the region. Regional aspirations drive inter-state
collaboration and cooperation. Exporting oil from Turkana, Uganda, and South Sudan
would generate positive externalities for the larger Kenyan economy. However, the
LAPSSET project has broader ambitions to redress severe poverty in the North.
Considering that Northern Kenya is the most underdeveloped region of the state,
LAPSSET aims to redress this problem through complementary business opportunities,
such as pipeline construction, long-term infrastructure maintenance, and transportation
industries. Railroads, paved roads, and an international port in Lamu will accompany the
construction of the pipeline and provide new opportunities for economic growth.
Growing economic interest in the Northern periphery, and increasing potential for
economic gains, drive a shift in how the North is viewed by the center. The state is now
far more concerned with development in the region. It is also concerned with efforts to
redress local grievances and prevent outbreaks of violence among pastoralist ethnic
groups. New strategies are in place to try to integrate previously marginalized minority
groups into the larger nation. In the view of analysts from the region, “strategies are
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designed, mostly so pastoralist groups do not stand in the way of development.”43 From
this perspective, the state’s effort to integrate previously marginalized groups into the
larger nation is a pacification strategy. Under the Kibaki regime, the GoK started to view
the North not just as an ungoverned bandits kingdom, but also as a potential, in Kibaki’s
terms, “bridge for opportunity” (Kantai 2012). Political will to engage in local
peacebuilding efforts across the region has increased with potential implications for
conflict patterns across Northern Kenya.

National Reform and Local Conflict
In January of 2015, following the collapse of the court case against Uhuru
Kenyatta, Fatou Bensouda, chief prosecutor of the ICC, released a summary of charges.
The case indicated that there was sufficient evidence that Pres. Kenyatta was personally
involved supporting the Mungiki militia in 2007 to carry out attacks against civilians.
However, throughout the pre-trial process Kenyatta denied his involvement in inciting
ethnic violence, and the ICC did not ban Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto from running
for the presidency even while facing trial for crimes against humanity.
Analysts argue the Kikuyu - Kalenjin Jubilee coalition is held together due to a
shared interest in protecting both groups from allegations of crimes against humanity
(ICG 2014). Political elites from the two most prominent ethnic groups had a shared
interest in gaining and maintaining access to political power in order to avert the ICC
indictment for crimes related to the 2007-2008 electoral process. The Jubilee coalition
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also uses the ICC trial as tool to mobilize its own support base, accusing ODM of
supporting a foreign process to unjustly try to take back power (Kisiangani 2014).
After the Kenyatta and Rutto’s Jubilee party won the national election in 2013,
the ICC case also affected state development policies that have increased pressure for
inter-group conflict in Northern Kenya. In particular, as Ali Gorai describes, “the ICC
trial led to a decisive turn east.”44 The trial process influenced the Kenyatta regime’s
interest in collaborating with states less concerned with the ICC case and human rights
protections. China invests heavily in Kenya, especially in infrastructural development
projects across the northern periphery.
The “turn East” is shrinking space for civil society groups to hold the GoK
accountable, narrowing space for civil society organizations involved in local
peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts. Organizations working to gather human
rights data, track abuses related to political elites, and monitor the actions of police and
military forces are particularly under threat. The Kenya Information and Communication
Act of 2013, for example, directly reduced media independence. In 2014, the parliament
debated a new bill designed to prevent NGOs and CSOs from access to external funding.
Much like Ethiopia, the GoK is actively working to constrain civil society groups and
prevent opposition to and criticism of the Jubilee coalition.
From a historical perspective, the episode of 2007-2008 was not unique. Ethnic
violence escalated during multiple electoral cycles in Kenya, including in 1992, 1997,
and 2005. In all of the cases, elites were, if not directly, at least indirectly involved in
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mobilizing support for youth militias. Therefore, a key finding of the Waki Report in
2008 was that containing ethnic violence in Kenya requires upholding the rule of law for
elites involved in criminal activities (Mueller 2011). The ICC case is the first experience
using an external justice mechanism in Kenya to regulate impunity and election crimes.
The logic of the process is that it will create a strong institutional disincentive for elites to
use youth militias to manipulate elections, and reduce the future likelihood of electionrelated violence.
A wave of institutional innovation occurred after the outbreak of violence in
2008. Broad constitutional reform set up a new set of formal national institutions
designed to improve the capacity of the state to prevent outbreaks of inter-ethnic group
violence. The so-called Agenda Four served as the foundation for constitutional proposals
that were approved by referendum and enshrined in the new Kenyan Constitution in
2010. New institutions and reform processes play key roles in shaping state approaches to
inter-ethnic conflicts and clashes across the country. In particular, Agenda Four Reforms
fall in multiple categories of formal institutions thought necessary to contain outbreaks of
ethnic violence.
The first priority focuses on improving the effectiveness of policing in Kenya,
long identified as one of the most corrupt institutions in all of Africa (Anderson 2002). A
new independent oversight committee for national police is now in place titled the
Independent Police Conduct Authority and administration police are in the process of
integration with the Kenya Police Service. The National Land Commission is working to
pass the Land Acts to address long-standing land-related grievances, as are reforms to
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address youth unemployment and devolve power to the county level. Devolution is
designed to reduce the intensity of competition around presidential elections.
Institutional changes aim to control and limit elite impunity for supporting ethnic
militias and engaging in violence for political purposes. However, there is still a very
high risk of inter-ethnic clashes across Kenya due to the fact that elites have framed all of
the core issues within ongoing reform process in terms of political and ethnic affiliation.
All of the political issues of post-conflict reform and their corresponding public debates
take on ethnic dimensions.
For example, the issue of corruption is addressed through processes of ethnic
balancing, which questions the long-term Kikuyu dominance of the public service.
Similarly, incumbent versus opposition ethnic politics between a Kikuyu-Kalenjin
alliance and a largely Luo opposition, drive contestation around police and judicial
reform. The land question revolves around the history of political elites, and their
families gaining ownership of very large swaths of land through illegal land grabbing.
Land contestation also takes on an ethnic dimension (Boone 2014). Surveys indicate the
public reform efforts as slow and of little benefit, indicating a high level of mistrust in
public institutions due to persistent corruption in the political system (SRIC 2013). The
expansion of formal institutions and oversight bodies intends to limit ethnic violence. At
the moment, however, formal institutional changes have not redressed deeply entrenched
practices of corruption and impunity – especially in the rural periphery, and especially
around issues of local security.45
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Localizing Ethnic Politics
The construction of a new national peace architecture and the devolution of power
occurred at the same time. The two processes, however, are working at cross-purposes. In
2010, constitutional reforms decentralized state power. Constitution changes were
enacted in 2013, creating 47 counties with access to state funds and new jobs and posts at
county level, including governors, senators, and members of the county assembly
(MCAs). The intended outcomes of devolution were to allow state resources to reach the
most marginalized areas, to support groups with very little power and control within the
national government, and to improve governance of the periphery. Devolution, in sum,
was designed to reduce grievances among the marginalized groups within Kenya, and
thus reduce insecurity.
The early stages of devolution, however, have reproduced and intensified intergroup conflict and ethnic politics at the local level.46 The process has had unintended
effects due to the fact that the nature of funding allocation from the national government
generates a rentier state problem at the county-level (see also, Aslaksen and Torvik 2006;
Torvik 2009; Basedau and Lay 2009; Ross 2013). At the county-level, taxation of the
local population is the not the primary source of resources for public goods. Rather with
funding from the national government, local leaders can allocate resources to particular
groups to gain support, which intensifies intergroup competition for access to countylevel political positions.
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In Mandera, Moyale, Isiolo, and Turkana, devolution exacerbated competition
over territorial control and, in some cases, escalated inter-ethnic group violence. Local
populations view devolution as the institutionalization of ethnic territories. Devolution
imposed an ethnic template upon contested territories, and created a situation where
county government posts come with more power. Abdi Mohammed describes how
devolution, “creates new minorities among minorities,” deepening the assumed link
between ethnicity and territorial control (IRIN News 2014). As Carrier and Kochore
report, new narratives across Northern Kenya of: “go back to your county,” “you do not
belong,” “and expelling the other” have become more common (see, Carrier and Kochore
2014). Ethnic groups operate under the assumption devolution is a form of ethnic
federalism, much like the system in Ethiopia, which is increasing suspicion and fear of
organized political exclusion among ethnic groups at the county level.
Devolution also created localized financial shocks (Kimenyi 2013). All six of the
counties under comparative assessment, due to their very high levels of poverty, have
access to extra funding from the GoK through the Equalization Fund.47 With the new
county budget formula, MCAs have larger budgets than MPs, especially because the
MCA has a smaller constituency to serve. In Bryan Kahumbura’s terms, “County leaders
are sitting pretty. With devolution, the Northern counties now receive more state
resources per year than they have in total in the past 50 years.”48 According to GoK
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reports, county governments in Northern Kenya now receive between $33 – 81 million
dollars per year. In 2013, for example, the Mandera County Government in 2013 was
allocated $73 million dollars through the Equalization Fund. Inter-ethnic group conflict
over political power to control the allocation of funds led to a situation where, as of
December of 2014, none of the county budget was utilized (IRIN 2014). This is a new
pattern across the periphery. Inter-ethnic group conflict around local political
competitions has become increasingly severe, even in remote periphery settings.

Kenya’s Peace Committee System
The expansion of the District Peace Committee (DPC) system and its rapid spread
is a unique contextual feature of the Kenya context. Insecurity can trigger social
organization and the formation of organizational structures to manage rising uncertainty,
reduce the risk of violence, and prevent escalation after violence breaks out. For example,
conflict escalation sparked collective peacebuilding action in Wajir, Kenya in 1993. A
local women’s market association formed a local peace committee and intervened in a
deadly conflict between the Degodia and Ajurran. The group coordinated local
peacebuilding processes through multiple local associations to contain violence.
In particular, the coalition of civic associations in Wajir enforced and sustained a
long-term negotiation process between elites from the Degodia and Ajurran communities
and collaborated with the government to enforce bargains and monitor the movement of
local youth militias. These actions had an observable impact on violence reduction. The
unexpected success of the Wajir Development and Peace Committee caused the model to
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become an archetype for the formation of peace committees across Kenya. The United
Nations Development Program (UNDP), in cooperation with multiple national level
CSOs, including Peacenet Kenya and the Uwiano Platform, provided financial and
technical support for establishing country-wide peace committee institutions (van
Tongeren 2005; van Tongeren 2013; Odendaal 2013).
In 2001, the Ministry of Security in the Office of the President established the
National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management (NSC) to
oversee DPCs, and, in 2008, the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008
provided further support. At present, major efforts of the NSC include advocacy for a bill
on National Conflict Management and Peacebuilding (National Policy on Peacebuilding
2011, 9). During the field research period, the bill was stalled in parliament due to
uncertainty about where the mandate for peacebuilding rests within the state structure.
Devolution triggered national debate over whether peacebuilding should be controlled at
the county or national level.
Not all DPCs have had the same success as the Wajir DPC, and the process of
devolution is creating increasing complex operating conditions for formal, focal-level
peacebuilding institutions. In fact, the national peace architecture is not functioning as a
cohesive system. Mads Frilander, Country Director for Danish Demining Group, states,
“DPCs have lost credibility and momentum. It is unclear what they will look like with
devolution. They have become semi-political institutions. They are not strong and they
are not easily mobilized.” 49 Where DPCs have been successful, prior analysis suggests it
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is largely due to charismatic leaders with strong skills in reconciliation and integration
(see also, Menkhaus 2015). Frilander further states, “Leadership matters with local DPCs,
even down to personalities and the need for local champions that are trusted and seen as
real peacebuilding leaders. Not everyone has the skills necessary for engaging in complex
political negotiations in ethnically diverse environments.”50
Within the process of devolution, political tension and competition around the
locus of control over local peacebuilding and security efforts have caused the DPC
system to unravel in many locations. The locus of authority and control over local
peacebuilding efforts still remains a contentious debate in Kenya. There is no consensus
over whether the state or counties should have authority over local security interventions.
As such, county-level governments are working to develop new institutions to try to fill
in the gaps and improve coordination among the broad array of civic groups involved in
peacebuilding efforts. In Marsabit, for example, the governor developed the
“Commission for Cohesion, Peace, and the Coordination of Non-state actors” in an effort
to try to improve peacebuilding interventions at the county-level.51 Supporting the
initiative, local politicians made the argument that state-sanctioned security forces “do
not know the terrain of Northern Kenya. We need our own actors in the police, to ensure
our own security” (KTN 2014).
Deep ethnic fragmentation and a lack of trust in state-based policing create
complex conditions for local peacebuilding efforts. Tension over the locus of authority
50
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for local security, whether it rests with actors in the new county system, or actors in older
Provincial Administration system, means local civic groups remain the most critical
peacebuilding actors. DPCs are set up across the periphery, but their organizational
capacity is very limited compared to churches, NGOs, local CSOs, and even ethnic
militias.
Conclusion
Ethnic groups living in the periphery have little attachment to the larger, national
identity of Kenya. The high level of mobility of nomadic groups engaged in pastoralist
livelihoods caused them to ignore national boundaries, moving fluidly across the borders
of Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda. Throughout the post-independence period,
without capacity to tax pastoralist groups, the GoK viewed the area as inherently
ungovernable. Successive regimes left Northern Kenya alone. The area experienced no
development of modern state functions and a deep core-periphery cleavage as the center
experienced rapid economic growth and political development.
State strategies for governing the North changed little over the post-colonial
period, leaving the region of the state as an area of limited statehood at risk of conflict
due to the absence of state security (Stanislawski 2008; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus, and
Vlassenroot 2008). In other words, as long as inter-group violence did not escalate
severely, the state allowed local communities to control and maintain their own
protection tactics, only working behind the scenes to try to ensure that all groups have
relatively equal access to arms to, at the very least, deter opportunistic attacks against less
powerful ethnic groups. Pastoralists were left to navigate complex inter-ethnic group
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relations using informal conflict management practices to negotiate terms of resource
sharing and restitution following deadly attacks.
Adding another layer of complexity to the context, state interests in the periphery
changed with the discovery of oil and the prospect of major development projects related
to the LAPSSET pipeline, which has important implications for local conflict patterns.
The state is advancing in areas of the North where access to resources is at stake, but not
in others, creating new forms of inequality and new inter-ethnic group cleavages.
Employing Rothchild’s logic, with new opportunities for economic growth in the North,
the cost of continued marginalization of ethnic groups in area is rising. The major costs
include the risk of violent mobilization against the state and subsequent loss of
international support and investment (Rothchild 1973; Rothchild 1995). As a result, the
state is investing in the set up of formal security operations and state bureaucracies in
high potential areas such as Isiolo and Turkana. At the same time, rising interest of the
state in consolidating power in the rural periphery creates more direct linkages between
national ethnic politics and local-level ethnic politics.
Neo-patrimonial systems of governance with high levels of patronage and
clientelism remain highly susceptible to identity-based violence (Lemarchand 1972).
Within the larger political system, ethnicity functions as the basis for the consolidation of
power. With Northern increasingly relevant for the national development agenda and for
national political contests, conditions are in place for increasing fragmentation along
ethnic lines. National politicians rely on ethnic-based voting as the basis for electoral
competition. The threat of violence against would-be ethnic competitors helps maintain
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stability of regimes working to maintain order and construct state institutions. The
process of devolution is shifting this form of political behavior to the rural periphery. The
combination of devolution and national ethnic politics causes contentious ethnic conflict
around struggles for land, political power, and control over state resources. In some
cases, including Mandera, Moyale, and Isiolo, these conflicts have turned deadly.
The transformation of governance approaches in the ASALs impacts the logic of
violence among ethnic groups. Formal institutional change is increasing dissonance
between local peace and security institutions and emerging state institutions. Formal and
informal rules of the game often conflict. Access to formal security systems in the
ASALs still has a very high cost for pastoralist groups due to extensive corruption across
the security system. The high cost of engagement with state security system causes many
communities to avoid engagement with police, military, and even formal peacebuilding
institutions such as DPCs. Wealthier actors who can afford high cost bribes may engage
with the formal security system, providing them with access to information, protection,
and immunity from prosecution for violent actions that poorer actors and communities
cannot afford.
Due to institutional dissonance, ethnic militias, who rely on donations and support
from their own ethnic communities, commonly use violent revenge attacks as a primary
form of deterrence and communal protection. This is because they do not have access to
information about threats that is accurate, and they cannot directly identify and try
individual criminals considering the weakness of formal state judicial institutions. Under
these conditions, asymmetrical and indiscriminant identity-based attacks are likely to
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occur following acts of aggression, making escalation an increasingly likely phenomenon
in the region.
Kenya’s efforts to manage and govern communal conflict in the periphery
included formal bureaucratic approaches that have had a very mixed impact on local
conflict dynamics. Formal policing structures have had little success and formal peace
building institutions have a very mixed record. Disarmament campaigns have done very
little to limit violence and may have had unintended effects. Overall, considering local
peace systems are often ad hoc and not institutionalized, there is a very high level of
variation in both the presence and quality of local peacebuilding institutions. Further
inquiry into local cases, and processes of escalation and non-escalation is thus critical for
improving understanding of the factors and processes that make escalation less common
in some areas over others, especially under the harsh and increasingly uncertain
conditions on Kenya’s periphery.
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CHAPTER THREE: CONFLICT ESCALATION IN NORTHERN KENYA

Most inter-group conflicts are resolved without violence in Northern Kenya.
However, some conflicts escalate to include mass collective violence between ethnic
groups. The set of cases presented in this chapter share the same dependent variable: the
escalation of non-state conflict. In these cases, the state is not a direct, active participant
in the initial conflict. In all of the cases, however, state agents are third parties to the
conflict following initial acts of violence. As previous micro-level studies of civil war
suggest, it is common for different episodes of sub-state violence to have competing
logics (Kalyvas 2006; Habyarimana et al. 2009; Kalyvas 2012). Analytic narratives for
five inter-group conflicts in which local civic groups engaged in minimal preventive
action provide a platform for identifying common factors that lead to escalation. Before
assessing conditions that contain escalation in the next two chapters, the following cases
serve as a platform for analysis of common triggers and logics of escalation in Northern
Kenya.
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Table 3: Escalation Cases
Samburu, Turkana, and Marsabit
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Turkana: Turkana – Samburu Range War (December 1996 – 1997)
Samburu: The Baragoi Massacre (November 2012)
Samburu: The Maralal Conflict (October 2013)
Turkana: The Todonyang Massacre (May 2011)
Marsabit: The Moyale Clashes (2012 – 2013)

Samburu: Turkana – Samburu Range War (1996 – 1997)
Turkana and Samburu communities living along the Nyiro Mountain – Suguta
Valley conflict corridor, such as Waso Rongai, Kawap, Tuum, Parikati, Sarima, and
Loongerin, are as close as possible to the complete absence of the state. Administrative
and police posts are absent or abandoned, there are no paved roads, and no cell phone
coverage.52 The area has no international borders, no oil deposits, and minimal state
interest in economic development.53 Within a very fragile, semi-arid desert ecology,
populations support local youth militias, or moran, who are well-organized, increasingly
well-trained in military tactics,54 and heavily armed to protect valuable and highly
vulnerable communal resources. Semi-nomadic groups in the area, including the
Samburu, Turkana, and Pokot uphold strong social incentives for raiding and the use of
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Granted, there are rumors of mineral deposits in parts of Samburu County, but at present they are not
being pursued actively. One major development effort, The Turkana Windpower Project, is now under
construction in the area. To date it has caused only minimal conflict between ethnic groups in the area.
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force against rival ethnic out-groups.55 These social features are common to pastoralist
ethnic groups that live across Northern Kenya.
Context of Conflict
Conflict between the Samburu and Turkana escalated in 1996, initiating a
protracted range war along the Nyiro – Suguta Valley conflict corridor that cuts across
Turkana, Samburu and Southern Marsabit County.56 The UCDP database identifies the
Samburu – Turkana case as a non-state conflict, estimating the initial wave of escalation
led to 51 fatalities in 1996. Local informants claim the death toll was over 100 with
between 10,000 - 20,000 stolen livestock over the course of three months of attacks and
counter-attacks between Turkana and Samburu militias (UCDP 2014; see also, Pkalya,
Adan, and Masinde 2003).
Prior to the outbreak of armed violence, a regional drought caused pastoralist
groups from Marsabit to relocate to more fertile grazing areas in the Nyiro Valley.
Samburu leaders negotiated informal land and resource sharing arrangements with Gabra,
Rendille, and Somali groups prior to the initial migration.57 Negotiations among elders
and sub-district chiefs led to temporary, informal land-sharing arrangements, allowing for
the accommodation of ethnic out-groups within Samburu County.
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Detailed anthropologies account for rituals related to violence among pastoralist groups. This set of work
highlights heroism and raiding, age set social status and rewards, rituals of animal sacrifice following
deadly attacks, scarification, tattooing, ritualistic violence and rites of passage.
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Samburu accommodation, however, increased fear and suspicion among Turkana
clans with semi-permanent settlements along Western border of Samburu County.58
Fearing potential aggression due to the formation of alliances between Samburu, Gabra,
and Rendille militias and the loss of access to land in the Nyiro Valley that functioned as
reserve pasture for Turkana livestock, Turkana militia leaders organized 600 moran and
recruited reinforcements from Pokot militias. In December of 1996, the large joint militia
raided the Nyiro Valley. The joint militia attacked multiple Samburu and Rendille
settlements across the region. Smaller and widely dispersed Samburu, Rendille, and
Somali militias failed to repel the large-scale attack.
Patterns of Response
After the initial attack in December 1996, the Government of Kenya deployed
police, military, and political leaders by helicopter to track and recover stolen animals
and arrest Turkana militia leaders. During the state-led operation, the Turkana-Pokot
militia threatened and attacked police posts, and shot down a government helicopter with
a rocket-propelled grenade. The helicopter carried a well-known Samburu leader, District
Commissioner Henry Nyandoro, as well as, “ten other senior security personnel who
were trying to monitor [militia] movements, killing all of them on the spot” (Daily
Nation, December 28, 1996). The loss of a dominant group leader made the attack
symbolic and especially egregious for the Samburu.
Local churches in cooperation with Catholic and the Presbyterian mission stations
provided support for families that lost members, and assisted in relocating Turkana
58
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minority groups to more secure towns along the Nyiro Mountain range, including South
Horr and Baragoi.59 Prior to the conflict, Turkana and Samburu had semi-permanent,
integrated settlements along the main trade route, including Waso Rongai, Tuum, and
Loongerin. Fear of attacks against Turkana civilians caused area chiefs and councilors to
donate personal resources to relocate Turkana away from predominantly Samburu
settlements. Local government and mission station vehicles transported Turkana to
homogenous settlements to prevent indiscriminant revenge attacks against Turkana
civilians.
Samburu elders pooled communal resources and donations of livestock to
purchase more sophisticated weapons through preexisting livestock trade networks.60 A
Samburu informant describes the situation: “we began then [1996] to deal in illegal arms
with our other enemies [Gabra and Borana] because we could not access arms as easily as
the Turkana. We have no international border.”61 The Samburu also formed an alliance
with the Pokot to coordinate a counter attack. In January and February of 1997, a
Samburu – Pokot militia attacked Turkana settlements in the Suguta Valley. Informants
suggest Samburu elders leveraged relationships and radio communication across church
mission stations to gain information about Turkana settlements prior to engaging in the
59
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Covert trade networks may establish inter-ethnic group bonds that can then help to strengthen informant
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counter-attack: “we had to find ways to get more information about the Turkana and the
Pokot before those attacks—the church bases helped us do that.”62 Estimates indicate the
Samburu – Pokot militia killed 60 Turkana in multiple revenge attacks (Pkalya et al.
2004).
Outcomes
Respondents indicate that after 1997, “women and children started to die. That did
not happen before. It was not allowed among the Samburu or Turkana moran.”63 Conflict
between the two groups escalated in relation to direct failure of the state to ensure
security and the use of increasingly severe tactics by both groups in the conflict dyad.
Following the wave of violence, Suguta Valley, along the southwestern edge of the Nyiro
Valley, became known as the “valley of death” (AllAfrica April 28, 2006). It became a
strategic location for organization, mobilization, and refuge for armed bandit groups from
various ethnic backgrounds. Opportunistic militias used the remote and very harsh desert
environment as a base for the organization of attacks in the area. The 1996-1997 wave of
escalation made the region a no-go zone for state police and even Kenya Defense Forces
(KDF). After being targeted, the state was even less likely to intervene to prevent
mobilization of militia groups engaged in large-scale cattle theft. Conflict escalation
further eroded the state’s capacity to stem the increasing militarization and organization
of youth militias, increasing the likelihood of violence in the area.
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The case provides an example of the logic of escalation in pastoralist conflict
settings. Resource scarcity was a conditioning variable causing population movement and
inter-group conflict. The primary motive of the initial Turkana attack, however, was not
to acquire resources, but to dislocate Rendille, Gabra, and Somali groups, and prevent
Samburu militias from accommodating and forming alliances with ethnic out-groups. The
expansion of militia alliances would have put the Turkana at greater risk of predatory
attacks or dislocation from more fertile territories.64 A patron of a local Turkana militia
described this logic of deterrence, as follows:
We raid, not because we are poor and need more animals, but because we know
that if we look weak, they [Samburu] will raid us at any opportunity. We have to
make them fear us and fear that we are watching them from behind every rock. If
not, they will slowly move into our territory, pretend like they are our friends, but
then attack us first. If they do not fear us, they will want to live near us to take our
water and pastures and kill our people. We will not survive if we do not improve
our skills in raiding and war.65
An informant from a Samburu militia in the conflict corridor confirms the logic of using
banditry as a form of deterrence, as follows:
War is a more profitable activity than anything else that happens here, but stealing
animals from the Turkana is not for getting rich. It is for getting more powerful.
Animals are used to buy more weapons, more ammunition, and to pay bribes to
prevent the police from chasing us.66
Predation reinforces local militia capacity at the expense of other ethnic outgroups.67 The use of raiding and deadly force against rival ethnic groups follows a
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defensive logic—to cause other potentially aggressive ethnic groups to fear living in
close proximity. In the 1996 event, after the initial attack, for Samburu militias, there
were two strategic goals for escalating violence against Turkana communities. The first
goal was to create fear among the Turkana, as deterrent. The second was to restore a
sense of reciprocity: “whey they draw blood, we draw blood.”68 This led to spiraling
violence and the break down of former informal codes of behavior, such as traditional
moran codes against killing women and children during warfare (see also, Spencer 2004).
Conclusion
Samburu elders convened negotiations with rival ethnic group leaders during the
initial relocation period. However, Turkana militias viewed new inter-ethnic group
allegiances as a threat. In the absence of early warning and preventive intervention,
violence escalated. The police intervention failed to apprehend leaders of the Turkana –
Pokot militia and the Samburu lost a key leader, making the attack again a government
helicopter a highly symbolic act of violence. These conditions triggered rapid
mobilization of militias, the pooling of communal resources, arms acquisition through
inter-group trade networks, alliance formation, and subsequently, violent revenge attacks
against Turkana communities.
The critical tipping point toward escalation in this case was evidence that the state
was not immune from targeting. This created a new context for amassing weapons,
increasing militant skills among the warrior class, and developing increasingly
sophisticated strategies for communal protection. Samburu elders continue to reference
68
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the event as a justification for illegal arms acquisition, training and support for youth
militias, and spy networks across the region.69

Samburu: The Baragoi Massacre (August – November 2012)
The Baragoi Massacre is an episode of non-state conflict escalation between
Turkana and Samburu communities in Samburu County. The attacks leading up to the
massacre are not accounted for in the UCDP non-state conflict database, but the largescale event is listed (UCDP 2015). According to local informants the initiating event
occurred in early August of 2012. A Samburu militia stole 600 animals and killed 11
Turkana moran in Narokwe.70 In response, Turkana militias conducted two major raids.
They stole 600 animals from the Samburu near Baragoi, then stole 450 cattle two days
later in a raid near Lotikal. The Turkana militia killed 10 Samburu moran during the
raids. Three months later, in November of 2012, a Turkana militia massacred 42 security
personnel, predominantly Samburu KPR or “home guards,”71 during an ad hoc policing
mission to recover the stolen livestock.
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KPR policing actors are former ethnic militia members. They are provided access to G-3 rifles from the
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Context of Conflict
After the Turkana raids at Baragoi and Lotikal in August of 2012, Samburu elders
organized a protest in Baragoi. The group demanded a response from the local
government for failing to protect the community from major acts of Turkana aggression
(Standard Media 2012). In response, the Ministry of Internal Security coordinated a team
of 107 local security actors. A BBC Media reports claims the group was composed of,
“the regular police, reservists, and paramilitary officers” (BBC Nov. 14, 2012). The ad
hoc group included different types of security personnel, but Samburu KPR or informal
“home guards” were the major participants. A Samburu informant described the
composition of the police force as follows: “even though some members of the General
Service Unit (GSU) were involved, they [the Turkana] assumed we [the Samburu] were
going for a counter-attack and revenge, rather than a peace mission.”72
The composition of the group indicated to the Turkana that a Samburu militia had
backing from the government. As a Turkana informant described, “the government was
with the Samburu, our enemies; we thought they were going to clear us.”73 With dense
informant networks across the area, the composition, organization, and route of the police
group was well known: “with informers on both sides, the Turkana knew the exact date
and time of movement of the group coming after them.”74 Some informants presumed
Turkana political elites alerted local militias of the policing mission and justified the use
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of extreme force.75 For example, a security analyst involved in the operation provides a
plausible explanation of the role of Turkana politicians:
Turkana politicians gave a message to all their moran beforehand: telling them,
‘there is an operation coming to kill you.’ This made them fearful and they
prepared for all out war. The evidence for this is clear – the Turkana were so well
prepared, and their most skilled sharpshooters were there. They knew exactly
what the Samburu were doing and had support from their politicians for the attack
well in advance. No way they would have been so ready to kill without that
support. Security is always the main concern of our people, so politicians are very
aware of threats to their people, all of the time.76
There are mixed reports on how the attack evolved, and a high level of
speculation due to the fact that only a few KPR survived the attack to provide first-hand
reports. The following excerpt is based on interviews with informants who were in
Baragoi during the episode:
The [Samburu] KPRs went through the valley, following the escape path that the
local moran identified after the Turkana stole their animals. The KPR were ahead
of the police who did not know the area as well as the Samburu. Then Turkana
snipers from the hills attacked them. After the shooting began, the Samburu KPRs
tried to counter attack around the hill, but they lost 8 people right away trying to
climb the hill. Then, the police, who were behind, came into the attack too – but
the Turkana were just so ready and so well positioned, that everyone was killed
completely.77
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Patterns of Response
A KDF military operation tracked the militia after the massacre. The military
operation did not lead to any arrests. Intelligence reports suggest the Turkana militia split
into two smaller groups that dissolved into predominantly Turkana communities around
Marti in Samburu County and Parikati in Turkana County.78 The nature the attack
indicated that the Turkana militia had prior information of the timing and movement of
the group. The militia was pre-positioned in a strategic position, had knowledge of the
mountainous terrain of the Suguta Valley, and a pre-planned retreat strategy to evade
capture. Weapons caches of the Turkana militia were highly sophisticated, including
sniper rifles, AK-47, RPGs, grenades. This indicates that the militia had, at least, strong
informal trade networks for acquiring illegal weapons beyond the capacity of most local
militias. Some analysts interpret these facts as evidence of direct political elite support for
the militia.
After the massacre, the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC) in
Baragoi and the Samburu North DPC canceled long-running inter-group dialogue
programming and shifted activities toward peace messaging to stabilize conditions and
prevent acts of post-massacre revenge.79 Turkana villages near Baragoi dissipated and
engaged in mass flight. The Turkana community abandoned the town of Lemerok—the
village nearest the site of massacre and the most likely location for Samburu militias to
target for revenge attacks.
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With sufficient foreknowledge of the mission, the Turkana could have engaged in
negotiation rather than violence, especially through the Catholic Church and the DPC.
However, the nature of prior policing missions affected the decision to use deadly force.
Prior policing missions in the area involved excessive force against civilians who were
accused of harboring militia members. Philip Ongunje argues, “In the absence of a
political settlement to ensure the hybrid local police force would deal with them [the
Turkana] justly, the militia choose extreme violence as the mode of resistance.”80 The
depth of uncertainty around the operation created conditions conducive for one of the
most severe acts of violence within the long-running range war between the Samburu and
Turkana.
Outcomes
The KDF failed to apprehend the Turkana militia, and perceptions of inequality,
corruption, and direct marginalization deepened among the Samburu. The most common
narrative of the Baragoi massacre among Samburu respondents was not that the state
failed to provide security, but that the state sided with the Turkana. Rumors spread
among the Samburu that Turkana contributed money to hire lawyers and prevent an
investigation into the attack. The local government charged two Turkana MPs, but the
case was dropped. Other informants claimed a Turkana MP cut the Turkana militia
members a deal, offering immunity for mobilizing support for ODM in the 2013

80

Philip Ongunje, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 15, 2013.

112

election.81 Turkana leaders, such as Ekuru Okot, of the Turkana Professionals
Association, claimed the Samburu police force was planning to drive Turkana from the
county in order for the Samburu to have an electoral advantage in the lead up to the 2013
election.82 Following the massacre, the national political cleavage between ODM and
Jubilee became part of the conflict narrative.
Conclusions
The Baragoi incident highlights that state support, or even the perception of state
support for a particular ethnic group can increase the sense of shared communal threat
and trigger escalatory dynamics. In this case, the local government armed and backed
informal Samburu police reservists in the absence of a clear agreement between the
Samburu and Turkana regarding the formation of neutral policing forces. The Turkana
community supported local militias to engage in mass organized violence to eliminate a
potential threat to the larger Turkana community support network. Uncertainty
surrounding the policing operation, as well as a history of violent policing operations in
the past, triggered a violent response. The Turkana attack was related to intra-community
defense, as well as retaliation for prior acts of state-sanctioned violence against the
Turkana community.
The Turkana militia also took all of the weapons from the bodies of the Samburu
KPRs who died in the massacre, which increased the expectation among the Samburu of
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more aggressive attacks against Samburu settlements. An informant stated, “The problem
now is the Turkana took 57 guns from the officers they killed, but only 3 have been
recovered. We know those guns have circulated among the Turkana, because we’ve heard
the voice of the G-3 in other raids.”83 The perception of an imbalance in weapons
stockpiles set up conditions conducive for further escalation, including attacks in in
Maralal, and raids in Waso Rongai and Tuum (described below).

The Maralal Clashes (October 2013)
Less than one year after the Baragoi Massacre, on October 30th, 2013, ethnic riots
broke out between the Samburu and Turkana in the town of Maralal. The event is not
recorded in the UCDP database since it did not cause more than 25 confirmed fatalities.
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) records one fatality
related to the Maralal clashes (Raleigh et al. 2010). Local informants, however, reported
8 total fatalities occurred over the course of the process of escalation.84 Narratives
gathered from first-hand conflict participants and witnesses allows for analysis of a
process of escalation that unfolded within a very short timespan.
Context of Conflict
One week prior to the outbreak of violence in Maralal, a Turkana militia attacked
a Samburu community on the outskirts of Baragoi. The militia stole 200 cattle and killed
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two Samburu moran.85 Informants indicate the Turkana militia used G-3 rifles acquired
during the Baragoi Massacre during the attacks. On October 28th, a week after the raid,
Samburu living in Morijo village identified the stolen animals in two trucks en route to
Maralal: “all Samburu clans know the marks of Samburu animals. They noticed our
marks.”86 Samburu elders in Maralal received the report and organized a large group to
blockade the road and watch for the trucks. When the lorries arrived in Maralal, the group
stopped them and escorted the vehicles to the police station. The trucks and livestock
were then impounded in the police compound.87
Patterns of Response
After two days, Samburu in Maralal, “started thinking the animals would go back
to the Turkana, so they organized a demonstration at the police station.”88 A well-known
student from Laikipia University organized a group of 500 Samburu youth. Early in the
morning of October 30th, they walked through Maralal town to the police station with
posters, destroyed the padlock to the police station gate, and let the cattle off the trucks.
To disperse the group, a police officer shot into the air, but then shot at the crowd killing
a 14-year-old boy.
A Samburu university student, one of the lead organizers of the protest, took
photos of the shooting and showed the images to the Officer Commanding the Station
85
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(OCS). The protest dispersed, and the police took back the cattle and locked them in the
trucks at the station. Then, the station commander pursued and apprehended the student
who took the photos and ordered an officer to shoot the student. The officer refused. The
commander took a rifle from the officer and publically assassinated the student in front of
the group of Samburu protestors.89 Then, informants describe,
We all ran, but reorganized and came back to the police station. The police shot at
us before we were close, and injured two more. We went away, but then went
back again. Everyone was refusing to let the police take the body. The group then
made a line and yelled at the police, ‘shoot us, too!’ for almost three hours. They
kept shooting, but, by then, killing was everywhere. Moran in Maralal went
through Turkana neighborhoods to chase all of them out, even beyond Maralal.
Many Turkana living in Samburu villages around Maralal were killed. We know
at least seven Turkana died and many houses were burned.90
After the deadly riots, informants describe,
“the MP and the Governor of Samburu flew to Maralal from Nairobi. They called
a forum and told us: hold his body until we tell you what to do. The MP cried, and
they took the boy’s body. They put the OCS in jail in Maralal, at first, but then he
was relocated. No one knows where he has gone. They kept it a secret to protect
him.”91
The Catholic Church in Maralal convened peace dialogues and conducted peace
messaging, but the town dis-integrated in the wake of the clash.92 Discrimination and
threats against Turkana increased. Samburu business owners stopped working with
Turkana actors, and a large majority of the Turkana community relocated away from
Maralal. Even though the Samburu were aggressors, the event deepened perceptions of
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inequality, victimhood, and suspicion among the Samburu community. The police
released the cattle and lorries to the Turkana one week after the riots, causing local
leaders to make claims that: “the police are part of this syndicate of Turkana cattle
rustling.”93
Conclusion
Although state actors were not directly involved in the initial conflict, the
perception of state inequality interacted with the nature of violent actions in the process
of escalation. Police protection for Turkana, and the public assassination of a young,
well-known university student triggered rapid escalation. The initial act of violence broke
a social norm, and local police became a third party to the conflict. These two factors led
to threats and violent attacks against Turkana civilians in Maralal and surrounding
villages. Violence escalated rapidly with minimal space for intervention, and rapid disintegration of the town undermined opportunities for negotiation.

Turkana: The Todonyang Massacre (2011 - 2013)
The Todonyang massacre is a case of non-state, inter-ethnic group conflict that
escalated to include mass collective violence between Turkana and Dassanetch
communities. Todonyang is a small fishing village in the Northeast corner of Turkana
County near the border of Ethiopia. A catholic mission station is the only external
organization based in the village. Local CSOs based in Lodwar, SAPCONE and the
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Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, provide intermittent support for local
peacebuilding work in the Todonyang area. The conflict is not included in the UCDP
non-state conflict database, but it is listed in the ACLED database. ACLED data captures
three deadly conflict events within the escalation process, totaling 48 fatalities (Raleigh et
al. 2010).
The Turkana and the Dassanetch94 have a long conflict history. Historically, the
Dassanetch were the only group with semi-permanent settlements across the marshlands
of Northern Lake Turkana in Southwestern Ethiopia. Turkana shifted livelihoods over
time due to climate change, unstable rain patterns, and insecurity due to persistent
raiding. At the same time, the water level in Lake Turkana fell and the marshlands
retreated southward beyond Kenya’s boundary. Under these conditions, to the Turkana,
the Dassanetch are illegal immigrants in Kenya; to the Dassanetch, the Turkana
community infringes upon fishing resources—the Dassanetch community’s traditional
source of livelihood.95 Informants trace conditions for increasing hostility between the
two groups trace to September 2002 when tension increased due to conflict over
marshland access and killings related to Dassanetch initiation rites.96
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Patterns of Response
In response, elders from both communities, with the support of the local Catholic
Church and the MP for Turkana North, Japheth Ekidor, mediated an informal peace pact
to set rules for resource sharing in the marshlands. Both groups signed the pact on
September 11th, 2002. On September 13th, only two days after the local peace agreement
was signed, a Dassanetch militia attacked a village near Todonyang killing ten Turkana
civilians. A second attack on September 17th, 2002 caused six fatalities (Raleigh et al.
2010). Ekidor continued to convene peace negotiations, but on October 14, 2002, as the
Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC) reports, “Ekidor’s vehicle was sprayed
with bullets while he was in route to Nairobi ahead of Kenya African National Union
(KANU) Presidential nominations” (SRIC 2006).
Following the assassination of Ekidor, from 2002 – 2011, best estimates indicate
cyclical clashes between the two groups caused between 15 – 20 fatalities per year (SRIC
2006).97 Turkana militias adopted more aggressive tactics, conducting terrorist-like raids
on Dassanetch civilians and attacking Ethiopian police. During this period, the conflict
developed a cross-border dimension with linkages to the LAPSSET project (see chapter 2
for overview).
Increasing demand for energy necessary for oil pipeline construction led the GoK
to sign an agreement to purchase energy from Ethiopia. The primary source of power for
LAPSSET projects will come from the Gibe III Dam on the Omo River. The dam, when
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complete, will block the Omo River and further reduce the marshlands of Northern Lake
Turkana, and push the Dassanetch closer to Turkana communities. The agreement
undermined the neutrality of the Kenyan government to mediate in the conflict, as
Turkana in Todonyang believe the GoK sided with Ethiopia, and by proxy, the
Dassanetch. It also increased fear among the Turkana that their interests were not
protected by the state.
On May 2, 2011, the most severe episode of violence within the long-running
conflict occurred, with direct acts of ethnic cleansing and cyclical revenge attacks. After
a dispute over access to the lake, a band of armed Dassanetch youth attacked a small
fishing settlement near Todonyang, killing one Turkana elder and injuring another.
Turkana citizens rapidly mobilized and conducted revenge attacks, initially killing 4
Dassanetch living in Todonyang (see, Maina, Friends of Lake Turkana, 2011).
After the major attack in Todonyang, leaders of the Catholic parish mobilized to
warn Turkana to evacuate from Dassanetch villages. Excerpts from Fr. Steven Ochieng’s
situation report indicate elders from the Catholic Church attempted to intervene, but did
not mobilize fast enough to prevent the massacre. Ochieng states:
“We were very worried and wanted to save the situation from more
casualties…News reached the village of Sies before us and we were in shock to
see the aftermath of one of the cruelest atrocities we have ever witnessed in the
area; 23 bodies of women, children and men…This was a massacre” (Ochieng,
May 28, 2011).
Before the informal response team could warn Turkana to relocate, the Dassanetch militia
killed 23 Turkana civilians who were en route to a market in the Dassanetch village of
Sies.
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KPR in Todonyang were not equipped contain violence, especially attacks by
heavily armed Dassanetch militia members with backing from the Ethiopian police.
Turkana informants claim, “The police arm the Merille to protect the marshes. Each
month, each person gets restocked with bullets.”98 In the absence of significant police
capacity, local civic associations including elders and the catholic mission functioned as
the primary crisis response team. The church coordinated a full evacuation of the village
of Todonyang, facilitating the movement of 1,200 people south to Lowarengak.
Informants report that the IDP settlement at Lowarengak was attacked multiple times
following the relocation. On August 15th, 2013, the Dassanetch attacked Todonyang,
again, killing 13 Turkana. Police from Ethiopia intervened to contain attacks, but the
Turkana militia killed 15 police.
Outcomes
An informal coalition of civic actors in Todonyang, including the area MP, local
religious leaders and elders convened negotiations that led to an informal pact. The pact
was very quickly broken, reducing the likelihood of future negotiation. Variation in civil
society space between Kenya and Ethiopia undermined the effectiveness of local peace
actors working to resolve the long-running conflict. Local peacebuilding associations,
including SAPCONE and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, cite this issue as a
major restraint for effective preventive action. Lucas Echuchuka describes this condition:
“The major problem in Todonyang is that there is no civil society in Ethiopia to negotiate
with. When we want to plan cross-border dialogues, and try to reach agreements to help
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the situation, they say where is the government? They won’t negotiate with CSOs.”99
Ethiopian government officials did not cooperate with civil society groups from Kenya
due the CSO Proclamation—a set of restrictive regulations against civic associations
engaged in issues linked to human rights promotion.
Conclusions
The Todonyang case presents a combination of pressures conducive for
escalation, including the deliberate and rapid breaking of a local peace pact, ritual
violence and inter-group fear, and the symbolic assassination of a local leader. The case
also illustrates pressures limiting effective preventive intervention. SAPCONE and CJPC
attempted to mediate the conflict, but were not able to convene negotiations due to formal
institutional restrictions on civil society associations operating in Ethiopia. State
representatives also faced restraints for engaging in the conflict as neutral third party
mediators. The perception that the government was not protecting the interests of the
Turkana community limited the ability of government actors to mediate. Under these
conditions, the Dassanetch and Turkana both engaged in increasingly severe, and
terrorist-like acts of violence. As the conflict escalated, both groups targeted state
security actors, police posts, border crossing posts, and even peacebuilding actors,
triggering further escalation.
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Marsabit: The Moyale Clashes (2011 – 2013)
Inter-ethnic group violence escalated in two major waves in Moyale between
2011 and 2013. The events are listed in the UCDP database, which estimates a total of
174 causalities during inter-ethnic group clashes among Borana, Gabra, Burji and Garre
communities. Moyale is small trading town on the border between Kenya and Ethiopia in
Northern Marsabit County. The Borana and Gabra have a long history of conflict outside
of Moyale—it is only recently that violence between the two groups escalated in Moyale.
The case presents a logic for conflict escalation between pastoralist ethnic groups
competing over increasingly scarce resources, with a border dimension. There is some
evidence of local preventive action containing the spread of violence beyond the urban
center.
Conflict Context
The Burji and Garre are minority groups in Moyale, yet they make up a large
portion of the business elite. Control over trade networks makes Burji and Garre powerful
minority actors in a border town where illegal weapons and human trafficking are major
economic activities. Borana and Gabra are also settled around Moyale. Both communities
maintain largely livestock-based subsistence livelihoods. In early 2011, within the initial
process of devolution and county government reform in Kenya (see chapter 2), Burji and
Garre actors gained political influence within the Moyale electoral constituency. Under
shifting political conditions, the following events intensified conflict between ethnic
groups in Moyale, leading to two waves mass collective violence.
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In 2011, facing pressure to relocate from settlements in Somalia and Mandera due
to rising in resource scarcity and insecurity, Garre communities established new
settlements in the Moyale area on the border between Kenya and Ethiopia. Garre
expansionism increased tension and conflict over territory around the border town. In
July 2011, a Garre militia clashed with a Borana militia north of Moyale. Shortly
following the Garre attack against Borana settlements, the Gabra formed an alliance with
the Garre.
Analysts suggest the alliance, in part, was a coordinated effort for Gabra militias
to gain access to funding from radical Islamic groups through Garre networks, in order to
increase funding and military training for Gabra militias.100 With the Garre population
rapidly growing due to emigration from Somalia to areas along the Kenya – Ethiopia
border, rumors spread about impending attacks. For instance, actors from the Borana
community claimed the Gabra-Garre alliance preemptively secured protection from
Kenyan and Ethiopian security forces through large bribes and payoffs.101
Informants from Marsabit County indicated the Gabra - Garre strategy was well
formulated, promoted through online platforms, and very well known among security
officers, and even key peacebuilding organizations. For example, a statement from David
Kimaiyo, Inspector General of the Kenya Police, published in the East African Standard
described threats related to the Garre expansionist narrative:
Kimaiyo said [the police] are also investigating a website known as Garr online
for allegedly inciting skirmishes. The website calls for the secession of parts of
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North Eastern Kenya. According to map, the new region will be called Garreland
Republic which stretches from Isiolo–Moyale, Wajir and Mandera to parts of
Ethiopia (AllAfrica, September 3, 2013).
Despite widespread knowledge of the threat of major attacks, violence escalated.
On January 2nd, 2012, a Gabra militia attacked Mansile, Heilu, and Oda, Borana villages
on the outskirts of Moyale. The Heilu attack occurred at the same time District
Commissioner Elias Kithaura was in the village conducting peace talks (AllAfrica 2012).
Kithaura was able to escape from the attack unharmed with support of Borana KPR
protecting the convoy of mediators. The attack triggered four days of clashes between
Gabra and Borana militias around Moyale. Borana civilians fled from the area and
traveled across border into Ethiopia, and the Gabra militia gained control of all three
villages after the Borana militia ran out of ammunition (BBC News, “20,000 Flee Moyale
Clashes,” July 28, 2012).
The KDF and border patrols based in Moyale secured the border to prevent an
influx of armed actors from Ethiopia. Borana and Gabra reinforcements tried to cross the
border, but most reinforcements retreated after clashing with KDF border patrols. In
Moyale town, riots broke out. Borana youth attacked the District Commissioner’s office,
claiming he was supporting Gabra in the clashes. However, no fatalities occurred in
Moyale town during the initial attacks, only in the surrounding villages. Reports estimate
25 actors from both sides were killed during the four days of clashes.102
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Patterns of Response
After direct violence ended, Gabra retained control of the three villages outside of
Moyale. National-level mediators from the National Cohesion and Integration
Commission (NCIC) secured a ceasefire agreement through negotiations with local
political leaders from the Gabra, Garre, Borana, and Burji communities (AllAfrica 2013).
The KDF border patrol unit promised to enforcement the ceasefire, and President
Kenyatta threatened local political leaders with suspension of the government should the
ceasefire not hold. However, both groups interpreted the threat as a political move rather
than a sincere effort to contain the conflict. Borana and Gabra communities in Moyale
assumed Kenyatta aimed to use the conflict to undermine the new County Governor,
Ukur Yatani Kanacho, who was aligned with CORD rather than Jubilee (Menkhaus 2015,
121).
Two months after the first wave of violence, in March of 2012, Borana civilians
who had fled to Ethiopia returned to Kenya. Then, in April, Gabra civilians from Ethiopia
moved into grazing areas on Kenyan side of the border 30 kilometers form Moyale town,
and set up two nomadic settlements called Funan Nyata and Antuta. The Borana viewed
this as an act of aggression related to the Gabra’s expansionist strategy. The new
settlements caused the Borana community to mobilize and recruit more youth militia
members from intra-ethnic networks in Ethiopia, under the assumption that new
settlements were evidence that the Gabra intended to take control of the area.103 They
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assumed nomadic settlements were potential forward bases for Borana militias working
to gain access to the area.
With ongoing threats of attacks, from May – August 2013, the ceasefire held.
There were ongoing reports of small and sporadic acts of theft between Boran and Gabra
militias, but most of the attacks were in the form of banditry aimed toward vehicles on
the roads between Marsabit and Moyale. During this period, a clash in Ethiopia threated
to undermine the ceasefire. On July 25, 2012, a clash between Garre and Borana militias
on the Ethiopia side of the border lasted for three days. The UN and the Red Cross
reported 20 fatalities and over 20,000 IDPs in Ethiopia (Al Jazeera July 28th, 2012). The
clash did not spillover directly into Kenya. Borana in Kenya, however, interpreted the
conflict as another sign of increasing intensity of Garre acts of aggression and active
territorial expansion.
During August of 2012, campaigning picked in Moyale within the national
electoral cycle. Politicians used the conflict as a platform for consolidating support,
which further intensified tension between the Borana and Gabra (Scott-Villiers et al.
2014). Outcomes of the county elections were not favorable to the Borana, again
deepening the sense of threat. The REGABU alliance, comprised of the Rendille, Gabra,
Burji – the three minority groups in the area, won almost all major political posts
including the new104 governor, senator, and women’s representative roles.
A brief history of REGABU is critical for understanding the conflict dynamics in
the case. REGABU formed due to Gabra frustration toward Borana domination.
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Historically, prior to devolution, the Borana dominated mid-level political positions in
the county government. In particular, Gabra were persistently under-represented in the
teachers union, one of the largest labor groups in the area. Initially, in order to shift the
balance of power away from the Borana, the Gabra used the REGABU strategy to win
elections within the Kenya National Union of Teachers and Marsabit Teachers’
SACCO.105 Within teachers’ union elections, the strategy worked effectively to “sideline”
Borana representatives. The reversal in control of the teachers union, then, created a
situation where the majority ethnic group was underrepresented in the union. Borana
interpreted this as, as a “Gabra conspiracy to lock us out of power.”106 The same strategy
used in teachers union elections, was then applied as foundation for county elections in
2013, fueling the same sense of grievance among the Borana.
Electoral outcomes increased fear among the Borana of political exclusion within
the newly devolved system of county government.107 In response, the Borana accused the
REGABU alliance of “stealing our seats” (Daily Nation 2012). In the words of an
informant, “election outcomes left Borana feeling ‘sidelined,’ and the Gabra feeling
victorious over their historical subjugators.”108 The electoral processes increased fear of
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Ethnic alliances, therefore, shape the pattern of conflict with the Borana engaging against a coalition of
Gabra, Rendille, and Burji. Considering that the direct intention of the alliance was to prevent Borana from
accessing posts in the new county government, election outcomes in 2013, left created a sense of “Borana
status anxiety” due to the long history of ethnic-based allocation of state resources.
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marginalization by an alliance of minority groups, which intensified animosity and
tension in in Moyale.
Between April and August of 2012, conditions remained relatively peaceful in
Moyale. However, over the course of four months, the Borana reported increasing threats
of attack and displacement from Gabra militias and elites. In response, the Borana
activists organized a protest in Moyale, demanding a statement from the government
about how they were planning to deal with increasing threats against Borana from Gabra
militias. Protesters also demanded the arrest of a prominent local Gabra chief that they
accused coordinating a deadly raid (Star News, August 12, 2013). The KDF was
deployed to control crowds, but, as tension escalated, a KDF officer shot and killed a
Borana human rights activist, Hassan Ali Guyo. The incident deepened suspicion among
the Borana that the Gabra bribed Kenyan government officials and security actors to
support Gabra expansionism.
Two weeks after Guyo’s death, on August 26, 2013, a second wave of major
violence began. Gabra militias attacked Heilu, Odda, and Antuta on the outskirts of
Moyale town. During the second outbreak, the KDF was not able to effectively control
the border. Borana and Gabra reinforcements crossed into Kenya, causing clashes to
spiral for three days. The Kenyan military intervened using helicopter gunships, and
stepped up policing of the area.
Patterns of Response
In the wake of the clashes, the GoK posted a new District Commissioner to
Moyale, Kamunyan Chedotun. Chetodun had a specific mandate to lead a local peace
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process. Reports emerged of tension between Chetodun and local police. Boran and
Gabra leaders perceived a divided government, and rejected negotiations (Star Report,
August 28th, 2013). On December 3, 2013 clashes resumed. The Gabra/Burji alliance
again engaged in clashes with the Borana for four days, with, according to government
reports, 27 fatalities (20 Borana fatalities and 7 Gabra/Burji fatalities), and over 70,000
IDPs fleeing from Moyale. On day four, the KDF intervened using helicopter gunships
and infantry to drive militias from the town and reclaim the area.
Two days after direct conflict ended, reports spread of government alignment with
the Gabra.109 Reports suggested the KDP gave uniforms to Gabra militias during the
conflict and helped to burn Borana civilian homes. Borana elites took the issue to
parliament in Nairobi, calling for statements on the reasons for government support for
the Gabra during the clashes. The GoK responded, claiming that the Ethiopian military
was involved, and justified its support for the Gabra militia as a joint effort between the
Kenyan and Ethiopian militaries to root out OLF members hiding among the Borana
militia in Moyale (Borana News 2014).
Without established DPCs in Marsabit County, the GoK formed an ad hoc
county-level peacebuilding committee to mediate the conflict. A committee of eminent
personalities called the Kaparo-Haji joint committee facilitated negotiations. Ole Kaparo,
former speaker of National Assembly, and Yusef Haji, Garissa county senator, and
former Defense Minster led the ad hoc peace committee. The Kaparo-Haji committee
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achieved a negotiated settlement and stayed in place to oversee reconstruction, relocation
of IDPs, and allocation of resources to support affected families.110
The recommendation at the center of the peace strategy was to ensure the:
“equitable distribution of resources of the government, both financial and human”
(Marsabit County Review, June 2014). The committee imposed new rules of engagement.
Ole Kaparo set up a mandate that the government would fine communities five million
KES for breaking the ceasefire pact. On February 15th, 2014, an elite compromise was
reached. President Kenyatta increased pressure through an ultimatum:
Kenyatta issued an ultimatum to the local political leaders to reach an agreement.
Under pressure from the president, leaders from different communities in
Marsabit agreed to form an oversight committee to ensure continued efforts for
peace. If negotiations fail, Kenyatta stated, all measures will be taken to see peace
restored (Capital FM, February 15th, 2014).
Conclusions
Inter-ethnic group conflict escalated in Moyale in two major waves: one in 2012,
and the other in 2013. In 2013, clashes broke out following local elections. Initially, local
peace actors engaged in the conflict with little success in attaining a truce. The GoK
coordinated a peace restoration committee with external political actors as lead
negotiators. The process of devolution introduced more resources into the conflict
system, creating a type of localized financial shock and increased inter-ethnic group
competition. With political positions linked to exclusive control over the allocation of
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new county resources, the long history of identity-based allocation of state resources
raised the stakes of local elections.111
As Roba Shamaro describes,
“what really makes democracy dangerous in the North is that every leader has
their own ethnic militia. This creates very unstable conditions around contests for
local power. Politicians directly mobilized their own militias to burn houses and
displace rival groups in the lead up to elections.”112
Devolution, therefore, deepened inter-ethnic enmity as local elites competed for access to
new positions in the county government. Political entrepreneurs exploited ethnic identity.
Historical grievances related to prior acts of violence were brought to the surface,
establishing conditions highly conducive for a symbolic event, such as the killing of a
nonviolent activist, to spark even more widespread violence.
In the Moyale case, border dynamics intensified the process of escalation. Gabra
and Borana in Kenya both have ties with kinship groups in Ethiopia. This factor affected
the escalation process. During the lead up to attacks in Moyale, Borana and Gabra
militants trained new militias members across the border. Borana from Northern Marsabit
had links with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Borana in Kenya supplied and aided
former Oromo militia members in the process of evading the Ethiopian military, making
Gabra increasingly fearful of highly coordinated and aggressive attacks with support
from and cooperation with the OLF fighters.113 Increasing rumors of mobilization,
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While it is difficult to verify claims of harboring, due to high levels of suspicion and secrecy, most
likely, claims of linkages and support form the OLF for the Borana militias in Kenya are not overstated.
Community reports, for example, indicate there are still key actors who support the OLF being protected
and harbored in Sololo (see Marsabit Conflict Report 2005). The Ethiopian military, at times, has pursued
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armament, and bribery of security forces on the other side of the border increased
suspicion and fear between both groups.
At same time, both groups could draw upon ethnic ties across the border for
accessing arms, fleeing across border into Ethiopia, and calling for reinforcements.
Cross-border ethnic networks and linkages to conflict in Ethiopia made the conflict
increasingly complex on the Kenya side of the border. During the Moyale episode, for
example, the Borana were accused of calling in members of the OLF militia to assist in
attacks. Borana denied the allegations, claiming that they were victims of aggression
from both Kenyan and Ethiopian militaries, who were falsely accusing them of harboring
OLF rebels, merely based on their shared identity (see also, Menkhaus 2015, 47 – 48).
OLF militants from Ethiopia offered assistance for organization and militarization
of Borana youth in Marsabit introducing more actors with previous wartime experience
into the conflict system.114 The Ethiopian military and intelligence officers constantly
look for Borana OLF sympathizers in Kenya. Thus, the Gabra are highly likely to spoil
zones of protection for OLF rebels evading the Ethiopian military. OLF supporters
cannot trust Gabra to keep secrets of identity, whereabouts, as well as businesses
transactions related to human trafficking, poaching, or arms trafficking. The process of
securing Kenyan ID Cards for Borana from Ethiopia wanting to relocate to Kenya has
become a big business, with illegal trafficking operating under umbrella of livestock
OLF members across border in Kenya in areas around Sololo and Moyale, for example. Moreover, there
are reports that Borana chiefs who have not been loyal in supporting the OLF have been assassinated. The
OLF has used aggression and violent tactics against elites within Borana community, which may help
secure protection and harboring of rebel leaders within the remotest areas of Northern Kenya.
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trade.115 Therefore, cleansing Gabra from contested border areas is a way for the Borana
to protect illegal, intra-group activities as well as protect actors supporting the OLF from
Ethiopian spies and military actors. Border dynamics play a significant role in the
conflict.
In the Moyale case, the Borana conducted highly organized attacks against the
Gabra. The level of organization required for clandestine activities intensified identitybased divisions. Local peace actions occurred prior to the escalation of violence in
Moyale but did not contain escalation. There is some evidence of local peace action
preventing the spillover of conflict from Moyale to surrounding villages through the
coordinated actions of elders networks formed through negotiation processes over local
declarations following the Turbi massacre (see chapter five for further analysis).

Logics of Escalation
In these cases, the following conditions stand out as common features of
escalation processes in areas with limited state presence. First, the initial trigger of
escalation was related to the quality of particular acts of violence. Inter-group conflict
intensified in relation to the downing of a helicopter with a prominent Samburu leader,
the killing of a well known student activist, the targeting church elders, and the killing of
youth militia members, as respondents described, “in their sleep.” All of these acts of
violence were symbolic and fell outside of more expected acts of killing that occurred
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more regularly between male youth involved in militias. These acts broke the social norm
of reciprocity regarding informal codes of targeting within range wars, and increased the
likelihood of escalation (Rothchild 1973).
The second common pattern is that different combinations of civic associations
responded to initial crises to mediate informal peace pacts. In the Turkana - Samburu
case, local government officials, church mission station leaders, and group elders
intervened and led negotiation processes. Operational preventive actions predominantly
included peace messaging, and assistance for relocation. In the Todonyang case, a
prominent MP, the Catholic Church and local CSOs mediated. The rapid breaking of
locally negotiated informal peace pacts, however, played a role in the escalation process
in multiple cases. Informal peace pacts were signed, but quickly broke due to small-scale
acts of violence.
The state used ad hoc helicopter missions to respond to the most remote clashes,
but sent a team of eminent personalities to Moyale to broker a cease-fire agreement. The
use of elite, immanent figures is a common state-led approach to govern conflict in the
periphery. At the state level of analysis, two actions influenced the process of escalation.
In four of the cases, conflict intensified after militias targeted and killed state police
agents. Targeting of the police led increased communal support for local militias. Patrons
of local militias formed cross-ethnic alliances, and extended trade networks to gain
access to more sophisticated arms using pooled communal resources. Similarly, when
conflict actors perceived that the state used force unevenly, conflict escalated. In four of
the five cases, when the targeted group assumed state agents aligned with the aggressor,
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conflict escalated. The perception of state discrimination is a common factor that plays
into local conflict escalation dynamics.
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Table 4: Features of Escalation Cases
Explanatory
Factors
Groups
1. Symbolic
2. Border
/Dev/Periphery
3. State
Response
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4. Cohesive
Coalition
Elite Unity
Informal
Institutions
Militia Trust
5. Local
Adaptation

Outcomes
1) Escalation
2) Nonescalation
3) Re-escalation

1. Turkana
Nyrio Clashes
(1996 – 1997)

2. Samburu
Baragoi
(2012)

3. Samburu
Maralal
(2013)

4. Turkana
Todonyang
(2011)

5. Marsabit
Moyale
(2012 - 2013)

Samburu, Turkana,
Pokot, Somali
Y
Political Leader
Periphery

Samburu, Turkana

Samburu, Turkana

Turkana, Dassanetch

Gabra, Borana

N
Fear: Revenge
Periphery

Y
Student Killed
Periphery

Y
Activist Killed
Border

Coercive: Police
Force
(state targeted)

Coercive: Hybrid
Police Force
(state targeted)

Coercive: Police
Force
(unequal force)

Y
Political Leader
Border/Development
al
Coercive: Police
Force
(state targeted)

N

N

Y*
(Rapid Riot)

N
Fragmented:
CSO Restraint in
Ethiopia

Coercive: Militia
Force
Non: Mediation
(Elder)

Coercive: Militia
Force

Coercive: Militia
Force

Coercive: Militia
Force

Coercive: Militia
Force
Non: Messaging
(Elder)

1
Escalation

1
Escalation

1
Escalation

1
Escalation

1
Escalation

(*2 – catholic church
protection)

(*2 – no urban to
rural spread)

Coercive: Military
Force
Sanctions
(unequal force)
Non: Mediation
N
Fragmented:
DPC Collapse

CHAPTER FOUR: LIMITED ESCALATION IN NORTHERN KENYA

The set of cases analyzed in chapter four share the same dependent variable:
limited escalation or resilience. Inter-group conflict intensified and actors had the
opportunity use violence against a rival group, but they did not. In contrast to the set of
cases in chapters 3, episodes in this chapter provide evidence of coalitions of local civic
associations playing roles in processes of preventive intervention and warning response
to contain inter-group conflict.
In all of the cases, there is evidence of local peace actors operating outside of
formal organizational affiliations to respond to threats and dampen violence. Each case
considers plausible conditions for constraint, or factors related to external actors and
preventive intervention, and restraint, or factors internal to armed groups, contributing to
non-escalation. Across the cases, informal coalitions of civic organizations prevent
conflict escalation following acts of violence through three key mechanisms: threatmonitoring networks, providing platforms for inter-group negotiation of informal peace
pacts, and enforcing traditional codes of restitution.
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Table 5: Limited Escalation Cases
Samburu, Marsabit, Turkana, and Isiolo
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Samburu: Nyiro Mountain Corridor: Turkana – Samburu (2012 – 2014)
Marsabit: Sarimo Settlement: Gabra – Turkana (2010 – 2014)
West Pokot: Turkwel Gorge and the Motorcycle Murders (2014)
Turkana: Oil and Ethnic Riots (2012 – 2014)
Isiolo: Post-election Peace (2013 – 2014)

Samburu: Nyiro Mountain Corridor: Turkana – Samburu (2012 – 2014)
Conflict between Samburu and Turkana militias along the Nyiro Mountain
conflict corridor from 2012 –2014 is a case in which inter-group hostility was very high,
but escalation did not occur. Following a series of three Turkana attacks against Samburu
villages and resources, local militias did not use violence against Turkana settlements
along the border of Samburu County. Why did inter-group violence not escalate during a
period of increasing hostility and threats of revenge attacks? The series of conflict events
is included in the ACLED database, but not in the UCDP database since total fatalities
did not reach the threshold (Raleigh et al. 2010). The Nyiro mountain case is an example
of local civic associations playing a key role in containing escalation.
Conflict Context
Overlapping conditions increase the potential for escalation and collective
violence within the conflict between the Samburu and Turkana along the Nyiro Mountain
– Suguta Valley corridor. Small arms density is high. Saferworld and SRIC survey
indicate a 100% ownership rate among adults for the area (SRIC 2006). Turkana
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settlements within the boundaries of Samburu County have rising populations, and
Samburu politicians regularly express fear of Turkana resettlement schemes. The area
chief, Dominic Lepulelei stated, “Their home area, Suguta Valley, is a terrible place.
They keep moving into our territory. They have it in their minds take over our grazing
areas.”116 Drawing upon this suspicion, Samburu political leaders regularly threaten, “to
push the ‘Samburu-Turkana’ back towards ‘Turkana-Turkana.’”117 Samburu politicians
consistently threaten to remove Turkana settlements due to fear of a long-term Turkana
expansionist strategy.118 Rising competition over increasingly scarce resources, political
incitement, and a history of inter-group banditry and violent clashes suggests there is a
high risk for conflict escalation.
Between 2012 – 2014, a series of conflict events increased hostility between the
Samburu and Turkana along the Suguta Valley – Nyiro Mountain conflict corridor. Less
than a year after the Baragoi massacre in 2012 (see chapter 3), on the morning of October
17th, 2013, a Turkana militia attacked the village of Waso Rongai. The militia killed four
Samburu moran, injured three, and stole 600 cattle. One day prior to the attack, Turkana
abandoned the village of Kawap, a semi-permanent settlement 8 kilometers west of Waso
Rongai along the Turkana militia’s escape route—evidence of direct collaboration
between the Kawap community and the militia.
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Following the attack, the Samburu North DPC and the Catholic Church in
Baragoi convened a peace dialogue between Samburu and Turkana ward representatives.
The dialogue led to a new informal boundary agreement, and a new rule of engagement
for Turkana and Samburu militias: “shoot on sight.”119 Elders from both groups informed
leaders of remote Samburu and Turkana militias of the new boundary rules.
Shortly after the dialogue, on October 27th, 2013, a Turkana militia broke the
agreement. A militia attacked Tuum, injuring one Samburu moran and stealing 120
cattle. Families who lost animals in Tuum demanded a direct response from local
Samburu militias, increasing the potential for a revenge attack against Turkana
settlements. Even though only one injury occurred, a local elder stated, “[the Tuum
attack] was not at all acceptable for the Samburu—it was cowardly, shameful, and
happened right beside the police barracks.”120 During the attack, only one warrior
monitored a large herd of cattle belonging to 17 families, and fog covered the valley.
Informants indicated the animals belonged to the poorest families in the
community, stating, “There is no way we can stand still when the poorest among us lost
so much.”121 The proximity of the attack to the most recent peace dialogue, “made the
Tuum raid so bitter.”122 Respondents expressed the Turkana were, “speaking peace with
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one mouth, and organizing violence against us with the other.”123 In the words of a key
moran leader, “a Turkana must die, and the cows must be brought back, due to the way
they took the Tuum cows.”124

Patterns of Response
Despite increased hostility and direct demands from the Tuum community for
moran to coordinate revenge attacks, revenge attacks did not occur. On the brink of
escalation, what factors prevented Samburu militias in the Nyiro Valley from engaging in
revenge attacks against Turkana settlements? In July of 2014, drought was the most
common explanation. In the words of one informant: “when it rains, there will be
trouble.”125 Without access to water and resources away from the mountain range, moran
could not travel inconspicuously to conduct a counter-raid operation. With clear evidence
of increased tension, Turkana militias stationed scouts across the rangeland, especially
close to well-known water points and raiding routes. Militia vigilance increased the risk
of Samburu mobilization, especially under drought conditions. With the Samburu
community demanding a revenge attack, a plausible explanation for restraint is that
environmental conditions increased the cost and risk of conducting a counter-raid,
containing escalation (see also, Witsenburg and Adano 2009).
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In other cases of escalation, such as the Baragoi conflict and Turbi massacre,
militias elected to engage in asymmetrical revenge attacks against proximate out-group
communities. Turkana civilian populations in close proximity to Tuum, including Parikati
and Sarima and Kurungu were not immediately targeted. What factors prevented revenge
attacks against proximate Turkana settlements? The following narrative employs insights
from interviews and focus group conversations on threat response strategies employed in
the area. Local interpretations from Tuum, Loongerin, Parikati and Sarima, the most
plausible sites of attacks, suggest informal out-group coping mechanisms, and intra-group
civic associations play key roles in containing violence. Local civic associations, in
particular, contributed significantly to non-escalation.

Parikati – Tuum Communal Protection Strategies
Parikati, Kenya is a Turkana village on the edge of the Suguta Valley, between
Turkana and Samburu Counties, 15 kilometers from Tuum. There is very little trust
between the two groups and a persistent threat of attack. Samburu do not allow Turkana
from Parikati direct access to markets in Tuum out of fear of spying, and access to
information related to militia locations and resources. Livestock trade between Parikati
and Tuum occurs through heavily policed sokko, or “peace markets,” organized by the
Catholic Church, or through intermediaries who conduct exchanges in remote locations
between the two villages. Samburu militia members assume the Turkana community in
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Parikati is likely to collaborate with highly mobile Turkana or Pokot militias to raid
Samburu livestock.126
Turkana living in Parikati articulated a range of strategies to reduce the likelihood
of Samburu targeting the village following deadly raids. Local elder Jonathan Losokon
stated, “Parikati is a very dangerous place, but we trained ourselves to survive in this
area.”127 A small network of Turkana leaders in Parikati share threat information with
patrons of Samburu militias in Tuum. In the absence of communication technology,
Turkana source information on potential threats through intra-clan trade networks.128 This
is a high-risk strategy, as Turkana militias have assassinated actors caught spying for
Samburu militias.129 The covert informant network limits the likelihood of rapid
escalation. As a local Samburu militia leader stated, “We still do not trust them at all. We
would attack them if we knew they were working with other enemies, but as long as they
share information with us, we cannot attack them.”130 Clandestine informant networks
establish a minimal form of cross-ethnic group connection to reduce the likelihood that
Samburu will target out-group villages.
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At the same time, informal, intra-group policing131 strategies compliment covert
inter-group information networks. The tenuous relationship would break down if
Samburu suspected Turkana of forming an outside alliance to allow an external Turkana
or Pokot militia to use the village as a forward base for conducting raids. As Joseph
Lokinei describes:
We do not let other Turkana or Pokot pass through Parikati, even just to trade.
There are spies for the Turkana in Parikati and in Tuum and spies for the Samburu
in Parikati and Tuum. All of the spies want peace and to protect their own
animals. They tell each other if the other group is coming through their territory to
attack. We do not want those who kill to be part of our community, so we keep
them out.132
The GoK promotes informal community policing among pastoralist communities in the
area via the nyumba kumi (“ten houses”) initiative. Replicating communal policing
structures in Rwanda, the GoK encourages villages to develop informal community
watch systems to control movement of potential spoilers in and out of settlements in the
most insecure areas.
Livestock management strategies compliment informant networks and intra-group
policing. For example, the Turkana community in Parikati established livestock
identification and tracking systems for each clan, and enforced a shared communal rule to
not purchase animals from unknown Turkana or Pokot markets or traders. They do not
purchase livestock if they do not know and trust the source to reduce suspicion among
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Samburu militias: “even if they think we are thieves, there will not be peace.”133 Turkana
in Parikati over-accumulate livestock. A prominent elder stated, “We do not sell animals,
even if we need the money for schools fees. Sometimes, we really struggle for food, but
if raided, at least we can forgive and not organize for revenge.”134 Respondents claim
these tactics prevent Samburu from attacking Turkana living in Tuum following Turkana
militia attacks on Samburu resources: “In these ways, we suffer to keep peace.”135
Sarima – Loonjerin Communal Protection Strategies
Similar to Parikati, Sarima, Kenya is a Turkana settlement at high risk for revenge
attacks. Loonjerin and Sarima are, “two villages in the danger zone. When the Turkana
attack Samburu, they must first attack Loonjerin. It is just at the base of the mountains
and easy to scout for animals and warriors. When the Samburu attack, they first attack
Sarima.”136 Due to the severity of past attacks that have occurred in these two locations at
the intersection of major raiding routes, there is a very high level of distrust and intergroup suspicion. For example, a Samburu elder state: “Those of Sarima also give us fake
names of raiders when we go to them after the attack to see what happened. They use
diversion and lies to try to keep the peace and protect their own people.”137
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Despite severe suspicion and mistrust between the Samburu and Turkana, similar
to Parikati, both groups have in place covert informant networks. Samburu informants
described,
“They [Turkana of Sarima] are still our enemies, but they let us know if Turkana,
Pokot, or Gabra militias are on the other side. This is a dangerous strategy.
Sometimes bandits from other groups make tracks leading to Sarima to make us
think [the Turkana] were involved when they were not.”138
An ex-militia leader,139 and now key elder of the Turkana clan describes the strategic
dilemma for the settlement:
We live at a very dangerous point along the road between Maralal and
Loiyangalani. Many people pass through here, so we have to be welcoming to
everyone for our businesses. This makes the Samburu suspicious of us. They
think we are always working with others to coordinate attacks on them. That is
why we have to make sure they know this is not the case. We have to be a town of
peace. If we are not, the Samburu will clear us.140
Due to high levels of suspicion, and shared knowledge of the various ways the
other group can avert blame and mislead local policing missions with tracking or
misinformation about impending raids, informant networks are complex and layered. As
one respondent stated, “we have spies to spy on our spies.”141 The main Turkana elder
based in Sarima is infamous. Respondents from the area said, “that guy was a real
warlord” and accounted stories of his leadership and behavior during deadly clashes. He
now chairs the local peace committee of Sarima. As a major local power broker, the local
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leader of the Sarima settlement works in close collaboration with Samburu elders,
informants, and militia leaders, and has become a central figure for information sharing
and monitoring. Critically, his dominant status as a former militia leader protects him
from threats from other Turkana militias.
Respondents from Sarima village claimed they disarmed the village to make it
less prone to attacks, stating: “home guards (KPR) have weapons to protect us, so we do
not need weapons.”142 Further investigation indicated that this is not the case: “Turkana
in Sarima have a lot of weapons. Everyone does. But it is true that they do not try to get
more. If they did, we would know and they would have to leave.”143 Samburu elders
maintain linkages with actors involved in weapons trade that provide them with
information about who is purchasing or transporting weapons into the area, which plays
into calculations related to potential threats.
Civic Associations and Warning Response in the Nyiro Valley
A rapid deployment unit (RDU) with an anti-stock theft police force is based on
the outskirts of Tuum. Police actors, however, do not have access to day-to-day
interactions and exchanges between the Samburu and Turkana regarding potential threats.
Samburu and Turkana are suspicious of the policing force comprised of soldiers from
“down country.” Samburu militia leaders in Tuum do not provide information to the
formal security unit due to the high cost of corruption, and that fact that militia actors
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assumed their illegal weapons would be confiscated. A group of young boys in Tuum, too
young to be initiated into moran protection groups, frequented the military camp and, in
exchange for food, provided some information to the military. State actors in Tuum
functioned well outside of the primary group of actors responsible for the day-to-day
management of threat warnings and organized scouting missions.
Local civic associations with insider linkages to leaders of youth militias station
in remote outposts involved in day-to-day scouting and warning response in the Tuum
area reveals a strong, informal coalition of local civic groups that includes five Samburu
associations. The Protestant Church in Tuum is as a major hub for communication with
leaders, elders, and, indirectly, leaders of armed communal protection units. The mission
station in Tuum had the only Thuraya (satellite) phone in village. Early warning
messages are sent to that phone in the hands of a local missionary. Vehicles from the
mission regularly deployed for tracking, animal recovery, and scouting missions.
Elders groups played a key role. Elders are the main patrons for young moran
entrenched in the day-to-day process of livestock protection, information gathering, and
positioning of resources. This is very different from the past social structure.144
Increasing insecurity in the area has triggered change within the Samburu age-set
hierarchy. Traditionally, Samburu moran operated independently. Elders collaborate
closely with moran to provide support and protection while in mobile cattle camps. For
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example, as an informant described, “last year we failed in a raid and lost one warrior.
Elders came in to support us and help organize the next one we could learn quickly from
the mistakes.”145 Elders also play multiple roles within various community organizations,
increasing their capacity to acquire broad and detailed information about conflicts and
negotiation processes to provide to warriors. Warrior bands living in remote, clan-based
cattle camps use information provided through informal networks to make day-to-day
decisions on herd movement, scouting locations, or mobilization for offensive theft or
attack if low-risk opportunities are identified.
The Catholic Church of Tuum is another major hub for improving and enhancing
local protection strategies. The Church constructed signage around the valley with the
message, “Tuum – Land of Peace.” It was involved in peace messaging, and coordinating
peace dialogues designed for long-term norm change and a discursive shift (Cameron,
Weatherbed, and Onyiego 2013). In other words, dialogues pursed the goal of convincing
all groups living in the area to identify smaller bandit groups as thieves and murderers,
not as, “legitimate members of the larger collective.”146 Most importantly, the Catholic
Church organized peace markets, helping to reestablish open exchange between Turkana
and Samburu, and increase opportunities for information sharing among clandestine
informant networks.
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The teachers’ union played a role, as well. On a day-to-day basis teachers engage
with Samburu youth, many of whom choose, “to stay in town rather than in the
camps.”147 Samburu students maintain direct relationships with age mates stationed in
remote protection militias, allowing teachers the opportunity access and relay information
related to rumors, conflict dynamics, and potential threats.
The District Peace Committee for Samburu North played a minimal role in
responding to the Samburu – Turkana conflict. With an increasing threat of violence, the
chairman of the DPC for Samburu North, Moses Lenaroishi, traveled to Tuum to conduct
a peace dialogue. After suggesting the Samburu were culpable for prior attacks,
informants indicate that the community did not allow him to convene a dialogue. Leaders
of Samburu militias communicated to the DPC that, “there is no way must a Turkana not
die and the cows be brought back.”148 The threat initiated dialogue among leaders of the
DPC and local political representatives about the government paying restitution for the
crimes to reduce the risk of escalation, the first time a proposal was considered.149
Outcomes
Historically, clashes occurred between Turkana and Samburu in Loongerin and
Sarima. Recently, however, clashes have not occurred between Samburu and Turkana
communities for six years. Coping strategies restrain the mobilization and movement of
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large armed militias in the area, making it difficult for armed groups to move freely and
inconspicuously across the territory. Small groups still operate in the area, often in very
small bands of moran that break away from the larger militia to engage in banditry.
Dense covert informant networks prevent mobilization and planning required to engage
in large-scale raids and attacks, increasing risk for large bands of armed actors to operate
in the area. Dense informant networks restrain the mobilization of large groups, but they
cannot fully contain all mobile ethnic militia groups that are small, strategic, and well
armed.
Covert trans-ethnic informant networks are strong, even if this is a high-risk
strategy. The absence of an international border forces Samburu militias to purchase arms
and ammunition through outsider ethnic groups, rather than through intra-group
networks. Thus, the formation of illicit arms networks that cut across identity boundaries
strengthens informant networks that help in creating trans-ethnic alliances for threat
monitoring, and policing of inter-group boundary areas within Samburu County. Due to
the fact the Samburu have historically faced threats from almost every group in the
region, militias have developed skills in forming opportunistic alliances. As conflict
dynamics change, the Samburu have the capacity to use threat of the use of force as a
deterrent and to work through civic organizations to monitor potential threats and
convene inter-group negotiations.
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Conclusions
The case indicates local associations extend informal threat-monitoring networks.
Covert informant networks contain inter-group violence, but at high risk to informants.
Clandestine information sharing provides communities on both sides of the conflict dyad
with greater access to information. They also increase time to address and respond to
potential threats or reinforce local protection strategies. Cooperation between militias and
local civic associations, improves scouting and threat response capacity for local militias.
An informal coalition of local civic associations in Tuum improved intra-group
communication and extended the threat response capacity of Samburu militias.
Reports of suspicious armed groups moving in the area – reach armed actors in
remote manyattas set up at locations with broad visibility. The rapid spread of
information through civic organizations triggered deployment of armed scouts to areas
with suspicious activity. Scouts then gained more accurate information about movement
of potentially threatening actors in the area, in order to shift placement of protection units
and deploy additional scouting units to strategic locations. Vehicles from local
associations helped local militias respond to potential threats and police broader territory,
allowing actors within monitoring networks to attain even more information about of
potential threats.
The informal protection system in Tuum resisted interference of outside actors.
Local associations prevented external actors and civic groups from operating in the area.
Respondents identified multiple external CSOs and church groups interested in ad hoc
peace work or missionary work in the area that were not allowed access. Samburu elders
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stated, “NGOs and other missionaries do not support our moran. They tell them to disarm
and go to school, but without the moran, no one can live here.”150 Since the state cannot
ensure security in the area, local associations, even those involved in peacebuilding
programming, collaborate with and support armed militias to ensure local militias have
capacity to respond quickly to information about potential threats.
In this case, local militias leverage the resources of civic associations to extend
policing and threat-response capacity. The collaborative relationship between local
militias and the coalition of civic organizations allows for armed groups to Tuum to
engage in more strategic, and controlled interactions and negotiations with Turkana
militias, reducing the likelihood of rapid, asymmetrical revenge attacks against proximate
Turkana communities and thus limiting the escalation of violence.

Marsabit: Sarimo: Turkana – Gabra (2010 – 2014)
Outside of town centers such as Marsabit and Loiyangalani, across the remote,
Northwestern region of Marsabit County, the majority of semi-permanent settlements are
ethnically homogenous. Sarimo, however, is a unique Turkana – Gabra settlement in
Northwestern Marsabit County. Similar to the nature of inter-group relations between
Samburu and Turkana settlements in the Nyiro Valley, Sarimo is an example of nonescalation. Local civic associations and informal institutional arrangements play key roles
in containing conflict between local communities from two rival groups. Guyo Tuke
describes the setting:
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“Sarimo is a unique case of peace in Marsabit County. The Turkana and Gabra
decided to settle together even after major clashes in 2008 and 2009, and even
stayed together in peace after a major drought in 2011. Many thought there would
be problems in Sarimo, but Turkana are now grazing over 100 kilometers into
Gabra territory, with no problems.”151
Context of Conflict
Gabra and Turkana militias engaged in deadly clashes outside of Loiyangalani152
in the village of Moite in May of 2007. The conflict escalated with major attacks in April
and July of 2008. ACLED data indicates clashes between the Gabra and Turkana caused
31 total fatalities in 2008 (Raleigh et al. 2010). In 2009, during a major drought, Gabra
and Turkana elders negotiated an informal peace agreement, called the Sarimo
Declaration. A local civic association called the Pastoralist Integrated Support Program
(PISP) was the lead coordinating organization, collaborating with elders from both
groups and the District Peace Committee in Loiyangalani.
After the signing of the pre-movement pact, the two groups formed a new
settlement in Sarimo. The village remains divided, with no inter-group marriage, and
persistent intergroup suspicion. Gabra and Borana militias still engage in attacks against
Turkana clans outside of Loiyangalani. The Gabra view Turkana groups on the eastern
side of the lake, as “living outside of their home area.”153 However, even following
attacks between Gabra and Turkana militias in neighboring areas, the joint settlement did
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not dis-integrate. Sarimo is a case in which conflict was of the brink of escalation, but
violence did not escalate.
Patterns of Response
Peacebuilding actors in Marsabit claimed the work of PISP, a local NGO with
special focus on supporting the pastoralist groups across Marsabit County played a
critical role in strengthening communal protection strategies. Prior to the establishment of
the village of Sarimo in 2006, PISP conducted a peacebuilding program that included
pre-movement negotiations, pact making, and a training program for local KPR.154
Informants from Sarimo, however, did not support the narrative of successful external
intervention.
During the focus group, a respondent stated,
“The [peacebuilders] set up new rules and agreements about land and animals for
all of us to follow, but in our scattered nomadic societies, rules are difficult to
follow. Our people are scattered everywhere, so their programs always
breakdown. We have to build new rules with our neighbors everywhere we go.”155
Leaders in Sarima cited the following criticism of preventive efforts conducted in the
village, stating,
“Peace programs are small, short-term, and one-time meetings. The NGOs sit up
there, and nothing reaches us. No one sits with us to see how we keep peace. We
use our own leaders and processes to resolved our own conflicts. They sit up there
and take credit, while our people keep peace.”156
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The most plausible factors that help contain violence between the Turkana and
Gabra and prevent dis-integration of the unique settlement are as follows. The Turkana
community living in Sarimo fled an even more insecure area to the South of Loiyangalani
under severe threat from Samburu, Borana, and Gabra militias. Gabra actors settled in
Sarimo relocated from an insecure area north of North Horr. Both groups settled in the
remote village due to flight from more severe violence. The location remains at threat of
attack from Dassanetch militias to the North; however, Sarimo is a strategic location for
protection from Dassanetch aggression. Sibiloi National Park is a buffer. Sibiloi is
remote, largely ungoverned territory, but ranger patrols make it difficult for Dassanetch
militias to cross the area.
In short, the Turkana and the Gabra face a common aggressor, increasing the
likelihood of cooperation and negotiation following inter-group conflict events. Leaders
in Sarimo described the strategic dilemma for both groups:
After so many battle deaths in our communities, we all agreed that this death is
useless. We came to an agreement to share the land. We chose a very distant, very
harsh location, even with less water. Our women and children suffer most. But we
had to come here, so we would not have a border with the Dassanetch. Sometimes
the Dassanetch try to come this far; so we must work together to survive here. We
see the benefit of peace and of staying together to be protected from the
Dassanetch.157
Respondents from Sarimo also identified disarmament and day-to-day practices of
resource management as key conditions for inter-group peace. Integrated livestock
management and tracking functions to increase security. Everyone in the settlement helps
protect livestock. Women and children herd livestock by day, but, at night, men monitor
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the area, circling borders to look for footprints and scout for bands of raiders. If there is
suspicion of theft, the KPR lead recovery missions as both groups have disarmed.
Turkana respondents described the situation: “We accepted not having arms only because
we would not be allowed to live in Gabra areas. As long as we have the KPR and as long
we know whether or not the Dassanetch are coming, we think everything will be OK.”158
The enforcement of an informal peace pact cements the higher level of intergroup cooperation in Sarimo, as well.159 Clashes occurred between Turkana and Gabra
youth militias over grazing blocs and water points south of Sarimo broke out in 2009 near
Loiyangalani shortly following the peace agreement. One Turkana died in the clashes. In
contrast to other cases where informal peace pacts failed to contain further escalation of
violence (see chapter 5), the Sarimo pact held. Why did the Gabra community choose to
pay the high cost of restitution following the clash? PISP intervened, along with elders,
and representatives of the district peace committee in Loiyangalani.
The local coalition assisted in coordination and enforcement of the informal
restitution payment stipulated in the Sarimo Declaration, and supported both groups in
the process of navigating the county justice system. PISP played a key role in supporting
the informal process of restitution. The enforcement of the informal institutional
arrangement governing the settlement was highly symbolic for both groups: “after the
Gabra made the payment, we knew we could stay in peace for a long time.” Elders stated,
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“We knew we had to follow the rules to stay here in peace. We pressured the community
to ensure the payment was made.”160
Conclusions
The Sarimo settlement, similar to Parikati and Sarima, is a case where a minority
group, the Turkana adopted context specific informal institutional arrangements to live in
close proximity to a primary aggressor and reduce the likelihood of conflict escalation. In
2014, negotiations through the elders system and with Gabra clans led to the expansion of
informal agreements between the Gabra and Turkana, and Turkana gained access to
grazing rights in Gabra territory with rising resource scarcity.161 In this case, civic
associations complimented local protection strategies to prevent disintegration in Sarimo
following clashes between Gabra and Turkana militias in Loiyangalani. The experience
of enforcement of the informal peace agreement played a key role in preventing Gabra
and Turkana clashes from escalating.

West Pokot: Turkwel Gorge and the Motorcycle Murders (July 2014)
Turkwel Gorge is a micro-level case in which a coalition of local peacebuilding
organizations played a role in dampening violence between the Pokot and Turkana along
a highly volatile border area. The case is linked to the larger inter-group conflict
discussed in chapter 5, in which many preventive efforts did not limit escalation.
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However, in this micro-case, it is plausible that rapid threat response of elders, “reformed
warriors,” and Catholic Church leaders along the border contained a conflict that could
have continued to escalate. The coalition provided a platform for informal inter-group
negotiation, threat monitoring, and support for non-coercive communal protection
strategies.
Following an initial attack and a highly asymmetrical counter-attack, violence
stopped. ACLED data includes the key events within the conflict, starting on July 18th,
2014 (Raleigh et al. 2010). Participant observation and interviews with conflict actors
provide the foundation for the following conflict narrative. Intervention forestalled
further cyclical violence under conditions of severe volatility.
Context of Conflict
Historically, banditry was the most common conflict driver of inter-group conflict
along the border between West Pokot and Turkana. Groups in the area, including the
Pokot, Turkana, and Karamajong,162 have long engaged in highly cyclical raids.
Traditionally, stolen animals tended to stay within the herds of each group, remaining as
the foundation for wealth accumulation and social status. Animals were rarely sold, even
for school fees for children. Cyclical theft occurred in relationship to cycles of animal
replacement, and tit-for-tat retribution following initial acts of inter-group violence.
Many anthropologists argue elders organized raids, and attacks were opportunistic and
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highly risk-averse, which caused very low levels of fatalities. Parenti and other analysts
describe the traditional form of banditry as a game of social exchange. This approach
assumes that inter-group resource conflict functions to increase and develop the status
and household wealth of young warriors (Meier et al. 2007; Sterzel et al. 2012).
Armed actors, however, have become increasing militarized over time, and many
groups abandoned relatively peaceful games of social exchange. Well-organized Pokot
militias now engage in violent theft and banditry as an accumulation strategy, rather than
more traditional and symbolic forms of raiding (Griner 2013; Triche 2015). In West
Pokot, very violent forms of predatory resource extraction have emerged that are quite
different and more intensive than in other areas of Northern Kenya.
In contrast to relatively peaceful forms of traditional theft, banditry began to be
used not only for the purpose of the accumulation or exchange of wealth, but to
undermine the power of other ethnic groups operating within the predatory system. As
raids became increasingly militarized, armed groups changed tactics, and inter-group
violence escalated in relationship to the nature of attacks. Violence became more
indiscriminant with women and children becoming targets during raids, and villages
being looted and burned. Banditry became a tool for ethnic cleansing, across the larger
conflict system (Triche 2014). This form of inter-group violence concentrates around
Turkwel Gorge.
Turkwel Gorge, in West Pokot County near the Uganda border, is a site of major
contestation and frequent clashes between the Turkana and Pokot communities. Turkwel
River is a key water resource for both groups, flowing from Mt. Elgon, across West
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Pokot County through the Southern Plains of Turkana County, and across the Loturerei
Desert to Lake Turkana. Development assistance from France supported the construction
of a hydro-power plant along the river between 1986 – 1991 (Adams 1989). The reservoir
increased settlement of Turkana clans within West Pokot County. Turkana settled in the
area to access jobs during dam construction, the new stable water supply, electricity, and
opportunities for fishing. Over time, Lorogon village formed as a Turkana settlement near
the reservoir.
The project created high expectations among the Pokot.163 The GoK promised
compensation to the Pokot community through land, job opportunities, and overall
development gains. A local informant described, “today there have been no gains for us.
No jobs were given to the Pokot; they were given to the other communities, so we felt
cheated from land and jobs in our own county.”164 Actors from the Pokot community
claim Turkana encroachment is the primary cause of conflict in Turkwel Gorge.
Respondents state, “this was not their original land; they do not belong here.”165 Pokot
assume that the government of Kenya protects the Turkana in Lorogon, but tries to,
“chase the Pokot from Turkwel Gorge.”166 Similarly, the dominant narrative among the
Turkana is related to a Pokot conspiracy to drive the group away from water resources
and claim Turkana territory. A local Turkana respondent stated:
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When the dam was built there was a secret between the government [Moi regime]
and the Pokot to drive the Turkana away from the Turkwel River. They all drew a
secret map, and land around Turkwel Gorge was sold to the Pokot. We didn’t
know this until recently, but they changed the map of Turkana when they built the
dam. Lorogon was our land before.167
From the view of the Turkana, even though the settlement is within the borders of
West Pokot County, the community assumes it has a legitimate claim to the land around
the dam, claiming it used to be part of Turkana County. Both groups claim the land and
both groups assume the GoK supports and protects the other group. For example, Pokot
respondents indicate that unequal application of disarmament campaigns has exacerbated
the conflict, stating:
This conflict has become worse because of efforts to disarm all Pokot instead of
those guilty of crimes. When you criminalize the whole community, this leads to
mobilization of the whole community. There has been a strong government bias
against the Pokot. They help to recover cattle stolen for the Turkana, but they do
not help recover cattle the Turkana steal from us.168
The dam deepened conflict between the Pokot and Turkana over territorial
demarcation, ownership and access to Turkwel River, as well as access to irrigation
schemes linked to the new reservoir at Lorogon. Administrative control over Lorogon
remains contested. The village is within the boundaries of North Pokot District of West
Pokot County, but the chief of Lorogon represents the Turkana community and reports to
the Turkana County Administration (West FM, Sep. 16, 2014). Under these conditions,
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Pokot and Turkana militias engage in aggressive tactics and the minority Turkana
population living at Lorogon remains highly vulnerable to outbreaks of violence.169
On July 18th, 2014, Pokot warriors rode into Lorogon on motorbikes, killed four
Turkana men and took 20 animals. Two days later, on the 20th of July, Turkana engaged
in a nearly immediate revenge attack against a Pokot settlement near Turkwel. The
revenge attack was asymmetrical—the Turkana militia killed two Pokot men, one
woman, and eight elders and children.170 However, the conflict stopped short of further
escalation.
Why did the Turkana kill Pokot civilians, indiscriminately, after the attack? An
informant described, “after the incident on 18 July, we asked for them to hand over those
who were responsible for the attack, but they [the Pokot] did not produce them. This was
why we killed 11 Pokot.”171 Vigilante justice was used to try create a sense of equality of
loss. As a conflict actor described, “if we can’t get the right person, we have to get
someone from that group to make them feel the same pain.”172
The reported logic of violence indicates the trigger for highly asymmetrical
violence was the absence of equality of loss between both groups. As a conflict actor
described, “if we can’t get the right person, we have to get someone from that group to
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make them feel the same pain.”173 The expectation of tit-for-tat justice between both
groups is a strong and deeply embedded customary institution that shapes the trajectory
of conflict between the groups. Why did violence not continue to escalate, after the
highly asymmetrical Turkana attack directed toward women and children?
Patterns of Response
In response to the clashes, the state deployed political elites on a fact-finding
mission. The government mission coordinated a peace rally in Lorogon and promised
deployment of security personnel including a rural border patrol, rapid deployment unit,
and anti-stock theft unit for the area (see, Daily Nation, “More officers planned for
Pokot-Turkana border,” June 2, 2014). Historically, multiple organizations, including the
National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), POKATUSA, and Riam-Riam,
supported local peace processes in Turkwel Gorge. Peacebuilding actors targeted
resource-sharing issues,174 focusing on dialogues with Pokot and Turkana political
leaders (see also, Reliefweb, “Turkana-Pokot Peace Meeting,” March 05, 2014). In this
particular case, however, the Catholic Diocese of Kitale was the lead responder to the
conflict.
The diocese mobilized reformed warriors from Lorogon to assemble militia
leaders, and bring conflict actors together on neutral territory for negotiations.175 The
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Church convened a dialogue in Kitale on July 23rd, 2014. Mediators communicated to
both groups to send delegations of, “real warriors, not town people.”176 A well-known
mediator, Bishop Cornelius Korir,177 led the dialogue. Priests led intra-group dialogues,
and inter-group dialogues followed.
A final joint dialogue set forth three basic agreements to avert escalation: intergroup compensation and restitution, upholding the shared norm of non-targeting of
women, elders, and children, and limiting community mobility until tension eased. The
Bishop stated, “now that we have agreed, call your boys and tell them not to cross the
border with guns, because everyone is ready for war.”178 Pokot militia leaders agreed to
prevent reinforcements from traveling into the region from across the Ugandan border.
Militia patrons present at the dialogue informed local politicians of the outcomes of the
negotiation.179
Participants in the dialogue had extensive experience dealing with scripts of
formal peace negotiations due to the high level of prior intervention. After the program
ended, ongoing negotiations and inter-group dialogue took place outside of the peace
meeting in a more informal setting. Both groups voiced grievances related to composition
and group representation – Turkana claimed their negotiation team included, “real
warriors but the Pokot only brought town warriors,” and conflicts emerged over demands
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from Finn Church Aid (FCA) for payments and sitting fees. Participants claimed: “all the
other groups have paid us to come to these things!”180
In terms of the impact of the dialogue on conflict dynamics, discussing the
process with participants, they argued, “these meetings help a little.”181 Rather,
respondents highlighted the importance of the “reformed warriors” as key local peace
actors in ongoing work to contain violence in the area. As John Lodinyo, founder of
POKATUSA and supporter of reformed warriors programs, describes:
“Reformed warriors from both sides react to every problem. Things are bad now,
but they could be so much worse. Their bravery allows us to all work together to
make decisions about how to protect the community. When the peace actors live
out there, the situation changes. They demand peace.”182
Local reformed warriors groups, comprised of Turkana and Pokot men that have
been part of the conflict system in the past, formed over time through the longer-term
peacebuilding work of church networks and other CSOs. These groups have a very high
level of legitimacy and, as evident in the July 23rd dialogue, are able to convene actors
directly involved in clashes. Pokot participants, for example, stated, “we are only here to
talk, because (anonymous) is a reformed warrior, and he wanted us to be here.”183
Outside of intermittent dialogues supported through external organizations, peacebuilding
actors working along the Pokot – Turkana border claim village level peace groups
coordinate routinized inter-group dialogues to contain conflict.
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Outcomes
Under conditions of severe insecurity community protection strategies have a
taken on new forms. Three main village based groups coordinate local dialogue
processes, including elders’ councils, reformed warriors, and local women’s groups.
After local dialogues occur, elders and women leaders report receiving more information
about impending attacks, and being able to coordinate dialogues, warn other groups, and
alert patrons of local militias to persuade youth militias to stand down from planned
attacks.184 Local peace actors along the border claim village-level associations prevent
severe clashes and dislocation, even though the larger conflict is not resolved.
During periods of heightened insecurity, external organizations cannot access the
most insecure and vulnerable communities along the Pokot – Turkana border due to
threats from militias with experience resisting state police and military forces. In day-today settings, reformed warriors groups play a key role in threat monitoring and
coordination of local dialogue processes. In the words of a national-level conflict
specialist, “along the West Pokot border, there is significant reverse engineering of
peacebuilding technology.”185
Conclusions
Following the church-led intervention, two months followed without major
attacks; however, violence re-escalated in Lorogon in early September, leading to over 15
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fatalities.186 Reformed warriors and the dialogue platforms of the Catholic Church had a
momentary dampening impact. Rapid response and mobilization of local peace actors,
convening rapid preventive negotiations, and symbolic compensation for fatalities were
key mechanisms that restrained the immediate mobilization of armed groups for further
attacks. The larger conflict remained unresolved, however, especially in light of rising
conflict pressures within the larger conflict dyad between the Turkana and Pokot (see
chapter five). In this case, faith-based groups with linkages to local peacebuilding actors
with direct relationships with leaders of militia groups filled in gaps in preventive
intervention when other organizations withdrew due to increased insecurity.187
An informal coalition among the Catholic Church, Finn Church Aid, and local
groups of Reformed Warriors responded rapidly to violence to convene negotiations. The
coalition created opportunities for information exchange, and a platform for ongoing
inter-group negotiation directly following clashes. The formal dialogue process was
scripted and bureaucratic, but it provided an opportunity informal dialogue and
negotiation that would not have occurred otherwise. Due to the highly asymmetrical
nature of revenge killings against women and children, severe collective violence could
have occurred. The intervention did not transform the conflict, but contained it at a
critical juncture at which spiraling violence was likely. Deep perceptions of inequality in
state responses to the conflict continued to drive mobilization of armed groups, making
the conflict prone to recurrent violence.
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Turkana: Oil and Ethnic Riots (2012 – 2014)
Turkana County is a site of major economic transition. The discovery of oil in
Turkana, the Lamu Port South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport project (LAPSSET), Vision
2030, the construction of new roads, increasing cross-border trade of livestock and goods,
and increasing land speculation, all point toward significant development gains in the
region. The potential for rapid economic growth in an area of severe poverty influences
the dynamics of inter-group conflict. In 2013, riots broke out across oil drilling sites in
Turkana County. The conflict had ethnic dimensions. Turkana communities rioted
against, in the words of informants, “Kenyan outsiders.”188 In this case, ethnic identity
overlaps with the core-periphery division in the Kenya context. Turkana protesters
claimed Tullow Oil had unjust hiring practices, favoring non-locals. The case is non-state
conflict in which Turkana used coercive force against predominantly Kikuyu and
Kalenjin oil workers. The conflict did not escalate to include deadly violence. Following
the riots, local peacebuilding groups played a complementary role in containing
escalation.
Context of Conflict
Kenya, historically, has not experienced conflict pressures related to the so-called
resource curse. This is no longer the case. Turkana County has key risk factors for an
impending oil curse. Pre-existing inter-ethnic grievances around land rights and political
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representation are increasing between rival groups across Turkana County (Johannes,
Zulu, and Kalipeni 2014). Comparing conditions in Turkana with conflict dynamics in
DR Congo, South Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria, analysts now predict communal violence
will escalate in Turkana due to historical marginalization and severe poverty, highly
militarized ethnic militias, and the introduction of lootable resources. Cummings predicts
Turkana is the location of “Africa’s Next Oil Insurgency” (“Predicting Africa’s Next Oil
Insurgency: The Precarious Case of Kenya’s Turkana County” 2014).
In 2012, Tullow Oil, an Irish exploration and production company, discovered oil
in the South Lokichar Basin in Turkana County. Tullow drilled the first exploratory well
at the site Ngamia-1 in 2011, and confirmed discoveries at two locations in 2012:
Ngamia-1 and Twiga South. In 2013 three additional sites were viable: Etuko-1, Ekales1, and Agete-1. In early 2014, the GoK signed off on a multiple field exploration
approach, accelerating exploration and the development of additional well sites across
Turkana County. As of January 2015, the South Lokichar basin had the potential to
produce 1 billion barrels of oil (“Kenya Exploration and Appraisal Update” 2015).
In 2012, following the discovery of oil at Ngamia 1, politicians running in
national elections picked up on the emerging sense of fear of marginalization among
Turkana communities related to oil exploration.189 Campaign strategies appealed to this
sentiment. CORD, in particular, developed a platform targeting Turkana voters, claiming
the party would ensure that the Turkana community would benefit from oil extraction.
CORD gained broad support across Turkana County. CORD candidates won multiple
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county-level posts in the 2013 election, but the party did not win the national election
(see, IEBC Election Results 2013). National electoral outcomes increased fear among the
Turkana that the Jubilee coalition would not protect Turkana interests related to oil
extraction on communal land (Vasquez 2013).
In October 2013, James Lomenen, MP for Turkana South, and Nicholas Gikor,
MP for Turkana East organized and mobilized Turkana groups to protest outside Ngamia1 and Twiga-1. Initially peaceful protests escalated into large-scale riots. Protesters
hurled stones at vehicles, threatened security guards, broke into two compounds, looted
camps, and damaged property. Tullow Oil evacuated staff from the region, and Turkana
militias blockaded roads to prevent access to the compounds for two weeks (Akumu
2013). On October 26th, 2013, Tullow Oil halted drilling operations.190

Patterns of Response
In response to riots, Tullow Oil agreed to double the amount of funding allocated
for local development projects and to hire more Turkana workers, especially for higher
wage positions. The company re-articulated its work to build a social contract with the
community, in cooperation with Turkana leaders and politicians. Tullow stepped up
private security around convoys and drilling operations, and the GoK agreed to increase
policing around oil sites (Akumu 2014). A negotiated settlement led to the restoration of
operations two weeks following the riots.
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Prior to engaging in oil exploration in the region, Tullow Oil conducted risk
assessments and concluded setting up a major operation in Turkana County, an area with
extreme poverty and high levels of animosity toward outside ethnic groups, would
require careful communal diplomacy to avoid triggering conflict.191 Tullow established a
formal strategy to address grievances around local employment preemptively, with clear
strategies in place for conflict prevention. The firm’s strategies for communal conflict
prevention were based on a logic of appeasement, including local content and social
spending, was well as appeasement of national political elites through dialogues around
levels of taxation.
As of 2014, Tullow Oil Co. invested over $70 million in Kenya through $21.7
million paid in taxes to the national government, $47.9 million in local content
procedures, and $1 million in the form of social investment (Tullow Report 2014). Social
investments were directed to scholarships for Turkana students, and school and hospital
construction across Turkana County. The company hired local labor for a broad range of
positions across the operation. Seventy percent of Tullow Oil’s 2000 staff are Kenyan
nationals, and nine out of ten subcontracting companies are based in Kenya, as of
December 2014 (Internews 2014).
Early efforts to include a large majority of Turkana staff and control the narrative
around hiring practices, however, were not sufficient to prevent the emergence of local
grievances and riots (Hatcher 2014). Riots were directly related to the dilemma of
ensuring inequality in hiring within an unskilled labor pool. Tullow’s overall proportion
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of national (Kenyan) staff is 90%, and local contractors involved in supplying the wells
and exploratory bases report 60% of their staff are Turkana. However, only 25% of those
hired have high wage positions (Kavanagh 2014). Despite careful hiring practices, the
Turkana community perceived resources from the oil boom benefited Kenyans from
“down country,” over Turkana communities.
Tullow’s efforts have not changed perceptions of inequality, marginalization, and
the potential for state abuse. Informants, from a broad spectrum of Turkana society, share
a common view that, “gains from the oil will go to corrupt politicians; not to us.”192 Even
though there are numerous local employees, political elites benefit most from supply
chains and local sourcing efforts. Turkana political elites, in particular, and the only
actors with access to enough capital to purchase vehicles and start companies to provide
goods to the rapidly increasing number of drilling sites across Turkana County.193
To adapt to the increasing threat of communal conflict, Tullow employs informal
strategies to manage and prevent conflicts during day-to-day operations. At the locallevel, to manage inter-group grievances and suppress outbreaks of violence, the company
maintains tight control over conflict narratives. Tullow employees are not allowed to
directly speak to local media outlets, reporters, or researchers working on the issue.194
They are not allowed to engage communities directly during convoys. An anonymous
respondent, for instance, described that when the company’s vehicles encounter
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roadblocks set up by local Turkana youth militias, they are not allow to exit vehicles.
They must return to base and take a community relations liaison to the site to manage the
grievance and control information about the conflict. Specific personnel manage public
grievances and information related to conflict issues.195
Tullow makes regular public statements at key peacebuilding events, especially
related to projects they are funding in the region. The company is open and transparent
about its social efforts, but efforts have not reversed social expectations that gains from
oil will benefit outsiders (Vasquez 2013). The community at large is aware of the
massive financial gains at stake related to the oil. The company engages in clandestine
talks with the national government about resource sharing, which contributes to the
communal perception that outsiders, “are coming to drink our oil.”196 Accountability,
transparency, and limited cooperation with local labor associations are reported
weaknesses of the firm’s approach to violence prevention.197
Respondents from local peacebuilding organizations claimed the company did not
collaborate with or support local peacebuilding processes. However, in light of deepening
grievances and rising local conflicts related to the process of oil extraction, as the County
Peace Secretariat described, peacebuilding organizations fill in information gaps: “even
though we have little support from the company, local organizations voluntarily extend
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Tullow’s efforts. The oil issue is now part of every dialogue and project we do.”198 Local
peace actors in the area are highly skilled in engaging in high-risk preventive intervention
with very few resources due long-running interventions in the larger Karamoja Cluster.
With changing conflict dynamics actors within the broad peace coalition shifted efforts
toward dampening conflict around oil-related issues—a plausible constraint against
further riots.
Conclusions
Tension remained high between local Turkana communities and Kenyan
employees working for Tullow operations, but no major riots or acts of violence occurred
for two years. Why is this the case? Two primary factors stand out in the case. Turkana
political elites and business owners, the primary patrons of local Turkana militias, benefit
from start up businesses to provide locally sourced services and resources for Tullow Oil
well sites. In short, local powerbrokers, the dominant patrons and supporters of Turkana
militias have new economic interests that reduce the likelihood of violence between
Turkana communities and external workers.
At the same time, due to rising insecurity in the area, Tullow employs members of
Turkana militias, and former KPR officers as private security officers to protect assets
and compounds across the area. In short, key actors most likely to use riots and violence
to destabilize operations and capture resources, at present, benefit from the process of
rapid economic expansion. The most likely spoilers benefit from resource extraction
(Brass 1997). Actors with the most power to incite violence have interests related to the
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protection of peace and open trade routes. Local militias and their patrons benefit from
the oil industry, making escalation less likely.
Secondly, Turkana County has a very large and broad coalition of civic
associations involved in local peacebuilding interventions. The area experienced the rapid
expansion of civic associations to manage the massive influx of international donor
support to address insecurity along the Western border with Uganda. This process led to
the emergence of a strong, coalition of peace actors in the area with broad experience
working with multiple CSOs and NGOs on complex peacebuilding programs. For
instance, the Catholic Church, with more resources, staff, and logistical capacity than the
County government, stands at the center of a very broad set of peace organizations
operating across the area.
Even though key peacebuilding organizations broke down in the face of rising
political pressure in Turkana County (see chapter five for further analysis), actors from
prior associations reformulated new organizations to extend a broad range of preventive
actions to contain conflicts related to rapid economic expansion. A broad coalition of
local peace organizations works to increase levels of information sharing around Tullow
efforts, improve local conflict monitoring, and engage in rapid response mediation when
conflicts occur. These two factors contribute to containing conflict in this case, and
preventing the outbreak of further riots against Tullow operations and employees.
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Isiolo: Post-election Peace (2013 – 2014)
The Isiolo case is an example of successful preventive intervention through an
informal coalition of local civic actors operating outside of official roles in formal
organizational structures. The Isiolo conflict corridor experienced a pre-election period of
escalation (see, chapter five). However, it did not experience post-election violence as
analysts predicted (Menkhaus 2015). Conflict escalated between Borana and Gabra
communities in Moyale, and Garre and Degodia communities in Mandera following high
stakes elections in 2013. Violence, however, did not occur in Isiolo under similar
conditions (Carrier and Kochore 2014).
The Borana-Somali alliance won the most coveted positions in the devolved
county system—the governor, Godana Doyo, a Borana; the Deputy Governor, a Somali;
and the Senator Mohammed Kuti, from Sakuye. A Turkana representative won one of the
MP positions, but a Borana representative, Tiyyah Galgalo, won the new Women’s
Representative position. Electoral outcomes were skewed in favor of the Borana – Somali
coalition, yet did not trigger violence following the election. What explains this outcome
within the longer conflict trajectory? The case study analyzes non-escalation. The
narrative draws from interviews with politicians and local peace actors from Isiolo to
analyze actions of state actors, civic associations, and communities related to the high
threat of post-election violence.
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Patterns of Response
Respondents built a case that state support for local peace action prior to the
election had a positive effect, preventing outbreaks of violence following the 2013
election.199 Due to higher levels of state interest in peace and stability in Isiolo as a
necessary condition for resource extraction and international investment, in the lead up to
the election the GoK provided additional support to local peace actors and the District
Peace Committee. The Isiolo County government conduced multiple peace forums in
cooperation with DPCs (Elder, Stigant, and Claes 2014).
The state provided financial support for the DPC system through national
peacebuilding organizations including the NSC, NCIC, and the National Drought
Management Authority (NDMA), the three biggest state-based organizations with
political authority to engage in and support local peace efforts. The Isiolo Inter-agency
Forum was set up to help improve collaboration of multiple peace actors in the area. The
Governor of Isiolo County, Godana Doyo, expressed support for the forum and its work
to deploy peace actors to prevent conflict around the election (Daily Nation, Nov. 11,
2014).
Respondents from Isiolo, however, argue state-led peace forums conducted
through the DPC system had a minimal impact (Elder, Stigant, and Claes 2014). In
particular, citizens were deeply suspicious of government motives related to the formal
peace forums. Media reports following state-led peace forums did not report local
grievances related to the failures of state security interventions and the DPC system. In
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the words of one respondent, “After peace forums, politicians still go and report that
conflict in Isiolo is due to the fact that we are wild, violent, traditional people; when,
really what we are telling them in these forums is that they are failing to protect us.”200
During state-led peace forums, respondents describe how national-level
politicians used social cohesion narratives and Vision 2030, the national development
agenda, to try to unify rival groups. Kochore interpreted the use of a national social
cohesion agenda as a strategic effort to try to integrate historically marginalized groups
into the larger national identity in order to neutralize potential secessionist sentiments201
among the population in Isiolo (Kochore 2013). The promotion of national cohesion and
development agendas did not reduce inter-group suspicion. Local actors remain very
skeptical of the new narratives, especially in light of how the state tried to exert power in
the past. In the words of a local Borana leader, “the government can’t even stop the
Samburu from attacking us, but now they care about ‘development,’ ‘social cohesion,’
and ‘peace’? All we are seeing is outsiders rushing in to grab our land and take our
money.”202
Outcomes
Even with very little trust in formal peacebuilding interventions in the area and a
high level of inter-group fear around the election, a local movement with broad support
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from multiple civic associations conducted a pre-election pact making campaign. Pastoral
Women of Isiolo, as the lead local association, in cooperation with youth groups, and
DPC leaders operating outside of their official roles conducted informal dialogues with
all candidates. The coalition managed to get every candidate to sign a pact to not engage
in or support acts of violence around the election, or following the election.203 Initially,
the effort was locally driven. Donor organizations learned of the pre-election pact making
campaign, creating a multiplier effect. Saferworld and CJPC provided logistical support
for the organization of pre-election dialogues in December of 2012, which provided local
peace actors even broader access to political entrepreneurs and an opportunity for all
candidates to display support for the pact (Saferworld 2014).
Conclusion
The collaborative, ground-up effort ensured that all candidates signed pre-election
pacts against the use of violence, creating a new informal institution of accountability
between civil society actors and political actors. In the words of Abdia Mohammud,
“political aspirants and community representatives all have to all be on the same page to
prevent conflict.”204 In this case, an informal coalition of local associations retained
capacity to engage in preventive efforts that the DPC could not. The DPC faced pressures
related to ethnic political mobilization, undermining its potential to mediate between
groups in Isiolo.
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In the Isiolo case, there is evidence that an informal coalition of actors working
outside of their official roles in institutions neutralized the threat of post-election
violence. Due to the high risk of institutional capture during electoral contests, informal
civic associations can play roles in conflict mitigation that more formal institutions
cannot. In this case, a coalition of local peace actors coordinated a successful process of
pre-election pact making that reduced uncertainty around electoral outcomes, and
contributed to the prevention of conflict following tense elections.

Coalitions and Constraint
The five cases of limited escalation in this chapter share common features. Civic
organizations contained violence within inter-group conflicts through three main
mechanisms. Building from local knowledge related to risk factors within particular
conflict settings, civic associations collaborated to establish threat monitoring systems
and informal community policing systems along the Nyiro Valley conflict corridor and in
Sarimo. In the Sarimo, Isiolo, and Nyiro cases, informal coalitions supported processes of
pre-movement, and pre-election pact making that played key roles in preventing the
escalation of violence following initial acts of aggression.
In the Turkwel Gorge case, local civic associations supported and collaborated
with reformed armed actors who played key roles in increasing the likelihood that armed
actors would negotiate following the outbreak of violence. Coalitions of different forms,
including elders groups, faith-based groups, reformed warrior groups, local peacebuilding
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committees, and women’s associations, engaged in collective efforts in all of these cases
to contain the escalation of inter-group violence.
The Parikati, Sarima, and Sarimo cases reveal that adaptive, localized protection
strategies, specific to minority groups residing within larger inter-ethnic conflict systems
can function to reduce the likelihood of indiscriminant, asymmetrical targeting in
response to both theft and inter-ethnic clashes—two potential triggers of escalation. In
the Parikati and Sarimo cases, covert information sharing, in-group policing, and
informal pact making were key mechanisms to contain escalation following deadly
attacks between local militias. In the Turkwel Gorge case, villages along the volatile
border used mediation skills learned through long-running peacebuilding programming,
or reverse engineering of peacebuilding processes, even in the absence of external
organizations to coordinate opportunities for preventive bargaining. In these cases there is
evidence that preventive adaptations among minority out-group communities living along
volatile borders decrease the likelihood of rapid escalation following acts of violence or
predation.
At the same time, village level protection tactics, alone, may not be sufficient to
fully contain violence. Due to sparse population distribution and the highly mobile nature
of ethnic militias in the area, covert informant networks or other village-level adaptations
could break down very quickly. A powerful rumor, or even a hint of suspicion of
collaboration with a militant group can lead to asymmetrical targeting and escalatory
dynamics. The Turkana and Samburu still have a very high among of fear, distrust and
inter-group hatred due to a very long history of protracted of inter-group clashes. With
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very high levels of suspicion and distrust between neighboring groups, informal
coalitions with the capacity to gather broad information through covert informant
networks can contain escalation. Strong coalitions restrain mobilization of large groups of
armed actors, and delay rapid and direct mobilization in response to attacks by providing
multiple platforms for negotiation.
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Table 6: Features of Limited Escalation Cases
Explanatory
Factors
Groups
1. Symbolic
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2. Border
/Dev/Periphery
3. State
Response
4. Cohesive
Coalition
Elite Unity
Informal
Institutions
Militia Trust
5. Local
Adaptation
Outcomes
1) Escalation
2) Nonescalation
3) Re-escalation

6. Samburu
Nyrio Corridor
(2012 – 2014)

7. Marsabit
Sarimo
(2010 – 2014)

8. Turkana
Turkwel
(2014)

9. Turkana
Oil Riots
(2012 – 2014)

10. Isiolo
Post-election
(2013 – 2014)

Samburu, Turkana,
Pokot, Somali
Y
Theft of Poor; Prior
Symbolic
Periphery

Samburu, Turkana

Samburu, Turkana

Gabra, Borana

N
Fear: Revenge

N
Grievance:
Inequality/Revenge
Border

Turkana – Samburu;
Borana - Somali
N
Grievance:
Inequality
Developmental

Coercive: Police
Force
Sanctions
Non: Mediation
Y
(intra-group)
(informal pact)
(militia trust)

Coercive: No
Non: Mediation

Coercive:
Inducements
Non: Messaging

Coercive: Police
Force
Non: Messaging

Y
(inter-group)
(informal pact; preemptive)
(militia trust –
integrated KPR)
cohere: resist
common threat
Coercive: Militia
Force
Non: Message
Assistance
2
Non-escalation

Y
(inter-group)
(informal pact)
(militia trust –
reformed warriors)

Y
(intra-group)
(militias –
benefiting)

cohere: long-term
peace agenda
Coercive: Militia
Force
Non: Mediation

cohere: long-term
peace agenda
Coercive: Militia
Privatized

cohere: resist
common threat
Coercive:
Militia Force
Non: Mediation

2
Non-escalation

2
Non-escalation

2
Non-escalation

cohere: resist
common threat
Coercive: Militia
Force
Non: Messaging
2
Non-escalation

Periphery

Y
Death of
activist
Developmental
Coercive:
Police Force
Non:
Messaging
Y
(inter-group)
(informal pact;
pre-emptive)

CHAPTER FIVE: RECURRING ESCALATION IN NORTHERN KENYA

Cases in chapter four analyzed the extent to which coalitions of civic associations
dampened violence across various conflict settings in Northern Kenya. In chapter five,
the question is reversed. What factors limit the effectiveness of local coalitions to engage
in successful interventions to contain escalation? The cases represent settings in which
threat monitoring networks, local peace processes and informal pacts, and informal
communal protection strategies failed to contain the re-escalation of ethnic violence.
Narratives for five conflicts in which local peacebuilding actors engaged in
preventive intervention yet violence still escalated provide a platform for comparison of
factors that may undermine preventive measures. In cases where civic organizations had
prior success in containing conflict, symbolic acts of violence or the use of indiscriminant
force by state actors undermined trust between local associations and militia patrons,
increasing the likelihood of escalation. The relationship between modes of state and nonstate response to local inter-ethnic violence affect patterns of escalation in this set of
cases.
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Table 7: Recurring Escalation Cases
West Pokot, Isiolo, and Mandera
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Marsabit: Turbi Massacre (2002 – 2005)
West Pokot: Pokot – Turkana Range War (2013 – 2014)
Isiolo: The Isiolo Triangle (2008 – 2012)
Mandera: Garre – Murule (2005 – 2008)
Mandera: Garre – Degodia Clashes (2013 – 2014)

The Turbi Massacre (2005)
The Turbi Massacre is a case of non-state conflict in which responses to threats
ultimately did not prevent mass collective violence. Prior to the massacre, multiple civic
associations coordinated negotiations using customary rules for conflict management,
established informal threat-monitoring networks, and supported local communal
protection strategies. Notwithstanding, violence escalated in July of 2005. A group of
1,000 Borana crossed the border from Ethiopia and attacked the village of Turbi, a small
trading post in Northern Marsabit County.205
During the raid, the Borana militia directly targeted Turbi Primary School. The
group wielded machetes, shot students, and killed an infant with a rock, making it one of
the most severe acts of ethnic violence in Kenya’s history (Mwangi 2006). Casualty
reports vary.206 The NSC conducted an official government inquiry, reporting 50
fatalities and 25 injuries during the initial attack at Turbi, with 50 additional fatalities
205

Turbi is a small village with a population of 1,300 people. It sits on the border between Gabra and
Borana dominated territories in Northern Marsabit County.
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The UCDP non-state conflict database estimates between 68 – 95 fatalities.
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over the course of three days of violence that spread to other towns including Maikona,
Kalacha, and Marsabit (NSC 2005).
Conflict Context
Dr. Bonaye Godana, a prominent Gabra politician from North Horr rose to
national political prominence in the late 1980s, increasing political tension between the
Gabra and Borana. Borana, historically, dominated political positions in Marsabit
County. Godana’s appointment as Kenya’s Foreign Minister in 1998 was a threat to the
status quo. Menkhaus elaborates: “Godana presided over Kenyan foreign policy during a
time when Kenya agreed to work with Ethiopia to combat the OLF, which the Ethiopian
government considered a terrorist organization but many Boran Oromo viewed as a
legitimate liberation movement (Menkhaus 2015, 120). Notwithstanding, inter-group
relations remained stable. Militias from both groups formed alliances to protect integrated
settlements from Rendille, Samburu, and Dassanetch aggression.207
Informants trace the conflict in Turbi back to a localized incident in August of
2002, in which a minor inter-group dispute over an outstanding debt turned deadly, with
one Borana fatality.208 In response, the Gabra conducted a revenge raid and stole 800
livestock. With rising threat of attacks, elders convened an informal negotiation to
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Ibrahim Sora, CIFA, Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, September 12, 2014. Both the Gabra
and Borana have ethnic ties the cut across the border with Ethiopia. Both groups speak the same variant of
Cushitic language, with an Oromo variation. Due to language similarity, there has been a very high level of
intermarriage between Gabra and Borana, historically. Historically, the two groups engaged in a strong
militia alliance, called the “Worr Liban alliance” during clashes against Maasai to take control of Marsabit
area during the 1950s and 60s (see also, Schlee 1985).
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Jeremiah Omar, Former DPC Chairman, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 8, 2014.
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prevent further incitement. One week later, on September 15th, 2002, the Marsabit DPC
coordinated a follow up dialogue. Mediators used the Garissa Declaration as a foundation
for dialogue around restitution. Both groups rejected high rate of compensation: 100
cattle for murder, and a repayment scheme of 3:1 for stolen livestock.209
After failed negotiations, informal resource-sharing agreements broke down
around Turbi. Gabra and Borana communities began to claim exclusive control over
water points. Due to rising tension, local civic organizations intervened. Two local civic
associations based in Marsabit, PISP (Gabra) and CIFA (Borana), in cooperation with the
Marsabit District Peace Committee convened a cross-border peace meeting in Yabello,
Ethiopia in November 2003. With backing from the DPC, the Marsabit County
Government promised to enforce the peace agreement. Elders, in response, signed the
Yabello pact, which held over the course of 2003. However, settlements did not reintegrate. Borana did not resettle in Turbi, out of fear of potential revenge attacks. In
February 2004, Gabra elders from the Moyale DPC organized peace meetings in Turbi
and Marsabit, but when the external mediation team arrived in Turbi, the meeting
collapsed after a small-scale riot. The long series of local peace processes stabilized
conditions, but did not resolve the conflict between the Gabra and Borana.
In April of 2005, in the lead up to national elections in 2006, the District
Commissioner (DC) disbanded DPCs in Moyale and Marsabit. Formally, the District
Security and Intelligence Committee (DSIC) provided oversight for DPCs. In practice,
they were informal organizations with backing from donor organizations. OXFAM-GB
209

Tumal Orto, Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, September 13, 2014.
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and ITDG provided the bulk of support for the Marsabit DPC. The District Commissioner
appointed religious leaders as chairmen, who then relied on personal and church-based
networks to form and maintain informal early warning systems, coordinate rapid
responses to clashes, and support local peace processes. Prior leaders of the Marsabit
DPC system claim it was a strong, independent organizational framework with a record
of successful conflict prevention across Marsabit County.
From the perspective of former DPC leaders, politicians dissolved the system
because, “it was too strong—politicians wanted to get us out of the way to be able to use
the conflict to win the next election.”210 The DC claimed he disbanded the DPCs because,
“they stepped outside of their mandate—the organization became too involved in security
issues that County Government should control not the DPC” (National Steering
Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management 2005, 12). Multiple respondents
supported the view that political elites disbanded the DPC because it was one of the only
neutral institutions in Marsabit with the potential capacity to undermine Borana political
strategies.
Notwithstanding, even after the DPC collapsed, on May 23rd, 2005, PISP, CIFA,
and mediators from the Diocese of Marsabit convened a dialogue in Maikona to take
forward the local peace process. Both groups agreed on a shared compensation rate for
the 2002 Turbi raids: stolen livestock returned a rate of 1:1, and communal compensation
for murder based on the Borana tradition of 40 cattle or the monetary equivalent. Both
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groups paid restitution for the 2002 events on June 30, 2005 in Maikona.211 The local
truce, however, was broken, rapidly. On June 5th, 2005 a Gabra militia attacked and killed
five Borana near Moyale. The attack triggered a series of increasingly severe revenge
attacks. Gabra raided Hurri Hills, killed a Borana chief, and one Borana KPR. The killing
of the Borana Chief triggered acts of revenge in Marsabit town, with two fatalities and
five homes burned.
The following week, police deployed additional KPR to the area. Borana
politicians led a peace mission, collaborating with local peace actors to try to secure
another truce. In the midst of a flurry of preventive intervention, the key trigger to very
rapid escalation and major cleansing occurred on July 1st, 2005. A Gabra militia attacked
and killed six Borana youth in the village of Forole. In the words of a respondent, “it was
in no way acceptable for the Borana—killing those boys in their sleep.”212 In response,
Borana living in Ethiopia mobilized a large group of actors to conduct a major attack at
Turbi.
Informants indicate information about plans for the Turbi attack traveled broadly,
up to two weeks prior to the massacre.213 There was basic early information warning of
the group mobilizing. For example, reports from the NSC fact-finding mission indicate
Gabra children withdrew from school in Turbi during the week prior to the attack (NSC
2005). Even with rumors of the movement of the large band of attackers spreading
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broadly, there was no preventive response. The Borana militia attacked Turbi on July 12,
2005. The nature of violence was symbolic. The main target of the attack was the center
of social life in the village—the primary school. As news of the attack spread, violence
escalated. Attacks occurred across multiple rural villages: “in Bubisa 10 passengers were
dragged out of a mission vehicle and murdered in the trading center. The victims were
Gabra, Catholic evangelists from Sololo” (NSC 2005,10). In Maikona, Gabra killed one
Borana and burned 10 homes burned, and in Kalacha, most Borana fled rapidly, but
Gabra burned 20 Borana homes.214
Outcomes
Accusations of political involvement followed the massacre. Tension increased
between the two dominant Borana MPs from Marsabit, Abdi Tari Sasura and Guracha
Galgallo, and the Gabra MP, Dr. Bonaya Godana.215 Gabra politicians aggressively
contested Borana dominance (Schlee 2008). One year after the Turbi massacre, on April
10, 2006, Godana died in a plane crash in Marsabit, along with 10 other passengers; three
of the 14 survived.216
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Halkano Bukuno, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, September 21, 2014.
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Carrier and Kochore describe, “Dr. Godana was seen as the chief architect of a distinct Gabra political
and cultural identity that countered the Borana hegemony” (Carrier and Kochore 2014, 141; see also,
Schlee and Shongolo 2012). Godana was an active proponent for the Gabra in a political system dominated
by the Borana, and a predominant national figure, rising to the position of deputy leader of KANU.
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Other prominent politicians died in the crash, including, internal security assistant minister Mirugi
Kariuki, and MPs Abdi Sasura (Saku), Titus Ngoyoni (Laisamis), Guracha Galgalo (Moyale) and
Abdullahi Aden (East Africa Legislative Assembly MP).
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The flight was in route to Moyale for peace talks to address ongoing intercommunal clashes between the Borana and Gabra along the border with Ethiopia. The
official report indicated the plane crashed into the side of Marsabit Mountain due to an
unexpected weather change. However, Gabra claim Borana politicians organized the
crash to prevent the Gabra from gaining political power following the Turbi Massacre. In
the words of a local activist, “Godana was eliminated because he was about to take the
government to court over Turbi, he had documents on the case, and Borana in the
government organized to take him out. They paid the pilots to take their own lives.”217 In
the wake of the massacre, anthropologists who study the area marked distinctive shifts in
inter-ethnic group differentiation in terms of identity and traditional religious practice
(Watson 2010).
The severity of violence used in the Turbi massacre in 2005 and the following
events ossified a deep division between the Boran and Gabra. The event also triggered
extensive cooperation among organizations working to restore peace in the area, which
had a side effect of forming and extending a broad local peacebuilding constituency
along the border. Tumal Orto argues the post-Turbi reconciliation processes led to the
formation of extensive threat-monitoring networks among elders at the village level.
After the DPC collapsed, an informal coalition of peace actors assembled Borana and
Gabra elders to implement a long-term peace process to address deep grievances from the
Turbi Massacre. Tumal Orto states:
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A lot of NGOs were trying to bring peace after Turbi, but nothing was working.
In 2006 and 2007 we were all involved in all types of dialogues that did not help –
nothing was working; nobody was agreeing to anything. So we started our own
peace process between the Borana and Gabra. Our strategy was to forget about
NGOs and the government and to go directly to the elders. We took yaa and
gadda members and their appointees and held meetings with them, under trees, in
every village along the border, engaging local elders leaders from both
countries.218
After three years of informal negotiations, Borana and Gabra elders agreed to a
peace declaration, signed in Maikona. Gabra and Borana elders signed the
Maikona/Walda declaration on July 29th, 2009. The declaration articulated rules for
compensation for killing, and the roles of traditional elders in enforcement of
compensation. Livestock markets re-integrated after almost three years of full separation
and ongoing violence after the 2009.
Although violence escalated rapidly within Moyale town in 2012 and 2013,
respondents claim, the post-Turbi peacebuilding process constructed an informal, rural
coalition of conflict monitors with a shared interest in preventing political conflict from
undermining a hard-fought peace agreement. In particular, after reports of violence in
Moyale spread, elders within the network report rapidly engaging in local peace
messaging with three primary persuasive tactics, including interpreting the episode as an
urban problem rather than an ethnic conflict in order to limit its spread, reinforcing and
traditional restitution rules established in the Maikona Walda Declaration and articulating
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the high communal cost or organizing attacks, and deploying local protection units to
increase monitoring and scouting across rural areas surrounding Moyale.219
Informants also claimed that that the nature of prior state actions in the area,
including shaming of local leaders caused elders to avoid engagement with the politics of
Moyale violence, and rely on local protection processes to contain escalation.220 It
remains plausible that informal grassroots efforts played a role in containing the spread of
violence beyond the town of Moyale in 2013 (see chapter three).
Conclusions
The Turbi case presents a set of compounding factors that led to the escalation of
mass collective violence, even with a broad coalition of local peace groups engaged in
significant preventive action. Prior to the massacre, the Borana and Gabra cooperated
extensively and shared many common social characteristics. A complex set of pressures
related to spillovers from the OLF movement in Ethiopia systematically increased tension
between the two groups. A highly local conflict event triggered a dispute that local peace
organizations struggled to resolve through series of broken peace pacts. Broken pacts
increased inter-group suspicion, settlements disintegrated, and contestation over land and
grazing rights increased. Political tension between group elites deepened the conflict,
creating a window for mass collective violence targeting an unprotected village.
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Escalation and restraint work in tandem. Following the massacre, local peace
processes helped form and expand the number of civic organizations engaged in local
peacebuilding efforts across the area, which, some informants claim played a key role in
containing violence in the Moyale case of 2012 – 2013. In the Turbi incident violence
between Gabra and Borana spread across multiple villages, but in 2012, violence between
Borana and Gabra in Moyale concentrated in a single town.

West Pokot: Turkana – Pokot Range War (2013 – 2014)
The Turkana – Pokot border conflict is a case of non-state, inter-ethnic group
conflict. The conflict is included in the UCDP database, which shows that after a fiveyear period without major clashes between 2008 – 2013, violence escalated in 2013
leading to over 70 fatalities. Cross-border dynamics play a role in the case. Uganda
military intervention contained inter-group conflict on the Uganda side of the border.221
On the Kenya side of the border, in West Pokot,222 conflict between the Pokot223 and
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Uganda approached the escalation of violence in the Karamoja Cluster and aggression by Pokot militias
differently than Kenya. Uganda invested in a long-term “boots on the ground” campaign to forcibly disarm
local militias involved in raiding, as has effectively closed the border.
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West Pokot County, in Northwestern Kenya, borders Uganda to the West and Turkana County to the
North. It is classified as an arid and semi- arid region but, geographically, has a highland-lowland split. The
Southern part of West Pokot is at higher elevation, along the Rift Valley escarpment. The region is very
mountainous and has poor infrastructure the Northern part of the County is very flat, semi-arid desert, more
similar to geological conditions in Turkana County. Impassable, but seasonal rivers cut through the area,
creating many pockets that bandits use for protection. The topography and geography of the area make it a
very good location for evading formal security actors (Bollig 2010).
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The Pokot ethnic group has roughly 220,000 Pokot members spread out across West Pokot and Baringo
counties. The Pokot identify as a sub-group of larger “Kalenjin” identity group that was constructed under
the rise of the Moi regime to counter the national political dominance of the Kikuyu (see Kipkorir, the
Marakwet of Kenya, 1982).
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Turkana escalated between 2013 – 2014, even under the watch of a large coalition of
peacebuilding organizations operating in the area (UN-OCHA 2015).
Context of Conflict
On September 4th of 2013, a Turkana militia killed two Pokot warriors in a raid
near Kainuk. In direct response a Pokot militia invaded the village of Lorogon, killing
three Turkana men and injuring one woman and two children (Sabahi News 2013). The
militia used trees to block the roads into and out of the village prior to the attack, and
held the village for one week. The militia blocked the road between Kainuk and Turkwel
Gorge, and shot at vehicles traveling along the main road between Kitale and Lodwar to
prevent access to the village. The area MP and CSOs traveling to the area to conduct
peace talks were not allowed access to the village. At the same time, the Pokot held three
police camps under siege with reports identifying two police fatalities.
The siege of Lorogon triggered a cycle of clashes between Turkana and Pokot
militias along the border between West Pokot and Turkana leading to over 20 fatalities
between September and December of 2013 all along the 200-kilometer border, including
Lorogon, Kainuk, Nakwamoru, and Kapedo.224 The conflict continued through 2014
when another major clash occurred outside the village of Kapedo. On November 1st
2014, a Pokot militia ambushed and attacked a police convoy. They killed over 24
Turkana KPR and administrative police in route to address reports of increased militia
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activity in Kapedo. The militia stole a GSU vehicle from one of the police camps
(Francas 2014).
Patterns of Response
In response to conflict escalation between the Pokot and Turkana, the GoK
deployed teams of security actors and political elites to intervene. In this case, due to the
relationship between development gains and conflict dynamics, the state deployed highlevel members of the Senate Security Committee, including Yusuf Haji, to mediate. To
date, an agreement has not been reached. Local, clan-based peace committees, called
Adakar225 Peace and Development Committees, are in place across the border area. They
formed during a long-running CEWARN program on conflict monitoring in the
Karamoja Cluster that ended in 2010.226 Local leaders of the adakar committees
collaborate with the Turkana District Peace and Development Committee in processes of
conflict monitoring and early warning. Local DPC chairpersons work voluntarily,
reporting very little success in dampening violence due to the increased risk of threat
from local Pokot militias, and the lack of external support.227
An extensive network of civic associations specifically committed to
peacebuilding activities in Turkana County, over 30 CSOs in total,228 is in place due to
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“Adakar” is like a clan in Turkana—a group of families living under leadership of a dominant elder.
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2014.
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For example, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), a very powerful and well organized
inter-denominational organization with a long history of peacebuilding work in Kenya, first engaged in
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extensive international donor support related to conflicts in the Karamoja Cluster and
increasing support from the GoK for local peacebuilding efforts. Even with very clear
understanding of current conflict drivers, and resources for intervening along the conflict
border, civic associations have very little capacity to contain violence along the border
between Turkana and West Pokot. Respondents indicate that capacity of local civic
organizations to contain conflict in this case is limited due to dilemmas of coordination,
and unique conditions that cause Pokot militias to use violence against peacebuilding
actors.
Uganda addressed insecurity in the Karamoja Cluster through military
intervention, which had unintended effects for local peace processes between the Pokot
and Turkana. In particular, forceful disarmament campaigns in Uganda heightened
suspicion and fear among the Pokot and Turkana that the state would engage in similar
disarmament tactics in Kenya. Daniel Edaan describes, “Disarmament in Uganda caused
Pokot militias to stop engaging with us in peace negotiations. They are very suspicious of
anyone they think will take their weapons, or report the situation to the government.”229
Militia groups and the communities supporting them are less willing to engage with civic
groups involved in peacebuilding work in the area. The nature of aggressive disarmament
in Uganda increased suspicion of outside actors involved in peace work.

peace work in Turkana in 1992, with a program titled, the “Community Peace Building and Development
Project.” The Catholic Justice and Peace Commission has been active in the area and has worked in close
cooperation with local CSOs, such as POKATUSA on local peace issues. Other key actors in the field of
peace building in Turkana County include: the CAPE Unit of AU/IBAR, the MAPOTU Peace Initiative
with support from World Vision-Kenya, and VSF Belgium.
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Pokot militias use force to repel NGOs, CSOs, and peace operations. Attacks have
occurred during peace meetings, or right after causing high-ranking staff among NGOs
and larger organizations to avoid taking the risks of engaging in the conflict zone. In
response, local organizations withdrew staff from remote field stations, limiting on-theground presence of external organizations that could monitor militia movement. With the
conflict intensifying, there is a significant amount of financial support available for
peacebuilding along the Turkana – Pokot border area, but CSOs are not physically
present along the border. NGOs working on the issue have urban bases and outsource
high-risk peace work to voluntary local peace committees.
POKATUSA, for example, one of the most locally oriented CSOs, coordinates
negotiations in areas away from the border because negotiators are not willing to travel to
and conduct dialogues in the area. Militias and patrons send intermediaries to travel to
dialogues who have no control over militia behaviors, making mediation, “a game of
repeated and broken agreements between actors who have no power to control violence
border.”230
The lead organization in Turkana that had prior success in containing violence
between Turkana and Pokot militia collapsed due to corruption, also undermining the
legitimacy of peacebuilding organizations in the area. In response to insecurity in the
Karamoja cluster, a grassroots peace association called the Turkana District Peace and
Development Committee formed, and later shifted its name to the Riam-Riam Peace
Network. Former youth militia leaders built the organization and were successful in
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improving crisis response in the larger Karamoja cluster region. Riam-Riam formed a
broad network of informants across the county from multiple local associations, ethnic
groups, and clans.
Following attacks, Riam Riam assembled teams of first responders of actors with
direct clan connections in the reported location. Response teams traveled directly to
conflict sites to coordinate targeted peacebuilding responses. The group was very
effective in preventing escalation and coordinating rapid negotiations and informal
restitution payments. New of the success of the local association traveled widely, and the
organization received donor support from Oxfam. However, leaders of Riam, Riam
gained political support for improving local security, which caused leaders within the
organization to shift into politics. In the words of Daniel Kiroket, “peace and politics do
not mix.”231 The high cost of engaging in politics incentivized theft of organizational
resources, and leaders of the organization embezzled donor funds to run a political
campaign. The collapse of the peace network shortly followed.232
Outcomes
In this case, the discovery of oil triggered the perception among the Pokot of
increasing wealth, weapons, and power among the Turkana. It also increased expectations
of state support for the Turkana to prevent Turkana mobilization against Tullow Oil sites
(see, chapter four). The Pokot presume the GoK will use force against local militias
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protect the Turkana and maintain access to oil. It also intensified land claims. Pokot
militia actors stated, “Lokichar was our land before the Turkana pushed us from there
with guns.”233 With these two expectations, Pokot militias now employ increasingly
aggressive attacks to undermine an expected rise in both power and state protection for
the Turkana. This has detrimental effects for local peacebuilding organizations—they are
also targeted.
The nature of Pokot aggression suggests direct intent to capture and control
territory with Turkana County—a more intensive form of aggression than in prior conflict
events between the two groups. Prior conflicts between the Turkana and Pokot had little
to do with the problem of inequality. Both groups were equally poor and marginalized.
This condition changed with the discovery of significant oil reserves in Turkana County.
Patrons of Pokot militias now support efforts of Pokot militias to gain access to areas
with oil resources, with targeting focused on the locations of as Orwo, Marich, or Alale
that have minority Pokot settlements, but are located within Turkana County. Pokot
militias rely on informants from these locations for support and information. In the most
recent incident at Kapedo, for example, most violence was directed toward state actors
who were attempting to control and limit boundary expansion of the Pokot, rather than
against Turkana civilians.
Pokot militias use violence to directly target Turkana groups, threaten the state,
and establish settlements in areas most likely to benefit from oil and expansion of
markets and services. With the discovery of oil, violence has a new functional value for
233

Dan Nganga, Interview with the author. Kitale, Kenya, July 20, 2014.

202

accessing territory and oil wealth. Civic associations have little capacity to contain the
violent rent seeking behavior of Pokot militias.
Civic actors face high risk in mediating the conflict and have little legitimacy due
to disarmament campaigns in Uganda, was well as prior organizational failures. Rather
than engaging in high-risk interventions, peace organizations operate from urban centers,
using resources to conduct ad hoc peace negotiations with intermediaries who do not
have power to control militia behavior. Even in the presence of a broad coalition of local
peace organizations supporting threat-monitoring networks and platforms for negotiating
and enforcing informal rules, preventive actions have failed to contain escalation in this
case.
The Isiolo Triangle (2009 – 2012)
Isiolo is a case of non-state, inter-ethnic group conflict that occurred even the
presence of a broad coalition of peacebuilding organizations. Preventive intervention in
this case failed to contain escalation. From late 1996 – 2002, violence escalated across
the Isiolo Triangle. Assessment reports from the time period estimate 1,200 fatalities
occurred due to inter-ethnic group clashes, with up to 300,000 animals stolen in raids and
counter raids (CEWARN 2004). Local militia strategies changed to include village
burnings and targeting of women and children (Goldsmith 1997). In 2002, coordinated
efforts of local civic associations and the District Peace Committee restored peace
(UNDP 2006). Local peace actors contained violence following a series of major clashes.
However, even with a relatively robust coalition of local peacebuilding organizations
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established in Isiolo, violence re-escalated in 2009 and 2012. Preventive responses did
not contain collective violence in this case.
Context of Conflict
In 1997, the year of the second national multi-party election, Borana militias
raided Degodia settlements in Eastern Isiolo. The attacks triggered a cycle of raids and
counter-raids that led to over 140 fatalities and the loss 17,500 cattle (Goldsmith 1997).
The large-scale nature of theft and the deadliness of attacks left a deep sense of grievance
between the Borana and Degodia.234 Prior to the initial attacks, reports claim Borana
political elites used clandestine intra-ethnic networks to provide militias with weapons
and information about large and vulnerable livestock populations belonging to Degodia
groups immigrating into Western Isiolo.235 Analysts indicate incumbent politicians armed
Borana militias to displace Somali populations aligned with opposition political parties,
rather than KANU (Brown 2003). Political elites engaged in intensive competition over
land and political representation directly incited attacks (Menkhaus 2005, 15). Elites used
resource conflict as a platform to cloak political violence (Kimenyi and Njuguna 2005).
After the outbreak of violence in 1997, state intervention failed to control clashes.
The GoK fired local politicians accused of supporting Borana militias, including MP for
Isiolo North, Charfano Mokko. Dismissals triggered local demonstrations against the
government for victimizing the Borana (Daily Nation, “Root Causes of Somali-Borana
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Conflict,” May 14, 2000). Grassroots organizations, eventually, stabilized communal
relations (Oxfam 2003; Menkhaus 2005; UNDP 2010). The Isiolo District Peace
Committee played a critical role for stabilization as a hub for conflict monitoring and
early warning. The District Peace Committee provided civic associations with detailed
information related to threats of impending attacks, and local chiefs with direct access to
militia intelligence. Local militia patrons cooperated with DPC leaders who then shared
dynamics of potential threats across the region.236 The extension of threat-monitoring
networks, at least, stabilized the conflict.
After the first major wave of violence, respondents report that elders played a key
role in dampening conflict around following elections in 2002 through the practice of
“negotiated democracy.”237 Elders from all major ethnic communities in the region
engaged in processes of negotiation over candidate selection in the lead up to elections.
Candidates for each post were selected for each position, “receiving the anointing of the
elders.”238 Informal negotiations limited the need for political candidates to engage in
process of population manipulation to ensure they would be well positioned to become
candidates. Respondents suggest the practice of negotiated democracy and the
development of stronger monitoring and early warning systems stabilized inter-group
relations and reduced clashes for a period of six years.239
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Following a long period of peace after 2002, in 2007, electoral dynamics sparked
another wave of escalation. The Borana are the majority ethnic group in Isiolo North and
Isiolo South, the two electoral constituencies in Isiolo County. The Borana have a long
history of political dominance in both districts. In 2007, Joseph Samaal, a Turkana
candidate, ran for the MP seat in Isiolo North and nearly won the election. Mohamed
Kuti, a Sakuye candidate with a strong alliance with the Borana, only narrowly won the
seat. The narrow victory threatened Borana political dominance in Isiolo North.
In response to the near loss, fearing the Borana constituency was too divided
among clans, Borana leaders reorganized internally to re-unite the group. The unification
strategy involved coordinated efforts to increase pressure on Turkana and Samburu
settlements in Northern Isiolo County.240 The Borana organized around a shared goal of
preventing Turkana and Somali groups from establishing settlements in Isiolo County.
These efforts led to more frequent attacks on minority group villages.
Intra-Borana unification efforts also had a secondary effect—the formation of
new political alliances. In response to increasing intra-Borana organization and
aggression, Samburu and Turkana communities formed a minority alliance. The Borana
and Degodia, also prior enemies from major attacks in 1998, formed a majority alliance.
Local respondents called the Borana-Somali alliance the Cushitic bloc.241 The alliances
formed along lines of, in Shamaro’s terms, cultural affinities. The Samburu and Turkana
shared a larger Nilotic, pastoralist identity, and the Borana and Somali shared a larger
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Islamic identity, as well as a common language. Cultural affinity functioned as a
framework, in both cases, for forming alliances among conflicting ethnic groups. Rising
risk of armed aggression based on ethnic identifies re-shaped the conflict trajectory
(Shamaro 2014). Cross-ethnic alliances increased the offensive and defensive capacity of
local militias, and expanded indigenous intelligence gathering capacity.
The outcomes of the 2007 county elections set up a path toward increasingly
deadly attacks between the Samburu – Borana. Political leaders from the SamburuTurkana alliance publically articulated a clear goal to unseat the Borana in Isiolo North.
The Borana - Somali alliance articulated a similar goal, “to clear the area of Samburu and
Turkana” (Shamaro 2014, 7). Political alliances shaped violent behavior. Seemingly
traditional pastoralist acts of raiding cloaked politically motivated violence designed to
undermine Borana power, dominance, and territorial control.242
The effects are visible in a steady increase in raiding behavior and attacks that
played out along the political cleavage. Between 2009 – 2013, estimates indicate intergroup clashes caused between 165 – 300 fatalities in Isiolo County (Saferworld Report
2009; Alternet 2011, East Africa Standard 2013, ACLED 2013). Most acts of aggression
during the time period targeted the dominant ethnic group—the Borana. Samburu and
Turkana militias collaborated through clandestine networks, sharing information related
to opportunities to attack Borana militias and settlements. In this period, the Samburu243
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initiated the majority of offensive raids, with the Borana organizing very deadly,
asymmetrical counter-attacks.
Patterns of Response
State efforts to contain conflict in Isiolo had unintended consequences. The state
established new police institutions across the Isiolo triangle, including anti-stock theft
units. Under the oversight of Commander Nelson Okioga, police trained security forces
to counter livestock raids, and were based in joint camps with rapid deployment units
(RDU). The police conducted disarmament operations. For example, in Western Isiolo,
during the initial wave of escalation in 2007, Samburu militias agreed to voluntary
disarmament, but only after the GoK promised to improving security, including the
allocation of more police and rapid defense forces, more development projects including
water points, schools, improvements in roads, and equality in disarmament among
neighboring communities (UNDP 2010). Less than one month after the campaign,
Borana raiders attacked. The event raised suspicion toward the government and led to
rapid re-armament across the Samburu community.
After failed voluntary disarmament, in 2009, KDF intervened in clashes between
the Samburu and Borana in Western Isiolo with the intent of disarming Samburu militias.
During the operation, Samburu killed four KDF soldiers. Samburu claimed that they
Borana are seen as weaker targets to the Samburu than the Turkana or Pokot. Local Borana and Somali
groups do not have same level of organization and number of armed actors. They do not have moran
systems, so they depend on different methods for communal and resource protection. The KPR, selfarming, elders carrying arms or hiring private mercenaries, and the maintenance of links to OLF militants
function to provide the Borana with for skills, training, weapons to counter the force of other armed
militias. Hired mercenaries is also common in the area, especially in urban centers.
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attacked because the military aligned with the Borana, while the Borana claimed
Samburu militias had been alerted of pending military strikes through insider networks
that allowed them time to design an effective defense strategy against the military. Failed
disarmament campaigns in the area undermined communal willingness to disarm, and
raised suspicions that state actors directly arm ethnic groups when it is in their interest to
do so.244 Respondents indicate that armed militias view disarmament campaigns as
moments of weakness. After disarmament campaigns, opportunistic militias commonly
attack disarmed groups.245
In 2009, over 5,000 IDPs fled to Isiolo due to rising violence. In response, in July
of 2009, the GoK secretively allocated 300 weapons to the Borana KPR as a response to
rising aggression by Samburu and Rendille militias. Reports of MPs and politicians
unloading trucks with arms and ammunition at night to the Borana leaked to Samburu
and Turkana militias. The logic of allocating arms to Borana was based on a long-held
assumption that the state could generate an informal balance of power to reduce Samburu
and Turkana aggression.246 However, it had the opposite effect.
Arms allocation through the KPR system increased suspicion of state support to
undermine the Turkana and Samburu alliance, and introduced new grievances around
inequality in the provision of weapons. Inequality in state distribution of arms led to fear
of Borana domination causing the Samburu to organize to ensure all moran in the area
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were better armed than the Borana. Samburu and Turkana militias organized local
protection groups to defend against an increased threat of Borana attacks, and engaged in
more offensive raids against Borana communities along the borders to undermine the
capacity of the Borana to mobilize against the Samburu (Saferworld 2009; UNDP 2010).
Allocation of weapons in the pursuit of an ethnic balance of power also
intensified the political dynamics of the conflict. Local political entrepreneurs began
using KPR arms allocation to campaign: “Politicians told their groups, ‘I will secure you,
and get you more weapons for our people, if I am in power.’”247 Samburu politicians
claimed that,
“the PNU [Party of National Unity] side of government [Borana – Somali
alliance], with lobbying from the Isiolo North MP and Minister for Livestock
Development, have resorted to arming supporters in order to punish the ODM
sympathizers [Turkana – Samburu alliance]” (UNDP 2010, 10).
Informal armament of KPR actors increased inter-group tension and depended
perceptions of state inequality.
Political elites used the conflict between the Samburu and Borana to consolidate
support for national political parties. For example, in 2009, the government, with Mwai
Kibaki as head of the PNU party, sent the KDF to engage in a disarmament campaign
against Samburu in Samburu East. Raila Odinga, Prime Minister, but in the opposition
ODM party traveled to the area after the disarmament campaign and accused the
government of human rights as a means to secure political support for ODM from the
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Samburu. The Samburu –Turkana alliance aligned with ODM; whereas, the Somali –
Borana alliance aligned with PNU.248
State responses in rising insecurity in the area provided the Borana with evidence
of how ethnic alliances influence state security interventions, and impact whether or not
dominant national political parties choose to support local militias, engage in
disarmament campaigns, or even prevent disarmament campaigns in particular areas. If
an ethnic group has access to national power through alliances with the dominant party,
disarmament campaigns can be prevented.
This dynamic raised the stakes of 2013 elections, and played into the process of
escalation in Isiolo. Accessing political control became directly associated with control
over which groups would be disarmed. Both groups saw the state as a potential enemy,
triggering militia mobilization and self-protection unit formation, as well as very
aggressive approaches to ensure access to local political power.249 As conflict escalated
between the two inter-ethnic group alliances, political interests led to the capture of the
District Peace Committee, which functioned as a central hub for the coordination of
preventive action.250
As Hussein Mursal describes, “DPCs were formed by the community, but
hijacked by politicians. DCs captured donor resources directed to the DPCs, and lost their
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original purpose and spirit of voluntarism.”251 Similar to the Marsabit case, the Isiolo
DPC lost capacity to operate as a neutral organization. The success of DPC leaders
during the period of peace made them valuable information sources for political
candidates. DPC leaders were gatekeepers of information needed for candidates to
develop strategies for campaigns. MPs and political entrepreneurs from the area looked to
DPC leaders for information about threats, mobilization processes, and peace processes.
During negotiations with political candidates, DPC leaders were offered
incentives for information they needed for positioning and campaigning, such as the
dynamics of local peace negotiations, political positions of local elders and area chiefs,
party alignment and degrees of support, territorial control, and the severity of threats in
particular areas. When actors from both sides of the conflict realized DPC leaders were
not neutral and shared information with political elites, the larger coalition of local peace
actors broke down and the Isiolo DPC system ceased to function as a key hub for the
coordination of peace activities.252
Outcomes
The process of devolution and local government reform led communities in the
area to make increasingly aggressive claims over territorial control and position youth
militias in disputed border areas. Small-scale demographic shifts triggered the
assumption among the Borana that Turkana and Samburu settlements would help provide
routes for armed raiders from outside of the area, such as the Pokot, to raid Borana
251

Hussein Mursale, Isiolo DPC Chairman, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 14, 2014.

252

Daniel Kiptugen, Oxfam, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 16, 2013.

212

settlements. Reported communal goals of attacks were twofold: to maximize harm and
damage on enemy groups, and to reduce the likelihood of direct and rapid revenge.
Escalation led to the expansion of covert information gathering networks across the area,
and youth militias developed increasingly sophisticated forms of tracking and cloaking
techniques.
With the presence of dense informant networks, the difficulty of entering an area
without being noticed, even for a small-armed group to conduct an attack, required a high
level of intra-group cooperation as well as inter-group cooperation across trans-ethnic
alliances.253 To reduce risk of direct retaliation, groups adopted increasingly sophisticated
cloaking strategies such as entering an area through the territory of an enemy (or nonallied) ethnic group to redirect a potential revenge response. Informants claimed: “if you
can’t trust your neighbors not to collaborate with armed militia from outside of the area,
you can’t trust your neighbors, at all. Raiders do so much to hide their identity, that most
times no one know who is attacking.”254 These tactics greatly increase the likelihood of
revenge attacks, and subsequent escalation.
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Conclusions
Ethnic violence escalated, in the Isiolo case, in relationship to perceptions of the
potential for future gain or future loss of power and wealth through access to control over
the County Government. With political power as the primary channel for access to not
only massive expected economic resources, but also control over state security
operations, the expectation of possible loss among the Borana, and possible gain among
the Samburu – Turkana triggered forcible dislocation, and acts of ethnic cleansing.
National-level politics reinforced local ethnic divisions. National politics raised
the stakes of elections, increased local political tension, and deepened the division
between identity-based alliances. While dominant interpretations of violence in the Isiolo
Triangle blame resource scarcity and traditional acts of banditry and violence, in this
case, political motivations exacerbated seemingly traditional acts of violence. Political
capture and the collapse of a previously effective local peace structure created windows
for escalation in Isiolo County.
Mandera: Garre – Murule (2005 – 2008)
Conflict between the Garre255 and Murule256 between 2005 – 2008 is a case of
non-state, inter-ethnic group violence in which preventive intervention failed to contain
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escalation. The case is recorded in the UCDP database, estimating between 63 – 105
fatalities in 2005 and 31 in 2008. The establishment of sub-county political districts was a
key trigger for conflict between the Garre and Murule.257 Historically, the Garre held the
only MP seat in Mandera County. In 1983, a Merule representative won the seat. In
response to the rising threat of political violence, the GoK divided the constituency into
two districts—Mandera East with a Murule majority, and Mandera West with a Garre
majority. Elections in 1988 allowed both groups the opportunity for political
representation.
At the same time, the new boundary cut through communal grazing land. Elders
used informal inter-group negotiations to determine water and resource sharing patterns
in the area. Redistricting, however, caused contestation over the Alango water point. Both
groups claimed ownership of the area and armed groups from each clan increased patrols
along the new border. Garre and Murule drew upon cross-border clan networks for
support, leading to accusations of using foreign actors to bolster local protection
militias.258
Fear of external support justified further mobilization, training, and arming of
youth militias. Both groups amassed weapons and expanded cross-border networks and

Mandera County in Northeastern Kenya for over 120 years. Murule populations also reside across the
border in Somalia, in particular in Gedo and Jubba (See, UCDP Encyclopedia).
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alliances.259 In particular, Garre developed linkages with the Rahanweyn Resistance
Army (RRA) in Somalia. By 2002, the RRA controlled a large region of Somalia called,
the South-West State of Somalia. After securing territorial control in Somalia, Garre
militias in Somalia extended additional support for Garre militias in both Ethiopia and
Kenya (Menkhaus 2005).
Conflict Context
Even with the formation of militia alliances through the late 1980s and early
1990s, clashes did not occur between the Garre and Murule in Kenya until December of
2004 when Garre movement into contested grazing territory increased inter-group
tension. The key trigger of escalation was the murder of a prominent Garre aid worker.
Armed Murule attacked a relief convoy at the junction of the Fino-El Wak roads, killing a
well-known actor from the Garre community (Hussein 2012).
The initial Garre revenge mission was thwarted. Murule caught the Garre militia
trespassing in Mandera East. The militia fled, but attacked and killed 20 Murule civilians
during the retreat (IRIN 2005). In response, Murule attacked at El-Wak leading to
population displacement of 1,500 Garre (IRIN, “Conflict over resources in border areas,”
August 1st, 2002).
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Actors from the Wajir Peace Network, including elders, local peace committees,
and women’s groups, engaged to try to restore peace and convene negotiations between
the two groups. Leaders of local peace committees and the DPCs organized and hosted a
peace rally for President Mwai Kibaki, who called on elders from the area to lead
mediation efforts to secure a ceasefire. Elders led a local peace process, proposing a
communal fine of 100 camels per fatality, based on the traditional rule of blood payment
within Heer system. Both groups agreed to the rule. Shortly after the local truce,
however, violence broke out again after a Murule boy was killed in Fino-El Wak. Murule
blamed it on the Garre, and on March 16th, 2005, mobilized a large-scale attack at the El
Golicha, killing 22 Garre civilians, including 15 women, an imam, and five children
(Hussein 2012).
After the very deadly attack in El Golicha, the GoK engaged with the DPC system
to coordinate a large-scale peacebuilding intervention across Mandera County. Local
peace committees took the lead in arranging and coordinating dialogues, with
overarching support from DPCs and an association of Muslim leaders called the Supreme
Council of Muslims in Kenya (SUPKEM). DPCs also coordinated the formation of ad
hoc inter-clan arbitration committee made up of clan elders, civil society leaders, political
parties, and religious groups.260 The DPC appointed Sheikh Umal of Jamia Mosque in
Mandera as a key leader of the peace operation. The process included village-level
dialogues across the region, and eventually the signing of a peace accord, named in honor
of Sheikh Umal.
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The Umal Accord reinforced traditional blood payment codes set at 100 camels
for each man and 50 camels for woman or child, pasture sharing agreements, open
movement across political districts, and restitution for homes burned. The agreement also
included a stipulation for both groups to participate voluntary disarmament campaigns
(see, AllAfrica, “Blood Money Pact Opens Gender Debate,” March 26, 2005). Analysts
claim the key to success of the local truce between the Garre and Murule was that the
Kenyan government stepped into to fill a key void in enforcement (Menkhaus 2005).
The Umal Accord was informal and based on traditional customs that clashed
with constitutional mandates. Notwithstanding, government officials promised to enforce
the informal pact, and threatened military action against spoilers (see, Elfversson, 2013).
However, on the ground, the GoK did not have capacity to enforce the agreement.261
Military action across the remote periphery area would have been very costly with
limited impact due to the ease militia evasion across state borders. In practice,
government representatives relied upon NGOs with broader presence in the area for
conflict monitoring and information gathering to produce reports on the status of
implementation for conflict parties (see, Hussein 2009). In this case, state – CSO
cooperation improved monitoring, information sharing, and helped stabilize the peace
accord. The Umal Accord, therefore, held for nearly three years.
Between 2005 – 2008, communities reported problems related to the
implementation of the Accord. The state committed to enforcing the declaration and
NGOs aided in monitoring. On the ground, however, DPCs were the main institutions
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involved in enforcement. DPC chairmen, however, had no capacity to force Garre and
Murule communities to pay reparations for violence crimes. Both groups shirked
payments for killings and paid bribes to conflict monitors to prevent reports from going
out that reparations were not paid.262 DPCs had few resources to effectively monitor
whether or not resource-sharing agreements around remote water points were upheld.
Therefore, during the period of peace, rather than relocating to former integrated
villages, Garre and Murule populations moved away from contested areas and
boundaries. Both groups formed more homogenous settlements seeking protection
through intra-clan networks and alliances. In 2006, insecurity increased in the area in
relation to the activities of criminal gangs associated with Garre and Murule militias.
Both groups had linkages to conflict dynamics in Somalia, which remained rife with
reports and rumors of kidnappings and assassinations of leaders from within cross-border
ethnic alliances.
An event in May of 2007 nearly triggered re-escalation of the conflict:
“in May 2007 Murule elders traveling to attend a peace meeting were ambushed
by a Garre militia. Two elders were killed and the rest were injured. The Murule
claimed that the Garre were never remorseful and instead dismissed the incident
as the work of unruly Murule youth” (UNDP 2010).
Peace held for one year following the attack. However, with rising tension due to ongoing
conflict events in Somalia, as well as problems associated with enforcement and
monitoring of the local peace pact, violence re-escalated in July of 2008.
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The Umal Accord established Alango as a buffer zone between Garre and Murule
communities. However, the government drilled a new borehole well in Alango in 2008,
causing a dispute over ownership and access to the buffer zone. On September 5th, 2008,
clashes broke out over control of Alango, with 13 fatalities. After the initial clash,
revenge attacks escalated over the course of three months across multiple villages along
the border leading to 30 fatalities through the end of October 2008, and 30,000 IDPs.
Patterns of Response
In October of 2008, the Kenyan police conducted a four-day sweep across the
region in an effort to disarm Garre and Murule militias. Over 600 security actors,
including police, administrative police, and KDF conducted a joint operation. GoK
reports on the operation indicate the police arrested 150 Somali and Ethiopia militia
actors without legal residency (Hussein 2012). Human Rights Watch, however, criticized
the campaign for abuses, including allegations of rape and beatings. Reports gathered
indicated joint forces caused up to 1,200 injuries through beatings one fatality (Human
Rights Watch 2008).263 Kenyan police denied allegations of civilian abuse.
Even with increased policing in the area, respondents involved in the response
argue increased policing did not contain conflict. In particular, “security personnel in the
area, from ‘down country,’ were vulnerable to attack, and new to the desert conditions,
terrain and topography. Fear of attack by militias from Somalia caused security personnel
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to conduct very few preventative monitoring campaigns.”264 In the absence of effective
policing, local communities turned to politicians, local militias, and cross-border ethnic
networks for protection.265 After 2008, the Garre, in particular, turned to ethnic kinship
networks in Ethiopia for support for small arms and training for local militias. In the early
2000s, the Ethiopian military supported Garre militias from Kenya to engage in a proxy
war against the OLF, drawing the Garre into conflict dynamics in Ethiopia, and providing
youth militias with battle experience.
The GoK also organized a joint peace team and called elders and politicians for
dialogues in Nairobi. In 2008, an ad hoc arbitration committee, called the Joint Nairobi
Community Peace and Resolution Committee formed under the National Ministry for
Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands. The committee organized 50 village and clan
elders from all sub-districts in the county, and conducted peace dialogues through
separate, intra-clan dialogues, before convening joint dialogues.
After the broad-based dialogue, delegates elected a ten-member team to mediate
at the village level. The team received vehicles and resources to travel across the county
and engage in village-level peace dialogues, especially along the district borders. A broad
collation of organizations supported the peace operation, including local political actors,
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National politicians play a very active role in supporting local ethnic militias in Mandera. Even though it
remains very difficult to find direct evidence of this support, key informants indicate that it is very well
known that politicians often make some of the largest contributions for the support of local militias.
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suppliers.
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representatives of the UNDP Country Office, and the NSC. Following the local peace
campaign, the GoK and UNDP reported successful voluntary disarmament along the
disputed border (see, UNDP 2008). Respondents, however, indicate that disarmament
was highly symbolic. In most locations, “local leaders brought out older weapons for
photo opportunities, but still had very large, hidden stockpiles.”266
District peace committees, prior to the 2005 outbreak, were in place in all four
constituencies including, Mandera East, Central, West, and North. DPCs were in place in
all four locations starting in the year 2000. In 2005, the District Commissioner at the time
was head of the DPC, and both the Garre and Murule viewed him as a neutral actor,
granting legitimacy to the ad hoc arbitration committee (Adan and Pkalaya 2006). The
neutrality of mediators involved in the peace process improved the possibility of intergroup cooperation across all of the local peace forums conducted across Mandera
County. The DPCs in 2005 functioned as the primary institution to organize, convene,
and conduct peace negotiations among religious, business, and political elites. In 2005,
they were a key part of the successful negotiation of the Umal peace accord, and the state
supported them during the process, improving their capacity to respond and engage in
multiple negotiations with various sets of conflict actors.
Some analysts report elders groups were key actors within the peace process.
Respondents, however, indicate the traditional elders system is no longer a strong
institution.267 Young Somali business elites challenge the authority of local elders. The
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growth of informal trade networks for the transport of goods across the Kenyan border
into Somali and Ethiopia led to the emergence of wealthy youth business owners who
have higher social standing than elders. Business networks provide youth with social
authority and control over local militias due to their financial support for militias through
clientelistic networks.268 As a result, local councils of elders are not always comprised of
older men from the community, as in the past, but now include young men with access to
business networks, transportation networks, and cross-border monetary exchange.
Outcomes
In the Mandera case, LPCs received financing through the local government,
allowing informal coalitions of peace groups to expand monitoring capacity, to build
stronger, more routinized processes of preventive negotiation (Weiss 2004; Menkhaus
2005). Notwithstanding, violence escalated in two major periods. Why did informal
institutions and local peace systems not contain conflict between the Garre and Murule?
Evidence suggests state actions undermined previously effective informal institutional
systems, and that border dynamics allowed for the introduction of external militants.
After 2005, the conflict broadened to involve clans from Somalia and Ethiopia,
who crossed the Kenya border to provide support for militia groups in Mandera. Due to
the failure of disarmament campaigns and the rise of strong cross-border networks,
militias from Garre and Murule remained heavily armed and prepared for violent
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clashes.269 With youth militias well connected and interlinked with political elites, they
had direct access to information about when and where the state was planning
disarmament campaigns, and when the DPC was planning peace negotiations, providing
militias time to relocate and evade both security interventions. Key informants involved
in local peace processes in Mandera described how leaders of DPCs and LPCs interacted
with communities and “played the peace game only on the surface.” 270 At the same time,
they maintained deep ties to their ethnic community and worked to assist militia members
with access to accurate information about peace activities, and the behavior and interests
of other groups operating in the area.
Traditional blood payment rules were not a sufficient disincentive, and proved
easy to shirk. As a key informant described, “elders directly support local militias, and
step into assume the cost of negotiating the informal justice system on behalf of youth
militants in the event of causalities during a clash.”271 In other words, the fact that the
entire community would absorb the cost of the blood payment did not create a strong
enough disincentive for individuals in militias to refrain from using violent force to
protect communal resources, or to engage in a revenge attack to protect the status of the
group.
State actions in the area undermined trust of civic actors, and undermined
capacity for local peace mobilization among a previously robust set of actors. As the
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Mandera Education Minister described: “With very little information, police choose to do
untargeted and indiscriminate ‘sweeps’ that offend the people and undermined the
legitimacy of local security institutions” (Mandera Education Commissioner, NCT
Interview, August 10, 2014). Indiscriminate police sweeps increase tension and
undermine trust in not only the police, but also local organizations thought to be
collaborating with the police. This not only constrained the ability of local peace
associations to extract information needed to convene negotiations, but it also made
representatives of peacebuilding organizations potential targets of violence. Alignment,
even perceived alignment, with the GoK reduced the efficacy of local peace actors.
Civic associations in Mandera ended up with little leverage to prevent wellorganized armed actors with prior battle experience from using increasingly severe forms
of violence against civilians. External actors involved in the conflict system have very
low levels of aversion to killing civilians due to prior experience in militias in Somalia
and Ethiopia. The local peace architecture in Mandera could not reduce uncertainty about
impending attacks or threats from militias that were very well organized due to nature of
severe insecurity in Somalia. The rapid influx of heavily armed, ethnic kinsmen from
Ethiopia and Somalia quickly triggered escalation, with more severe violence than in
prior conflicts.
Conclusions
Analysis of patterns of violence and responses to violence in Mandera between
the Garre and Murule indicates the level of internal organization and skill of armed actors
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to conduct attacks and evade both security interventions and peace actions played a major
role in this case. After an extensive local peace process, the introduction of external
actors the conflict created conditions for the re-escalation of violence. The nature and
qualities of armed actors who are well trained due to linkages with more complex
conflicts in bordering countries is critical for understanding why violence is more severe
in Mandera than in other conflicts across the ASALs.
The Garre – Murule case reveals that in the wake of 2005 escalation, a very large
joint peace coalition emerged among a very broad coalition of CSOs, including elders
groups, religious groups, women’s groups, political parties, and international donors, was
able to support an effective stabilization process that created a three year period of peace.
However, keeping a peace coalition in place proved difficult under conditions of severe
dis-integration of inter-ethnic ties and high levels of cross-border movement. Along the
border with Somalia, armed militias benefit from illegal trade and extra-legal activities,
and have significant resources as well as local social support to be able to evade and
resist attempts among local peace groups to contain the use of violence. At the sub-state
level, governance of local violence and conflict dynamics ends up in the hands of actors
not necessarily well equipped with authority, or coercive power to be able to contain
armed groups.

Mandera: Garre – Degodia Clashes (2013 – 2014)
Conflict between the Garre and Degodia is a case of non-state, inter-ethnic group
violence in which preventive intervention failed to contain escalation. The most recent
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wave of escalation was deadlier than prior clashes with direct targeting of children and
women, forced dislocation, as well as direct targeting of humanitarian and peacebuilding
organizations.272 Estimates indicate conflict between the Garre and Degodia between
2013 – 2014 resulted in over 1000 homes burned, 52,000 IDPs, and 200 fatalities (OCHA
Mandera Report 2014).
Reduction of ethnic violence in Wajir in the late 1990s is cited as evidence for
effective local peace institutions in violence prevention (Odendaal 2013). Originating
within a local women’s group called the Wajir Women for Peace Group, over time, a
coalition of local associations formed. The Wajir Peace Group convened negotiations
with armed groups and political elites, and effectively contained clashes between the
Degodia and Ajurran273 along the border between Kenya and Somalia (Ibrahim and
Jenner 1996; van Tongeren 2005; Menkhaus 2008).
Over time, Degodia involved in the Wajir Peace Group set up and expanded local
peace networks and associations across Wajir and Mandera. Conflict dynamics in the
area spill across county and state boundaries, and include the same ethnic groups and
similar conflict drivers (Menkhaus 2015). Garre are the majority group in Mandera, and
the Degodia are the Majority group in Wajir. The key puzzle for this case, therefore, is
why local peace organizations with past success were not unable to contain escalation
between the Garre and Degodia between 2012 and 2013.
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Context of Conflict
Respondents refer to 1984 as the beginning of conflict between the Garre and
Degodia.274 In that year, drought sparked clashes over territorial control. Redistricting
and ethnic based allocation of territory as a means to garner and consolidate political
support played a major role, as well. Historically, political parties created sub-districts to
gain ethnic-based support in Mandera. KANU political entrepreneurs, in particular, used
this strategy broadly the 1990s and 2000s. Based on ethnic bloc voting patterns, political
elites increased the number of electoral constituencies in Mandera and Wajir275 to
increase certainty around electoral outcomes. This strategy, originally designed to prevent
ethnic conflict, had unintended consequences. With a high level of population mobility,
district boundaries did not ensure all ethnic groups had equal representation in the county
government. Regularly shifting boundaries increased uncertainty, and, created linkages
between access to political posts and power to allocate scarce land resources.
Historically, the Garre276 and Degodia clans were the only two ethnic groups with
so-called “resident status” in Mandera County. All other groups were considered
minority, migrants, or “corner tribes.” The breaking of a long-standing informal
powersharing rule among the Garre and Degodia during the 2007 – 2008 election was the
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Mandera now has six districts: Mandera East, Central, North, West, Banisa and Lafey, and three
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The Garre maintain a communal belief that Mandera is their homeland. The historical narrative is that
they relocated to Mandera during the 19th century, effectively winning it from the Borana, and pushing
them back to Moyale. This narrative shapes the idea that Degodia, Murule and other minority groups are
“outsiders” to the area, and that the settlement of other groups is the area is only due to successful
negotiations and granting of permission by the Garre (see also, UNDP 2010).
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key event that set up conditions for escalation in 2013 – 2014. An informal rule of ethnic
powersharing maintained stability: the Garre held two MP seats, and the Degodia held
one MP seat. This distribution aligned with the demographic composition of the area
(Peace Direct 2014).
In the 2008 elections, the long-term ethnic balance shifted, breaking the informal
powersharing rule. In Mandera Central, the incumbent MP, Billow Kerrow, a Garre from
the majority clan, lost the election to Abdikadir Mohamed from the minority Degodia
clan. Mohamed’s victory shifted the MP seat to control by the minority Degodia group,
breaking the long period of Garre control. Grievances related to the political shift were
not resolved. Garre believed the 2008 election as rigged, raising the stakes of the 2013
election.277 Conditions surrounding the 2013 election also raised the stakes for both
groups. In particular, due to the ongoing process of devolution, county-level political
posts were associated with access to more power and more resources due to a sharp spike
in state resources allocated to Mandera County.278
National political dynamics raised the stakes of local elections. Constitutional
reform, passed in 2010, required securing both 50% of national vote and at least 25% of
the vote in fifty percent of Kenya’s 47 counties279 for a party to secure the presidency.
William Ruto, the Jubilee vice presidential candidate, and Raila Odinga, the ODM
277

Abdi Haji, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 17, 2013.

278

IEBC reforms in 2010 instituted after PEV in 2008 added three additional MP seats for Mandera
County.
279

The institutional design logic is based on the concept of centripetalism. The electoral rule, in theory,
incentivizes candidates to pursue a geographic, and thus ethnic, balance of political support during
campaigns.

229

presidential candidate both spent a significant amount of time campaigning in the rural
periphery, especially Mandera. This was a new campaign strategy for top national party
elites. With more at stake in the elections, political entrepreneurs conducted ethno-centric
campaigns, rife with hate speech and accusations of communal violence being used to
displace voters. 280
On March 4th, 2013, the outcome of the elections deepened tension between the
Garre and the Degodia communities. Garre representatives dominated all political posts.
The Garre won the MP seat in Mandera Central back from Degodia, as well as the
County Governor and Senator positions. The Garre also won the MP seat in the newly
defined district of Mandera North—an area with a majority Degodia population. The
Degodia assumed it would be impossible, based on demographics, for the Garre to win
the MP seat in Mandera North without manipulating the population or tampering with the
election itself (Carrier and Kochore 2014)
Two months after the election, on March 10th, 2013: “a campaign vehicle
belonging to the prior Senate candidate Billow Kerrow, who is from the Garre clan,
struck and killed a businessman from the Degodia clan in Rhamu.”281 The Degodia
community claimed the accident was intentional and politically motivated, making the
event highly symbolic of Garre aggression (Sabahi, June 26, 2013). On June 21st, 2013,
Degodia attacked Garre driving lorries near the village of Eldas as an act of retribution
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Prior to the hit and run, Rhamu was a location where Degodia claim they were forcefully displaced by
Garre militias, and Garre groups from outside of the district were resettled to secure the election for the
Garre.
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for the hit and run. Four Garre were killed. After the attack, the same Degodia militia
attacked a GSU camp near Eldas.
In response, on June 23rd, 2013, the Garre attacked the Degodia at Jariko village
in Banisa district, a largely Degodia IDP camp. The Garre militia used grenade launchers,
targeted and burned homes and lorries among a largely civilian IDP population. The
Jariko attack led to 14 fatalities and 17 injuries among the Degodia community. Police
were also attacked: one officer was killed and four were injured. During the conflict,
violence spilled over into Wajir County with incidents reported at Burmayo, Orgulae,
Saman, and Dunto, and in Ethiopia near Malkamari. Police and other first-responders
were attacked as militias tried to restrict the spread of information related to the events.282
A response team from the Wajir County Government, including the Governor, a Senator,
and a Women’s Representative, was attacked on the road to Mandera in Burmayo village
on June 30th, 2014, turning back the rapid response convoy (OCHA Mandera Report
2013).
On July 4th, 2013, Garre and Degodia elites signed an agreement in Mandera town
to accept electoral outcomes, just prior to Ramadan. The GoK sent more police to area to
try to maintain security, and canceled a disarmament campaign to allow time for
voluntary disarmament (Mandera Times, July 4th, 2013). Analysts indicate that the threat
of disarmament and holding local chiefs accountable for violence were key pressures that
led leaders from both communities to sign the Ramadan agreement (Hiraan, “Mandera
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County warring communities sign peace accord,” July 6, 2013). Ali Ibrahim Roba,
Mandera County Governor stated,
“the deal reached by the two communities was a culmination of weeks of multisector peace talks facilitated by the national and county governments with the
support from the local leadership and national cohesion and integration
commission” (Hiraan, “Mandera County warring communities sign peace
accord,” July 6, 2013).
The Ramadan Accord held only for nine months. On May 13th, 2014 a Garre
militia attacked three Degodia along the Burmayo-Fincharo road. The Degodia were
working on a road-clearing project—a development scheme both groups agreed to in the
Ramadan peace negotiations. The attack created a deep grievance among the Degodia,
especially since it was against civilian actors involved in a peacebuilding project
(Standard News, “Politics, Border Disputes, Garre Degodia clan clashes,” June 29th,
2014). With rising threat of revenge attacks, spillover dynamics from the KDF military
operation in Somalia complicated the situation and restricted local peace actors.
A set of attacks by al-Shabaab in Mandera followed directly on the heels of the
small act of communal violence. On May 14th, Al Shabaab conducted three attacks on
police stations in Mandera town, and attacked the deputy governor’s home with a grenade
launcher. Severe disorder in the area prevented local peace actors from engaging in rapid
response actions.283 One week after the major outbreak of violence, on May 21st, 2014,
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actors from local peace groups mobilize teams of elders to try to negotiate a ceasefire.
However, al-Shaabab gunmen attacked the peace team:
Al-Shabaab ambushed a security team heading to the reconciliation meeting
between the Degodia and Garre clans in El Wak town. Al-Shabaab spokesman Ali
Mohamud Rage warned that more attacks against Kenyan citizens would follow,
stating, ‘The only ones who should be blamed for your insecurity are none but
your government, which has invaded Somalia in an attempt to fight war on behalf
of the West,’ he said. ‘We tell the Kenyan people to not even dream of peace as
long as your sons are occupying Somalia’ (Boniface, May 21, 2014 in Sabahi).
In late May, Garre and Degodia leaders met President Kenyatta in Mandera and
agreed to a ceasefire. Elite-centric negotiations, again, failed to stop attacks for more than
a few weeks. Another major attack occurred in Banisa on June 23rd, 2014, with over 16
fatalities. On June 25th, both Degodia and Garre leaders met directly with President
Kenyatta, who issued a proclamation stating that a major security operation would be
conducted in the area if both groups could not control violence. Again, negotiations and
state-led mediation failed. On July 1st, over one hundred armed Garre attacked civilians at
Gunana village in a mission to attack a Degodia militia based along the border of Wajir
and Mandera. During the attack, the Garre targeted the administrative police camp in
order to repel police and prevent security actors from intervening (Finn Church Aid
Report 2014: 8).
Patterns of Response
State military forces responded to the conflict between the Garre and Degodia,
especially after reports emerged that both groups hired al-Shabaab gunmen284 to carry out
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attacks. Due to linkages between local communal conflict dynamics in Mandera and
Kenya’s larger national security intervention in Somalia, the state responded aggressively
to contain communal conflict in Mandera (see also, Anderson and McKnight 2015). The
GoK reinforced existing police units and established new joint security operations,
including Anti-terrorism Police Units (ATPUs).
ATPUs received allegations of conducting extra-judicial killings (Al Jazeera
2015; Chimp Reports 2015). The GoK instituted reforms of local policing structures,
including the removal of Garre and Degodia Police officers from Mandera in an effort to
remove potential bias within police forces. The GoK also passed new, controversial
legislation in December 2014 called the Security Laws Amendment Act to extend the
formal security sector. The legislation increases policing of cross border movement and
focuses on monitoring the movement of Somali refugees lacking formal documentation
of residence (Goitom 2014).
Severity of insecurity and the high level of interest in cross-border stability
trigged collaboration between the state, local peace committees, and NGOs operating in
the area including the Kenya Red Cross Society, the National Drought Management
Authority, Save the Children, Islamic Relief, and the Wajir Peace Committee. In other
areas of Northern Kenya, peace committees are left to function on their own with a very
low level of state support and interaction. DPCs in other locations operate as hybrid
institutions seeking the aid of NGOs and other outside donor groups. In contrast, in the

mercenaries. These actors have very sophisticated military capacity, and have been able to conduct very
deadly attacks, using more deadly weaponry and terrorist tactics, such as the use of IEDs in public spaces.
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Mandera case, DPCs received significant support and were called upon directly during
the security operations.285
In particular, state officials engaged with DPCs in each district for gathering
intelligence on conflict drivers, investigations related to evidence of political incitement
and the involvement of local elites, and communicating threats of disarmament. The DPC
set up state-level dialogues. The GoK and DPCs also collaborated to conduct diplomatic
talks among political leaders from Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia over the problem of
insecurity in the periphery of all three states.286

Outcomes
Respondents from the Mandera DPC argued the nature of the relationship
between the state security operation, the DPC, and local peace associations had
unintended consequences for local peacebuilding interventions. The Mandera Peace
Committee chairman stated,
Somalis are being systematically discriminated by Kenyan police and security
actors. If you don’t feel Kenyan, you don’t feel safe in Kenya. Police see Somalis
as ‘ATMs’ because they are highly likely not to have documents even if their
family has always lived in Kenya; they know they can get very high bribes from
targeting them (NCT Interview, August 10, 2014).
Following collaboration with the state during the policing campaign, local peacebuilding
organizations receive threats from local militias, and lost capacity to convene
negotiations. Reports accuse Kenyan security forces that responded to contain violence
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between the Garre and Degodia of shooting suspects without due process, indiscriminant
detainment of suspects, and deadly disarmament campaigns.287 Human rights
organizations accused police for abuse of local government officials for failing to
maintain security.288 Trust in local peace actors eroded due to heavy handed policing
tactics, the use of local peace organizations to gather intelligence, and the indiscriminant
targeting of Somalis by police across Kenya.289
Conclusion
A combination of factors generated conditions for escalation that a relatively
strong coalition of peacebuilding organizations was not able to control. As the new
minority group, the Degodia have a very strong suspicion that they will continue to face
organized political exclusion in Mandera at the hands of the Garre. Under this condition,
competition over the two most valuable resources in the area—land and political posts—
is the most powerful trigger of violence.
After the outbreak of clashes, militias sought recruits through intra-clan networks
in both Ethiopia and Somalia. Garre and Degodia leveraged networks with armed actors
in Somalia and Ethiopia to bolster local protection militias, including resource pooling
for hiring mercenaries to bolster protection units. They captured exclusive control over
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intelligence services, police, and local peace associations in order control all institutions
related to local security. The Ramadan Accord included an agreement to ensure police
were external actors from non-Somali groups. This stipulation was not upheld. Both
groups rejected external police actors to ensure information networks were controlled and
not leaking information to rival groups.290
All of these shifts occurred in parallel with the process of devolution and the
pursuit of exclusive control over political processes to gain control over new
administration posts. Prior to devolution both the Garre and Degodia had equally limited
access to state resources. However, with devolution, majority groups have the capacity to
lock out minority groups from access to state resources at the county level. One of the
primary tactics for locking out a competing group, therefore, becomes, the use of
traditional modes of inter-group violence, such as raiding, but on a larger, and deadlier
scale. These strategic shifts transformed and intensified conflict in Mandera County. The
informal peace architecture could not withstand the very rapid process of dis-integration,
institutional capture, and inter-group fear.291 The dis-integration process undermined both
elite and armed actor interest in cooperating with local peace actors.
Coalitions, Fragmentation, and Conflict Recurrence
Why were peacebuilding organizations with prior success in limiting violence not
able to stem escalation in these cases? Analysis of conflict escalation and corresponding
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patterns of intervention at the hands of state, civil society, and local peace actors indicate
there are five common patterns that undermine the capacity of local peace coalitions to
manage violence and prevent severe escalation of ethnic violence across the cases.
The first condition is the logic of violence itself. In the Isiolo case, for example,
resource conflict took on both economic and political purposes. It shifted from a logic of
economic predation to political violence conducted along cleavages based on ethnopolitical alliances. The second condition that triggered escalation, even in the presence of
a very strong coalition of peace actors was the nature of attacks. As attacks became more
severe, more direct, and targeted toward specific villages, the likelihood of highly
asymmetrical acts of violence increased.
Both the nature and logic of violence created conflict conditions civic associations
and non-coercive preventive strategies could not contain. Multiple, pre-conflict peace
declarations broke down. Informal peace declarations, agreements, and compensation
schemes were not sufficient disincentives to stem attacks from escalating. The covert
involvement of elites in instigating violence, arming local militias, and guiding strategic
targeting decisions became very difficult for local civic groups to counteract. Elites
avoided engagement with local peace associations. With a high level of impunity,
peacebuilding organizations faced challenges in stemming elite-led violence.
The increasing complexity of the local political economy also played a role. The
twin pressures of developmental change, and political change, created a more complex
political economy with a increasing number of interest groups and actors involved in the
conflict system. The rising diversity in the composition of the polity in Isiolo undermined
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cohesiveness among local peacebuilding groups. With rising violence and rising fear,
inter-ethnic communication and informal protection networks broke down, undermining
the ability of groups to reach pacts among elites from ethnic groups, all seeking to protect
or access political power. At the same time, the increasing sophistication of organization
among armed actors undermined local coping and protection strategies.
Local civic groups had some success at certain points with each conflict trajectory.
In some instances, informal coalitions limited escalation. However, in the early stages of
political change, under the conditions of shifting ethnic alliances, threats to status quo
and majority control, and the rising possibility of future financial gain from development
interventions, even relatively strong coalition of peace actors could not fully contain
violence incited by political elites.
Large coalitions of civic organizations involved in preventive efforts collapse under
political and economic pressures in West Pokot, Mandera, and Marsabit. For example,
the DPCs in Marsabit and Moyale collapsed in the in the lead up to the Turbi Massacre,
Riam-Riam and POKATUSA collapsed after leaders developed political aspirations and
used organizational resources to fund personal campaigns, and in the run up to elections,
the Isiolo DPC was captured by political interests. In these cases, the fragmentation of
previously effective peacebuilding coalitions was part of the process of conflict
escalation. Some forms of inter-group conflict, including more complex political
violence, may be outside of the scope of civic organizations. Conflicts with political
motivations that occur along international borders prove difficult for informal
organizational structures to contain.
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Table 8: Features of Recurring Escalation Cases
Explanatory
Factors
Groups
1. Symbolic
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2. Border/
Dev/Periphery
3. State Response

4. Cohesive
Coalition
Elite Unity
Informal
Institutions
Militia Trust
5. Local
Adaptation
Outcomes
1) Escalation
2) Non-escalation
3) Re-escalation

11. Marsabit
Turbi Massacre
(2002 – 2005)

12. West Pokot
Turkana Border
(2013 – 2014)

13. Isiolo
Triangle
(2008 – 2012)

14. Mandera
Garre – Murule
(2005 – 2008)

15. Mandera
Garre – Degodia
(2013 – 2014)

Gabra, Borana

Samburu, Turkana

Garre, Murule

Garre, Degodia

Y
Act of Weakness
Youth killed

N
Grievance:
Inequality

Samburu, Turkana,
Gabra, Somali
Y
Targeting: Norm
shift

Border

Developmental

Developmental

Y
Death of
humanitarian
worker
Border

Y
Death of
humanitarian
worker
Border

Coercive: Sanctions

Coercive: Military
Force
(disarm – Uganda;
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CHAPTER SIX: CONTAINING VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED
COMMUNITIES

The previous three chapters presented empirical evidence related to processes of
escalation in fifteen inter-ethnic group conflicts across six counties in Northern Kenya.
Three categories of episodes were matched based on most similar outcomes: escalation,
limited escalation, and cases where civic organizations had prior success in containing
escalation but violence re-escalated. Each case analyzed conflict triggers, patterns of
state, civic, and community response, and subsequent outcomes. Analysis focused on the
extent to which civic groups responded collectively to dampen threats of violent conflict
and effectively prevented further escalation. The following chapter draws from
comparative case study analysis, explaining why escalation occurred in some cases, but
not in others. Across the cases, the study finds that within areas of limited state presence,
local resilience to inter-ethnic group violence is a function of the interactions between
cohesive civic coalitions, patterns of state response, and communal adaptation.
State responses to local, inter-ethnic conflicts in Northern Kenya create a political
economy in which ethnically homogenous settlements face a persistent threat of violent
predation. Corruption among formal security organizations, the use of force against
civilians to extract information about local militias, the involvement of political elites in
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arming ethnic militias and coordinating disarmament campaigns directed against some
groups and not others, as Joseph Akoule describes, “make the state an enemy.”292
Under these conditions, civic associations have some capacity to contain
escalatory dynamics. Threat monitoring, rapid response, and informal bargaining
processes make it more difficult for large militias to form and mobilize rapid retaliation
attacks. In some cases, patrons of militias leverage civic associations to expand and
improve the capacity of militias to monitor insecure areas and respond to threats. In
others, civic associations unified around long-term peacebuilding agendas, supporting
preventive negotiations and informal codes of restitution that improved communal
resilience. These mechanisms contain escalation and make large scale, well-organized
acts of mass killing, such as the Turbi, Todonyang, and Baragoi massacres, rare. Informal
institutional arrangements help avert vengeance and contain the escalation of inter-ethnic
group violence following initial acts of aggression.
However, civic coalitions and communal adaption do not necessarily transform or
resolve deeply protracted inter-ethnic group conflicts under conditions of sub-state
fragility. In particular, following the state’s of use of indiscriminant violence against
civilians, communities continue to support, mobilize, and expand the capacity of local
militias to use the threat of deadly force as a primary deterrent. During perfect storms of
compounding conflict pressures, informal organizational structures and communal
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protection strategies can quickly disintegrate. In particular, symbolic killings commonly
trigger escalatory dynamics that are difficult for civic groups to contain.

State Responses across Local Contexts
State approaches to prevent the escalation of inter-ethnic group conflict were not
consistent across the cases. This finding confirms the state coping concept initially
proposed by Lawson and Rothchild (2005). Theories of ethnic conflict must account for
variable patterns of state action within particular sub-state conflict contexts. Findings
from the study indicate that across Northern Kenya there are three relatively consistent
patterns of state response to inter-ethnic group conflict. State responses to local, interethnic group conflict varied in relation to political and economic interests specific to
periphery areas, developmental areas, and border areas.

State Action in Periphery Conflicts
In response to clashes in the most remote and least economically viable areas of
Northern Kenya, including Samburu, Marsabit, and Turkana, the state deployed elite
security teams for short-term peacebuilding missions. Preventive interventions were
largely ad hoc and designed for information gathering, media interactions, and
interactions with local chiefs and political representatives. During helicopter missions
state elites accused local politicians of being involved or benefiting from conflict.
Political elites regularly shamed local leaders for failing to control “their people.”293
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Following more extreme episodes, such as the Bargoi Massacre and the Moyale clashes,
the state charged local political leaders with incitement. This occurred even with little
evidence of culpability. Public peacebuilding barazas were held in urban centers in
which political elites and eminent figures from police institutions issued ultimatums in
the presence of media outlets.
Informants indicated that these approaches had very little effect upon conflict
dynamics. In the words of an area chief from Marsabit County,
Helicopter missions do not accomplish anything for us. It makes us not respect
them, and not want to work with them on anything. When Kimaiyo flies here, he
warns everyone to stop fighting or there will be consequences. He accuses us of
being involved, and says that if we are involved in organizing or funding armed
groups, the problems will be serious. Then, he flies away, and nothing happens.294
State-sanctioned threats undermined cooperation between pastoralist communities and
state security actors, increasing the likelihood that groups would evade government
security interventions. In the Nyiro Valley conflict, for instance, there was very minimal
communal cooperation with RDU and anti-stock theft policing units. Local militias and
their patrons did not report information on potential threats to the police, largely due to
the high cost of corruption required to get security actors to respond to threats. Police
used crisis moments as opportunities to extract resources from the community, which
further undermined their ability to prevent inter-group conflict. Policing units based in
the periphery had very low prevention and protection capacity.
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Following more severe forms of violence in periphery areas, the state deployed
additional security personnel. GSU camps, administration police, and joint military and
police camps with rapid deployment units and anti-stock theft agents were established in
highly conflict prone corridors including Suguta Valley, Loima, and Turkwel Gorge.
Notwithstanding, the KPR remained the primary security actors involved in day-to-day
policing and threat monitoring. The operating assumption behind the KPR system is that
arming local community policing representatives from rival ethnic groups will create, as
James N’dungu describes, “an informal ethnic balance of power to stabilize inter-group
relations.”295
Communities, however, did not perceive the KPR system as an inclusive policing
institution. Particular ethnic groups with political connections could secure access to
weapons for their own KPR units. It is widely known that pastoralist politicians arm
ethnic militias, whether directly or indirectly through the KPR system.296 The depth of
corruption within police institutions across Northern Kenya creates a situation in which
communities pay bribes to gain access to weapons for local KPR agents (see also, Mkutu
and Wandera 2013). Inequality and inconsistency within state policing strategies led
ethnic groups to maintain large illegal weapons stockpiles and active linkages to crossborder arms markets. State actions and the availability of arms through co-ethnic, cross
border trade networks undermined the logic of the KPR system.
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In Samburu, Marsabit, West Pokot and Mandera, to try to control and limit
escalation the state conducted ad hoc disarmament campaigns. Disarmament processes,
however, had unintended consequences. The politicization of disarmament campaigns
contributed to escalatory dynamics. Disarmament was conducted in some communities
but not others, reinforcing the notion of inter-group inequality. It caused groups to re-arm
due to the increased threat of opportunistic attacks from neighboring militias that were
not dis-armed. In the words of an informant from Marsabit County, “the government is
against us, leaving us vulnerable if we do not have weapons. When they take our
weapons, we know the government wants to clear us.”297 Communities viewed
disarmament as a political action. In the Isiolo case, for example, political parties used
grievances related to disarmament to foster political support.
During disarmament campaigns, police and military agents used violence and
intimidation against communities. In West Pokot and Mandera, for example, after the
state used coercive force to disarm pastoralist communities, militias targeted state police,
paramilitary actors, and even peacebuilding convoys. The political dynamics behind
disarmament processes increased the likelihood of violence escalating to include direct
attacks against government security forces and civic organizations involved in
peacebuilding missions. For example, in the cases of the Baragoi massacre and the
Lorogon standoff, ethnic militias engaged in violent clashes with military and police
personnel who responded to try to contain violence. The perception of inequality within

297

Focus Group 139, Elders Dialogue, Dialogue with the author, Loongerin, Kenya, August 26, 2014.

246

state policing and peacebuilding interventions caused many conflicts to escalate to
include targeting of peacebuilders.
Suspicion and persistent fear of state meddling within local conflicts drove
communities to support, expand, and train local ethnic militias. Government interventions
were seen as a threat to communal security. In response, local militias became, over time,
more powerful than the KPR, policing units, and even formal military units. Informants
described state security forces as “outsiders,” “strangers,” and, in some cases,
“enemies.”298 Where police were not trusted, the state was not trusted.299 Where civic
groups were thought to be agents of the state, they lost the trust of local militias, as well.
This caused deep and persistent inter-ethnic group mistrust, suspicion, and fear. In the
most remote villages of the rural periphery, ethnic groups must not only work to evade
threats from other ethnic groups but also threats from state security actors.
State Action in Developmental Conflicts
In comparative perspective, the discovery of oil in the Turkana region and state
investment in new large-scale development projects in Isiolo presented unique challenges
for civic organizations involved in local conflict prevention, and variation in state
responses to local conflict. Turkana and Isiolo recently shifted from being economically
unviable, to being potential sources of wealth for the country at large. Political and

298

Mannaseh Wepundi, Former UNDP Consultant, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 15,
2014.
299

Philip Ongunje, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, July 15, 2014.

247

economic transition intensified competition between ethnic groups in the Turkana and
Isiolo cases.
In line with resource curse theories (Johannes, Zulu, and Kalipeni 2014;
Cummings 2015), rising interest in development gains exacerbated identity-based rent
seeking in Turkana and Isiolo. In the Turkana-Pokot conflict, Pokot elites at the state
level directly supported and incited violence against Turkana militias along the border to
dislocate populations in territories that are likely to contain oil deposits (see chapter four).
In the Isiolo case, rapid economic development correlated with the escalation of intergroup violence due to the increasing value of communal territory and local political
positions. Rapid development gains in both Turkana and Isiolo led elites to organize and
support local militias to aggressively dislocate other ethnic groups. In these cases,
resource-related conflict and traditional modes of raiding escalated and transformed into
political violence.
Under these conditions, regional experiences and lessons learned from Eritrea and
South Sudan about the relationship between identity politics, extractive industries, and
rapid economic growth drove variation in state responses to local conflicts in Isiolo and
Turkana (Kochore 2013). In areas where the state has interest in the extraction of
economic resources, local violence becomes more disruptive and higher cost to the state.
Rather than relying only upon ad hoc, short-term, and principally coercive modes of
response to local conflict, as in periphery regions with minimal economic potential, the
GoK invested in a broader range of both coercive and non-coercive preventive strategies
to try to contain inter-group violence and improve local security.
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In Isiolo and Turkana, the state supported and collaborated closely with District
Peace Committees, NGOs, CSOs, and other local civic groups during dialogues and
informal pact making processes. In contrast to other regions where local peacebuilding
organizations received little to no support from the state, with economic gains at stake,
the state provided more resources for the formation and institutionalization of local
peacebuilding organizations. In particular, the state supported the efforts of the National
Cohesion and Integration Commission to build inter-group unity through a narrative of
“unity in diversity”300 within areas of higher potential for rapid economic growth. At the
same time, DPCs in Lodwar and in Isiolo received considerable state support and
backing, more so than other DPCs in more remote, low potential areas.301
In Turkana and Isiolo, civic peacebuilding efforts became intertwined with the
state’s interest in resource extraction within previously marginalized areas. Due to the
lack of legitimacy and trust in external security actors, the responsibility for local
peacebuilding falls upon civil society associations and private companies (Raeymaekers,
Menkhaus, and Vlassenroot 2008). Peacebuilding efforts complimented the state’s
interest in pacification and integration of periphery areas. Providing support for civic
groups is much lower cost than the establishment and extension of formal security
systems. State support for non-coercive strategies was designed to limit the possibility of
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secessionist movements forming in areas where long-term marginalization increased the
likelihood of inter-ethnic group violence.
In the Turkana case, Tullow’s formal security practices had unintended
consequences for local conflict dynamics. Private security firms contracted KPR to
provide security for convoys working with oil companies and contractors, and as security
guards for wealthy elites with new private residences. This is a similar feature of the
context of Isiolo, where KPR and armed militia members were hired as private security
guards for compounds of political elites relocating to the region to benefit from rapid
economic growth. This had unintended consequences, however. As KPR left posts in
more remote villages such as Kainuk, Loima, and Todonyang for local security positions
within the oil industry, more remote villages were left more vulnerable to predatory
attacks.
Extractive firms in the Turkana case instituted specific informal strategies
designed to prevent conflict related to oil exploration and extraction process. Tullow Oil
used community relations liaisons to avoid direct contact between external workers and
local communities. The company carefully controlled narratives around hiring practices,
avoided interaction with local youth militias, and systematically managed rhetoric around
levels and types of services and development programming the company provided to the
community. Controlling narratives related to the firm’s practices and creating distance
between external staff and majority ethnic groups were primary strategies for conflict
prevention.
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Overall, increasing state investment in the local peacebuilding infrastructure
occurred in parallel with direct economic gains for local militias and patrons. Internally,
violence has not escalated between Turkana communities and external actors within
Turkana County. However, violence is escalating between Turkana and Pokot
communities along the Southern border of Turkana County. State responses have not
contained predatory rent seeking and the escalation of violence along the contested
border between Turkana and West Pokot.
State Action in Border Conflicts
Somalia is the world’s most failed state. This condition has caused long-term
disorder and inter-ethnic group violence with direct spillover effects in Kenya. In the
Mandera case, for example, in November and December of 2014, following clashes
between the Garre and Degodia in Kenya, Al Shabaab used the escalation of local
violence as an opportunity to conduct two deadly terrorist attacks—one on a bus and the
other on a quarry operation in Mandera County. The two attacks caused over 75
casualties in the span of less than three weeks. In April of 2015, as-Shabaab attacked
Garissa University College killing 148 people. Al Shabaab attributed the attacks to
Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia. In response, police used indiscriminant force
against local communities to try to apprehend culprits, which had unintended effects for
local peacebuilding processes addressing Garre – Degodia conflict dynamics.
Spillovers from conflict in Somalia clearly impact patterns of escalation in Kenya.
State failure in Somalia, however, is not the only explanatory factor. The large arc of
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instability spans across conflict corridors running from West Pokot and the Karamoja
Cluster, to Lodwar and Lokichoggio, Northern Marsabit, across to Mandera, and Wajir.
Border dynamics, more generally, impact conflict patterns and affect the capacity of local
peacebuilding organizations to effectively contain inter-ethnic group conflict.
In areas of the periphery where conflict dynamics spill across international
borders, state responses differ from developmental and non-border areas. The Moyale,
Mandera, and West Pokot cases all share similar cross-border dynamics. These areas are
prone to spillovers from local conflicts triggered in another state, or to conflicts spilling
over into a neighboring state. Ethnic conflict on one side of the border, may lead to
mobilization, grievances, political claims, and violent attacks on the other side of the
border. Conflict may escalate immediately, as in the Mandera case, or in the future due to
cross-border population displacement, as in the Isiolo and Marsabit cases. With conflict
dynamics among ethnic groups deeply intertwined and cutting across multiple borders, a
small scale clash can serve to undermine inter-state relations if one state accuses other of
failure to provide security in the area.
Across the inter-group conflicts that occurred along international borders, similar
to all of the other settings, the state responded through disarmament campaigns, elite
security teams, and public peace meetings. However, in order to prevent local conflicts
from becoming national security issue, the state was more likely to intervene militarily
along the border. Rather than rely on police, KPR, and hybrid policing missions, in
response to local violence in Mandera, Moyale, and West Pokot, the state was more
likely to deploy the KDF to respond to communal clashes.
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Coercive state actions impacted local peacebuilding processes and conflict
dynamics. Proximity to the border made disarmament campaigns and accurate
information gathering increasingly difficult for state security officers. As a result, the
most violent state sanctioned policing and information-gathering missions occurred along
border areas. For example, in Mandera, the GoK coopted local peacebuilding
organizations for intelligence gathering missions to try to apprehend militias, and used
violent tactics against civilians to try to extract information. These actions undermined
and broke down relationships between ethnic groups and peacebuilding organizations that
had taken a long time to develop. Informal organizational structures take a long time to
form—trust building and consensus building between diverse civic groups and local
militias and their patrons is a long-term process. Coercive state intervention can rapidly
fragment and undermine local peacebuilding constituencies.
In the Marsabit case, actors from Oromo rebel movement from Ethiopia sought
sanctuary among Borana communities in Marsabit County. The presence of OLF rebels
within the area also increased the use of indiscriminant policing tactics. Kenyan and
Ethiopian police, for example, both conducted violent “sweeps” through Moyale and
surrounding areas in order to intimidate OLF members in hiding. These conditions
increased the likelihood of escalation following smaller scale outbreaks of violence, as in
the Moyale, Mandera, and Turbi cases.
The link between the conflict between the Ethiopian government and the OLF
also increased suspicion and fear between Borana and Gabra communities in Kenya.
Gabra accused the Borana harboring rebels. Fear of the OLF using force against the
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community to extract resources for the war effort increased communal capacity to
protect, support, and rapidly mobilize youth militias along the Northern Marsabit border
(see also, Weinstein 2007).
Across the border cases, civic groups had less control over conflict dynamics. For
example, in the Todonyang case, multiple civic groups failed to convene inter-group
negotiations due to restraints against civic group mobilization in Ethiopia. Constraints on
civil society in Ethiopia were designed to prevent dissident groups from organizing
against the state. However, they had the side effect of undermining peacebuilding
associations in Kenya working to try to address and limit violence related to Turkana –
Dassanetch and Borana – Gabra conflicts. Peacebuilders from the Catholic Justice and
Peace Commission, for example, reported having to pretend to be representatives of the
GoK in order to coordinate peacebuilding interventions in Ethiopia.302 Ethiopia’s
restrictive policies against civic associations created difficult operating conditions for
peacebuilders working to address Gabra – Borana conflicts along the Kenya – Ethiopia
border.
Proximity to international borders also made state security efforts less effective in
containing escalation. Armed actors who can cross borders can more easily evade
Kenyan security actors by crossing the porous border, and seeking protection through
intra-ethnic alliances residing in Ethiopia or Somalia. Sharing a border with Uganda,
Ethiopia, or Somalia provides local militias with low cost access to arms through intra-
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ethnic trade networks, as well as the option of rapid reinforcement. If necessary, militia
support can be called into a conflict in Kenya.
Cross-border intra-ethnic networks allow groups without strong militias to
organize communal resources to pay for Somali or Ethiopian mercenaries. External actors
linked to clan networks and family lineage groups with military experience in Somali and
Ethiopia are better organized, well equipped, and have capacity to use violence with more
accuracy and deadliness than local youth militias. Groups without access to cross-border
mercenary networks, as in Samburu, Marsabit, and Isiolo do not have access to these
forms of militia organization.
Populations living along border areas in Kenya also are less likely to identify with
the larger national identity, and thus at higher risk of radicalization. Roba Shamaro states,
“the state has not been very effective in addressing radicalization of youth in the
North.”303 Mandera and Moyale are areas of Kenya highly marginalized by the state due
to the Shifta War. With the persistence of Somali irredentism, the primary response of the
state has been intentional isolation. Alienation of the area has created a large recruiting
pool of very poor and disenfranchised male youth, who view joining local militias as one
of the only ways to maintain subsistence. In the Mandera case, for example, weak state
institutions, porous borders, illegal economic networks, and Somali irredentism
contribute to the radicalization and mobilization of youth militias. Informal institutional
arrangements and peace process meet their upper limits in these environments. Radical
motivations, terrorist-like forms of killing, and the presence of armed actors that are able
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to evade detection or identification can quickly trigger escalatory dynamics that nonviolent, non-state actors have little capacity to contain.
Due to the porosity of borders, national security interests, and limited space for
civil society associations to operate within neighboring states, conflict episodes that
occurred along state borders had higher levels of political interest in local peacebuilding
processes. The state interacted and cooperated with local peacebuilding organizations in
border areas. The state had higher interest in securing international borders, yet at the
same time the state had little legitimacy due to the prior use of coercive governance
tactics, as in the Pokot, and Moyale cases. State co-optation of local peace structures
during process of state-led mediation can undermine the effectiveness of local
associations. In these cases, the state tended to co-opt local peace organizations as
frameworks for information gathering, conducting investigations, or coordinating and
conducting elite dialogues. These behaviors had the effect of undermining cooperative
relationships between local civic groups, militias, and militia patrons.
Border dynamics remain largely outside influence of local peacebuilding groups.
They cannot control recruitment of militias from across borders, or control illegal arms
flows. In the Mandera case, both groups sought external support from armed militias to
engage in the conflict. State borders allow groups the opportunity to retreat to safety and
develop in-group protection strategies. Limited mobility can increase pressure for groups
to negotiate. Borders provide an easy out for ethnic groups, undermining more difficult
negotiations and concessions required for more successful peacebuilding processes.
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Despite major challenges for effective local peacebuilding along international
border areas, there are examples of successful local associations in addressing crossborder conflict dynamics. Civic organizations in Wajir, Marsabit, and Moyale had had
some success in containing violence. However, even if local peacebuilding organizations
are comprised of genuine and motivated peacebuilding actors, and organizations are able
to overcome complex organizational challenges, containing violence is difficult along
border areas.
Heavily armed militias along international borders tend to have engaged in prior
deadly clashes with state security actors, have organizational networks that cut across
international boundaries, and work to protect vulnerable economic systems that are based
on predation. In these settings, civic organizations face the largest challenges in these
settings. International border regions are the most complex operating environments for
civic organizations.
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Table 9: Preventive Actions across Sub-state Contexts
•

Periphery
o Security teams and eminent persons
o Shaming, threats, and punishment of local leaders
o Public barazas and peace ultimatums
o Armament and disarmament
o Low state support for CSOs and NGOs

•

Developmental
o National unity campaigns (NCIC)
o Formalization of peacebuilding bureaucracies (Extension of DPC
system)
o Outsourcing to firms: private security, social accountability, and
narrative control
o High support for CSOs, NGOs, and local peace associations

•

Border
o Military operations and civic group co-optation
o State-led 3rd party mediation and elite dialogues
o National negotiations and formal peace agreements
o Cooptation of CSOs, NGOs, and local peace associations

Cohesive Coalitions: Monitoring, Threat Response, and Brokering
Under conditions of sub-state fragility, within certain parameters, informal
coalitions of civic groups across Northern Kenya play significant roles in containing
inter-group conflict. Resilience toward violence is related to the cohesiveness of civic
coalitions. However, comparative analysis reveals that two types of coalitions play roles
in fostering communal resilience. In the Samburu and Marsabit cases, for example,
coalitions of civic groups unified around resisting threats from a particular rival ethnic
out-group. In Isiolo, in contrast, civic organizations unified around long-term
peacebuilding agendas.
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Both types of coalitions helped to contain conflict and prevent the escalation of
violence. This finding contradicts Varshney’s assumption that formal crosscutting civic
groups are necessary for effective violence prevention (Varshney 2002). In some settings,
ethnically homogenous organizational structures contribute to containing escalation by
extending the capacity of local militias to monitor out-group movement, respond rapidly
to threats, and use of force as a primary deterrent of opportunistic attacks.
The following section describes the capacities of informal coalitions of civic
group across the cases. Across Northern Kenya, in the absence of state authority and
legitimacy, civic organizations had better access to information related to conflict threats
than police and military actors. Civic group coalitions contained escalation in all six
counties. Informal coalitions formed in the wake of major massacres, such as Turbi, and
in the wake of persistent aggression and insecurity, such as in the Nyiro Valley and
Mandera. The mechanisms linking cohesive civic coalitions to local resilience include the
establishment of threat monitoring and rapid response systems and supporting preventive
negotiation and pact making processes.
Local peacebuilding actors used formal organizational platforms as the basis for
extending threat monitoring networks that span across large geographical regions,
maintaining access to resources and logistical systems necessary for coordinating and
engaging in rapid response missions to address threats or rumors of rising insecurity, and
providing multiple opportunities for negotiation. Findings from the study reveal that the
extent to which civic associations contain violence depends upon trust between local
associations and militia patrons, the severity of violence, and state actions.
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Inter-group Coalitions and Resilience
In four cases, civic coalitions unified around long-term peacebuilding agendas
specific to particular conflict settings, increasing civic capacity to coordinate effective
threat response. In the case of Pokot – Turkana conflict, for example, reformed warriors
groups, catholic churches, and elders groups united around a long-term peacebuilding
agenda. The coalition comprised of Turkana and Pokot groups remained active even with
increasingly violent attacks against government security actors, and shifting levels of
interest and resources from various international donors and partner INGOs. In the
Lorogon case, the coalition convened preventive negotiations with militia leaders dampen
tension and contain escalation.
In the Isiolo case, a coalition of Borana, Gabra, Somali, and Rendille women’s
groups, youth, and elders groups proved effective in convening pre-election processes of
pact making to contain violence around high-risk local elections. Following initial
evidence of success, support from domestic NGOs such as Saferworld and the NSC
helped to expand the pact making process. Violence escalated following elections in
Moyale and Mandera, but not in Isiolo. Similar to the West Pokot case, civic groups
united around a long-term peacebuilding agenda. Even in the absence of a strong formal
DPC structure, local civic groups led pre-emptive pact-making processes with very
minimal external support. Cohesion among local organizations was critical in this case.
In Moyale, an informal network of peacebuilding actors unified around a longterm peacebuilding agenda. Following the Turbi massacre and the collapse of the formal
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peacebuilding structure, local peacebuilding actors took up the cause of reconciliation
and for three years convened bargaining processes between Gabra and Borana
communities that eventually led to the re-integration of settlements. The long-term
processes, itself, helped to form cross cutting relationships among elders groups that
prevented severe violence in Moyale from spreading beyond the town center. The longterm, post-Turbi peacebuilding process constructed an informal coalition of actors that
improved resilience in Northern Marsabit.
In the Turkana – Tullow Oil case, an informal coalition of peacebuilding actors
that cuts across identity lines also plays a significant, complimentary role in containing
violence related to tension between Turkana communities and external Kikuyu and
Kalenjin from “down country.” A large coalition of civic groups including the Catholic
Church, DPCs, local peace committees, and a broad range of NGOs with long-term
presence in the area adopted a peacebuilding agenda that compliments the preventive
approaches of Tullow Oil and the GoK. The high degree of complementarity proved
effective in containing inter-group conflict within Turkana County. In all of these cases,
civic groups united around long-term peacebuilding agendas and contributed significantly
to limiting escalation.
Intra-group Coalitions and Resilience
The cases of conflict between Turkana and Samburu communities in the Nyiro
Valley and between Gabra and Turkana communities in Western Marsabit, however,
display a different pattern of cohesion among local associations. Civic group coalitions in
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these areas contributed to conflict containment, but they were not crosscutting and
unified around long-term peacebuilding agendas. Civic groups unified around resisting a
particular threat. Guyo Elema describes, “the government marginalizes the area so much
that communities do not share information with the government. They share it with local
groups that have their best interests in mind. People say, ‘we have to deal with things on
our own.’ Communities are the only ones who can stop their own people from killing.”
Critically, CSOs do not have a strong track record for integrating identity groups
in Samburu and Marsabit. In the case of Marsabit, for example, even the most ostensibly
neutral civic organizations constantly face accusations of tribalism from the community.
Very few formal civic associations provide opportunities for routinized inter-group
interactions—civil society organizations thus are not obviously crosscutting in
Varshney’s terms. Schools and political parties are ethnically homogenous. Communitybased organizations (CBOs) serve particular communities. Local CSOs, in contrast to
INGOs, often rely on funding through identify-based support networks and dominant
politicians who source financial support through international networks. Thus, most
CSOs serve the interests of particular ethnic groups. Varshney’s theory of formal civic
associations does not fully explain patterns of conflict in this case (Varshney 2007).
This, however, does not fully undermine the capacity of civic groups to limit
escalation. Local peacebuilding actors with shared interests in resisting aggression from
particular armed groups developed covert relationships and clandestine threat monitoring
networks. Covert relationships among leaders of civic groups allowed for just enough
inter-group cooperation to improve day-to-day threat-monitoring necessary to prevent
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most conflicts from leading to more severe forms of escalation. For example, in the Nyiro
Mountain case, missionary stations, elders groups, teachers unions, and catholic churches
provided a broad range of preventive interventions. Militias leveraged civic groups to
improve threat monitoring and the capacity to use coercive force to deter attacks from
ethnic out-groups. The broad coalition of Samburu civic groups functioned to limit rapid
escalation and dampen violence largely through restraining potential spoilers—or
increasing the threat-monitoring and military capacity of local militias, raising the risk for
ethnic out-groups to use violence in the area.
Layers of village-level organizations with links to civic associations serve as the
foundation for inter-group collaboration for threat-response. Paul Galmagar describes,
“even though the DPC is not working well, there are informal security institutions that
keep violence low.”304 Community security practices and local scouting networks are the
first layer. Then monitoring and reporting internally, within identity groups occurs.
Information on possible threats is reported to civic organizations and not the police. From
that point, information is shared across networks of informers that cut across identity
groups, of actors who work across multiple civic groups in the area. “These are the
people know every stone, and every pathway. They know what happens under the trees
and how the militias move. This is why there is peace, because of these people, not
because of the government.”305
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Similarly, in Western Marsabit, elders groups, the KPR, and PISP, a local CSO
coordinated preventive bargaining processes, pre-movement pact making and helped to
enforce informal processes of restitution that served as the foundation for relatively
peaceful inter-group relations between rival ethnic groups. Over time, even though civic
groups remained divided along identity lines in the town, civic groups were unified in
response to a shared threat of attack from the Dassanetch. Formal organizational
structures were not integrated. Notwithstanding, informal informant networks formed that
provided minimal information sharing that cut across Gabra – Borana, and Dassanetch
divisions.
These cases raises a question—is it accurate to classify civic organizations as
largely non-coercive or nonviolent actors? In some settings in Northern Kenya, civic
associations directly and indirectly support local militias and extend their capacity to use
or threaten to use force against rival groups. For example, in the Nyiro Mountain corridor
civic organizations contain escalation following intergroup clashes largely through their
ability to expand and extend communal support for a broad network of armed militias.
Civic groups improved access to information about threats and provided organizational
support for militias to respond more rapidly and directly to threats and warnings of
impending attacks.
In some cases, the contribution of local organizations is not fostering crosscutting,
inter-group cooperation as Varshney’s theory suggests, but in improving the capacity of
local militias to employ coercive force as a deterrent. Local civic associations may rely
upon and indirectly support local militias for protection and access to insecure regions.
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Militias, in these cases, view peacebuilding activities as way to leverage organizational
resources to protect the community and its scarce resources.
Coalitions and Threat Monitoring
Across the cases, including along Nyiro Mountain conflict corridor, Turkana
County, Marsabit, and West Pokot, effective coalitions were comprised of grassroots
leaders of civic groups including teachers unions, elders’ councils, local peace
committees, mid-level managers of domestic and international NGOs, civil servants in
the local government, and local faith-based organization leaders. As Tumal Orto states,
“INGOs try to build peace, much more than the government. But they mostly do roadside
peace work; we are still on our own to prevent revenge in the most difficult places.”306
Local civic groups had the most direct contact with actors involved in militias, and the
highest willingness to voluntarily intervene in uncertain and insecure conditions.
Local civic associations have moral authority necessary for coordinating
collective action for rapid response and preventive bargaining in volatile conflict settings.
This quality is essential as the extent to which civic associations are able to contain
violence depends upon trust between peacebuilders and patrons and leaders of local youth
militias. To maintain access to and influence over local militias, civic associations must
be viewed as neutral or on one side. Peace elites with linkages to militia leaders provide
channels to information about potential political threats to stability, and receive
information that more formal peacebuilding organizations cannot access.

306

Tumal Orto, Interview with the author, Marsabit, Kenya, September 13, 2014.

265

This group of actors, therefore, has the capacity to engage in and support local
peace processes outside of more formal roles within NGOs and other civic groups. In
many cases, actors leading local peacebuilding efforts started out in careers with faithbased organizations, and then shifted into other organizations. Institution hopping
provided opportunities for local peacebuilders to become involved in multiple, parallel
peace programs. Engagement in processes of institution building improved peace actors’
knowledge of localized conflict dynamics, and, more importantly, expanded access to
information related to various types of triggers that may increase the likelihood of
conflict escalation in particular conflict settings. This class of actors displayed most
capacity to construct and support broad threat monitoring networks, and rapid
interventions to contain escalation of inter-ethnic violence, as they were less likely to be
threatened than external actors.
In multiple cases, faith-based organizations operated as central points of
coordination among multiple local associations. For example, in Samburu, for example,
missionary compounds were major hubs for threat monitoring and crisis response. They
become an integral part of the informal local security system. In Lodwar, the catholic
diocese had more vehicles than the county government, more money, a larger
constituency, and a large network of village-level peacebuilding groups spread out across
the entire county. Faith-based organizational structures, therefore, increase mobilization
capacity and the amount of local resources available for supporting peacebuilding
processes.
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Many coalitions formed around faith-based civic groups. Faith-based actors had a
high level of local moral authority and were less likely to be targeted for sharing
information related to conflicts. In many cases local peacebuilding actors were trained as
pastors prior to becoming dominant peace elites. They were viewed as neutral,
authoritative actors with a moral mandate for local peacebuilding. In West Pokot, actors
from local church communities engaged in a long-running intervention to develop a
group of reformed warriors (see chapter four). In the West Pokot cases, reformed
warriors played significant roles in maintaining threat monitoring networks and
convening preventive negotiations following actors of violence, where other
organizations could not. Actors involved in armed violence in the past became active and
effective participants in local peace organizations.
Within informal threat-monitoring systems, elders groups had power to help
dampen violence because of their knowledge of the direct identity of conflict actors and
spoilers operating in the area. When elders councils have support from other civic groups,
such as women’s groups for faith based organizations, who also have direct knowledge of
conflict actors, it becomes increasingly less likely that external spoilers, even if they are
co-ethnic kinsmen will not be protected by the larger community. If youth militia leaders
are aware that they have lost the support of civic groups and face the risk of being handed
to the state justice system as criminals, they are increasingly likely to avoid engaging in
acts or violence in those areas. Civic associations, in this way, can raise the cost of
violence for local militias.
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In the Samburu, Pokot, and Marsabit cases, civic coalitions mobilized resources
rapidly to respond to meet basic needs of families and groups who lost animals or family
members. This occurred even where more formal organizations such as DPCs lacked
necessary resources. Access to logistical systems is necessary for coordinating rapid
response missions to address threats or rumors of rising insecurity. They can also pool
resources to be the first outside observers to enter a conflict setting, which increases
accuracy of information about the conflict and the identity of actors involved, and can go
direct to a particular village and engage in negotiations over compensation, providing
outlets beyond revenge attacks.
Overall, effective local peacebuilding structures had following characteristics.
Actors with direct access to the planning of violent events and willing to engage in
preventive response under high risk of and threat of violence by militias, helped sustain
long-term peace processes that dampened violence. Teams of direct responders to initial
clashes tend to be comprised of peace actors that work for local civil society
organizations and use personal networks to access the conflict environment. Informal
peace actors then draw upon formal organizational resources and logical capacity to
coordinate collective peace actions.
In the absence of state security, local peace actors regularly engage in responses
to violence voluntarily and at great personal risk. Personal and social attachment to the
conflict environment increases the willingness of peace elites to engage in high risk,
direct responses to violent clashes. Cohesive coalitions increase the complexity of
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strategies to contain violence, and are better able to develop solutions to conflicts within
environments where state is absent and inefficient.
Table 10: Coalition Qualities for Effective Preventive Response

•

Distance
o Voluntary commitment to high-risk peace action
o Local contact, insider information, and spoiler access
o Moral authority and embeddedness
o Power to convene

•

Rapid Response
o Informal response teams and ethno-specific stabilization
o Resource pooling for victim support
o Spoiler identification, returns and restitution

Coalitions and Informal Pact-making
Prior analysis suggests many of the proposed mechanisms of informal
institutional restraint are not fully effective controls on violence due to the integration of
periphery, the proliferation of weapons, the rise of warlords and wealthy powerbrokers,
and change in size and forms of militia organization (Duffield 1997; Mkutu 2001; Turton
2003; Boege 2006; Chapman and Kagaha 2009). However, in multiple cases local pacts
based on customary codes of restitution limited escalation in the absence of effective
state security. Where civic associations provided opportunities for negotiation and around
traditional rules for restitution escalation was contained. Thus, regarding the debate
around channels through which local civic coalitions dampen violence, the study
confirms the importance of informal pact making processes and local resilience (Nilsson
2012; Kaplan 2013; Murdie 2014).
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The logic of peace pacts across Northern Kenya is based on the idea that if
individuals cannot pay for violent crimes, the entire community must pay. This rule
incentivizes communities to adopt strategies to control armed actors and prevent them
from engaging in indiscriminant violence. It raises the cost of violence for the entire
community. In Fearon and Laitin’s terms, informal communal pacts improve intra-group
policing (Fearon and Laitin 2002).
In contrast to Fearon and Laitin’s approach, however, comparative analysis
suggests local peace processes have a secondary effect—the construction of inter-group
civic coalitions. In Marsabit, Samburu, and Moyale informal pact making processes
strengthened civic coalitions and stabilized institutional arrangements for conflict
prevention. Long-term processes of negotiating and re-negotiating local peace
agreements expand opportunities and platforms for inter-group negotiation and
preventive bargaining and help to construct local peacebuilding constituencies.
In Northern Marsabit, for example, the process of pact making generated
knowledge about the inconsistencies in rules or restitution and gaps in enforcement
capacity across Northern Kenya. This, then, led to the development of cluster-based
declarations to harmonize rules for restitution (Maina 2011; Modogashe Report 2011).
Long-term bargaining following the Turbi Massacre unified civic organizations across
Northern Marsabit, and strengthened threat monitoring and rapid response networks. It
helped to construct a more robust local peacebuilding constituency that intervened and
prevented Gabra – Borana violence from spreading beyond the town of Moyale in 2014.
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In the Mandera case, the Umal Accord brought an end to the Garre – Murule
conflict in 2005. It was based on traditional codes of restitution. The Accord clashed with
constitutional mandates, but the GoK supported and helped enforce the agreement. It
stood for three years. The next wave of escalation was related to increasingly complex
political and economic conditions that civic organizations could not contain. In 2013, the
Ramadan Accord helped contain the Garre – Degodia conflict mirrored traditional codes
of restitution, with the government threatening to impose a large fine upon entire ethnic
communities in the event of a broken ceasefire.
In Western Marsabit, prior to relocation, informal pact making between the
Turkana and Gabra led to the formation of integrated settlements in the Sarimo valley.
Pre-movement pact making created opportunities for inter-group cooperation around
local resources and the establishment of new policing institutions. When tension began to
increase related to militia conflict near Loiyangalani, in the absence of state security
actors, civic actors helped to enforce the informal Accord. The restitution process was
based on the terms of the Sarimo declaration, and helped stabilize inter-group relations.
Respondents reported enforcement of the informal pact was a critical juncture that
allowed for further negotiations around resource sharing that helped to maintain peaceful
inter-group relations across Western Marsabit County.
In the Isiolo case, pre-election pact making reduced uncertainty of electoral
outcomes, and contributed to the prevention of conflict after elections. Pact making
provided routinized opportunities for strengthening local peacebuilding coalitions and
provided a foundation for organizing inter-group negotiations following acts of violence.
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Coalitions provided multiple platforms for brokering pacts between armed actors,
communities, and political elites.

Limitations of Civic Intervention
Civic coalitions did not contain escalation in all settings. Varshney suggests prior
organizational success often serves as a platform for further success in containing interethnic group conflict (2002). In contrast, the study finds that prior organizational
experience does not clearly yield future success. CSOs with prior success in containing
intergroup conflict face common risks that can lead to fragmentation and ineffectiveness.
In some cases, effective local peacebuilding coalitions had short lifespans.
Comparative analysis reveals conditions under which civic associations break
down and lose capacity to contain inter-ethnic group violence. Building effective
peacebuilding structures is already difficult under conditions of sub-state fragility. It is
even more difficult, as described above, under developmental pressures and along
international border regions. Holding together diverse groups of actors during peace
processes is complex, especially with high expectations of voluntarism, high risk of
personal insecurity, and inconsistent state responses to initial outbreaks of violence.
Specifically, three factors commonly undermine the capacity of civic organizations to
effectively coordinate preventive intervention—the type of violence, coercive state
actions, and incentives within the local political economy that can lead local peace elites
to shift into political roles.
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Symbolic Violence
First, in contrast to theories that highlight exogenous pressures such as the
absence of state authority, poverty and inequality, or elite predation, this finding suggests
key triggers of escalation are commonly local-level factors (Smock 1997; Johansson
2011). Inter-group conflict did not escalate for long periods of time under increasing
exogenous pressures and stress factors across multiple conflict settings. However,
symbolic acts of violence triggered rapid escalation across cases with both minimal and
significant preventive intervention. The following acts of violence served as the initial
trigger for militia mobilization, revenge attacks, and escalatory dynamics, even in the
presence of civic organizations that had previously proven successful in preventing
conflict.
Table 11: Symbolic Violence as Escalation Trigger

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Acts of weakness, and “shooting people in the back” (Turbi)
Assassination of nonviolent activists (Maralal Massacre; Moyale)
Assassination of political leader s(Turbi case; Samburu – Turkana Range War)
Hit and run by a political leader (Moyale)
Murder of aid worker (Moyale)
Targeting children, women, elders (Samburu – Pokot; Turkana – Pokot)
Theft of animals belonging to the poor, following a murder (“morally
reprehensible” action – Tuum Episode)
Theoretically, micro-level studies of intra-state conflict suggest episodes of

violence have competing logics (Kalyvas 2006; Habyarimana et al. 2009; Kalyvas 2012).
Across the conflicts under assessment, acts of violence had different logics and
characteristics that influenced processes of escalation. However, one common feature
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stands out across the cases. Acts of violence that broke social expectations and norms
about how and when violence should be used triggered escalation. This was a common
driver in multiple cases including Turbi, Moyale, Mandera, Tuum, and with the Samburu
– Turkana and Turkana – Pokot range wars. Violence escalated after the murder of an aid
worker in Mandera, the killing of a nonviolent activist in Maralal, and killings viewed as
acts of weakness in Turbi.
Where particular types of violent action break the norm of reciprocity, violence is
more likely to escalate. The norm of tit-for-tat justice is based on the assumption of
reciprocity. Rothchild’s concept remains a very strong insight: in the absence of the
shared norm of reciprocity, extreme collective fear emerges which then triggers conflict
and violence (Rothchild 1973). Unexpected forms of aggression are most likely to trigger
revenge attacks that result in high levels of causalities, as they increase uncertainty in the
conflict system. Groups assume victims of acts of armed banditry will organize revenge
attacks, are thus prepared to protect themselves from acts of revenge. A broad spectrum
of social, political, and economic tactics and communal adaptations are in place at the
village-level to thwart rapid revenge attacks.
Escalation tends to occur in relation to acts of violence that break social
expectations. Acts of aggression that fall outside of the informal rules of the game are
more likely to intensify conflict. Experiences of violence leave marks on societies and
generate lasting grievances against perpetrators.307 After acts of symbolic violence,
bonding tends to occur over bridging. In other words, as Ruth Aluoch states, “people
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revert to their ethnic identities as a source of protection during times of crisis and
uncertainty.”308 Grievances may remain latent for long periods of time. Symbolic acts of
violence serve as fodder for escalation in relation to other conflict pressures. When an act
of violence is a deeply symbolic affront to communal norms or symbolic of an intention
to undermine the whole community, escalation is more likely to occur.
Coercive State Action
To what extent do state actions support or undermine the preventive efforts of
peacebuilding organizations? The state used coercive force in response to multiple local
conflicts in Northern Kenya to try to contain escalation, but this action had unintended
consequences for local peace processes. In Asfaw Kumsaa’s terms, “if brute force
worked, conflict in the North would have stopped long ago.”309 State-led responses to
local conflicts frequently involved the use of indiscriminant violence against civilians,
increasing the likelihood that groups would evade peacebuilding interventions involving
state actors, and seek internal, community-based solutions to rising insecurity.
Bell et al. argue the state’s use of force against citizens, such as disappearances,
deepen citizens’ disaffection with the state, which increases the likelihood of violence
(Bell et al. 2013). This is part of the explanation in the Kenya context. Coercive state
action can lead to disaffection with state actors and increasing support for local militias.
However, the study finds evidence for a secondary impact. State-sanctioned violence
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undermines crosscutting civic coalitions. Across the Samburu, West Pokot, Moyale, and
Mandera cases, where the state used force against communities, local associations broke
down, creating windows for escalation.
State sanctioned violence increased citizen disaffection and increased communal
support for local militias. As Geoffrey Lipale stated, “When the state criminalizes the
whole community, this leads to mobilization of the whole community.”310 The expansion
of local military capacity and communal protection of culprits of violence are both
related to the state’s use of violence against pastoralist communities. Ethnic communities
protect in-group militia members who conduct acts of violence, and patrons of local
protection militias often pay bribes to release culprits from prison. Halkano Bukuno
describes the dilemma for state security actors,
“There is no real information on perpetrators of violence in the periphery. Police
ask elders and local politicians to identify criminals in their community, yet they
always blame violence on other groups in the area. In response, the government
punishes the whole group often very harshly, and violently.”311
Second, the state’s use of indiscriminant violence in response to outbreaks of
inter-group conflict narrows local civil society space. Where the state uses indiscriminant
force, local peace actors have a more difficult time in engaging with armed militias,
sustaining local peace processes, and maintaining covert informant networks for threat
monitoring. Policing intervention undermines trust between local organizations and
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militia leaders, and reduces the capacity of local peace associations to coordinate
preventive interventions.
For example, in Turkana, West Pokot, and Isiolo, informal organizational
structures with prior success were less capable of containing escalation following heavyhanded state policing missions. After police used excessive force against civilians to
extract information about militia groups, or co-opted local peace associations for
gathering information about conflict actors, the loss of insider status undermined the
ability of civic actors to function as neutral mediators and acquire accurate information
from armed groups. Armed militias avoid engagement with organizations they believe
may be working with the state to gather information for use in policing missions. In
Todonyang, Mandera, and West Pokot militias targeted civic groups following the cooptation of peacebuilding associations for intelligence gathering and disarmament
campaigns.
Similar dynamics occurred in Mandera. After state intervention to try to dampen
inter-group violence, Garre and Degodia pooled communal resource to hire external
mercenaries from Somalia and Ethiopia. Local political elites engaged in dialogues with
police and state-level government officials to avoid heavy-handed state security tactics
and accusations of ethnic incitement. At the same time, however, they remained deeply
involved in processes of arming and supporting ethnic militias. As the state became more
involved in peace processes, local militia leaders and their supporters became less willing
to engage with actors and organizations working on peace interventions. If information
on illegal arms or prior acts of violence reaches the state, it can be used to launch
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disarmament campaigns or accusations of political incitement. Militias resisted
cooperation and information sharing when civic groups aligned with the state.

Local Peacebuilders as Political Entrepreneurs
In some cases, effective peacebuilding organizations had short lifespans due to
role shifting among peace elites. Successful leaders of peacebuilding institutions shifted
into political roles leading to the loss of neutrality and the breakdown of previously
successful organizational structures. Multiple coalitions collapsed after extended periods
of success. This pattern occurred in the cases of West Pokot, Turkana, Isiolo, and
Marsabit.
It is difficult for local peacebuilding actors to remain neutral during periods of
heightened insecurity and increasingly contentious ethnic conflict. Politics and
peacebuilding do not go together. Politics in Kenya is based on ethnic divisions.
Collective identity is basis for the pursuit of individual power. Peacebuilding aims to
accomplish the opposite—the construction of trans-ethnic organizations and inter-group
relationships. Peace elites often develop political aspirations during local peacebuilding
processes. Civic leaders gain status and prestige through developing skills and networks
related to peacebuilding interventions.
The high cost of engaging in politics in the Kenya context, however, incentivizes
corruption to gain access to resources necessary to compete in the local elections. Within
the Turkana – Pokot conflict, Riam, Riam and POKATUSA, the two most prominent
civic organizations in the area broke down after leaders embezzled funds to run political
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campaigns. In the Isiolo case, the DPC was captured by political actors interested in using
the organizations to access information on local conflict dynamics for use in campaign
strategies. In Marsabit, due to increasing insecurity and tension between the Borana and
Gabra prior to the Turbi Massacre, the DC directly disbanded the most effective
peacebuilding institutions in Marsabit and Moyale in order to undermine organizations
most likely to attain and reveal accurate information about planned attacks. In this case,
political entrepreneurs working to gain power over contested territories directly
disbanded civic organizations prior to escalating the conflict.
After inter-ethnic group clashes, politicians and political entrepreneurs become
involved in conflict dynamics and enter into the negotiation space. This causes, “the
peacebuilding space to become a forum for ethnic politics.”312 In Galgallo Tuye’s terms,
“after clashes, politicians do not encourage us to live together, but to perish together as
fools.”313 The outcome of negotiations impact on how a community judges local political
actors. Whether or not a local political entrepreneur takes a hardline against a rival group,
or supports a process of restitution and reconciliation, is a political calculation. Peace
actors within intentions to make the shift into local politics become less likely to engage
as neutral mediators.
Communities assume state mediators use local peace processes to forward the
interests of a particular ethnic group, or political party. State actors are not viewed as

312

Dan Nganga, Interview with the author. Kitale, Kenya, July 20, 2014.

313

Galgallo Tuye, Former MP North Horr, Interview with the author. North Horr, Kenya. September 17,
2014.

279

neutral third party mediators due to the politicization of security provision. This causes
actors who, in the past, had power to convene across the conflict divide to become less
capable of effectively mediating inter-group conflicts. This dilemma is even more
intensive under the pressure of potential economic growth, as the stakes for winning
elections increases. With Vision 2030, more investment, and rising land prices, political
entrepreneurs across Northern Kenya operate under the assumption that county positions
will come with access to even more rents from businesses and actors seeking access to
the area. In these areas, it becomes increasing tempting for peace elites with large
constituencies and broad based legitimacy to make the shift into politics.
As conflict escalates and peacebuilding actors shift into political roles, civic
organizations often align with particular ethnic groups. Alignment with a particular ethnic
group, however, increases the risk of targeting during conflicts, especially when civic
groups lose the trust of local militias and their patrons. In the most severe cases of
escalation, including along the West Pokot – Turkana border, Mandera, and Todonyang,
militias targeted actors involved in local peace processes. Overall, these cases suggest a
spectrum of processes of organizational capture, ranging from indirect shifting of
peacebuilding actors into political roles, to direct organizational collapse related to
dismantling of peacebuilding structures prior to organized ethnic violence.

Communal Resilience and Militia Restraint
Informal communal protection strategies played a minor role in containing
escalation in some cases under analysis. In some cases, along the Nyiro conflict corridor
280

and in Western Marsabit, the factors that limited escalation were related to nonviolent
adaptation. Communal protection strategies reduced suspicion of cooperation with
external militias and made rapid, indiscriminant revenge attacks against particular outgroup communities less likely.
Bunker argues that communities linked to outsider militias are more likely to be
targeted (Bunker 2012). Findings from the Nyiro Mountain Corridor, however, indicate
this is not always the case. Turkana villages, associated with outsider militias developed
unique, non-violent adaptation strategies, and covert informant networks with local peace
elites that made them unlikely targets of revenge attacks. In this case, communal
adaptation reduced the likelihood of particular out-group villages being targeted
following deadly attacks by out-group militias.
This finding confirms that information sharing between ethnic groups is a critical
restraint. In Fearon and Laitin’s terms, “local information brokers” are key actors for
preventing violence (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Varshney 2002; McMahon 2007). What
differs, however, is the way in which information sharing does not necessarily require
intergroup trust, or crosscutting civic networks, as Varshney suggests (2002). Information
sharing still occurs under conditions of severe mistrust, suspicion, and fear, as a coping
and survival mechanism. Basic threat monitoring reduces the likelihood of violence still
occurs in the absence of inter-group trust.
In some cases, clandestine collective action limits escalation. Where groups, at
least, come to expect that members of an out-group will share accurate information about
threats of impending attacks, the in-group becomes more willing to reciprocate threat281

related information. Civic coalitions improve reciprocal sharing of information related to
potential threats from armed groups. In cases where violence did not escalate following
violent attacks, rival groups had complex, informal informant networks involving
participants from multiple ethnic groups, even groups outside of the primary conflict
dyad.
This strategy played a key role in containing escalation along the volatile borders
between Samburu and Turkana, Turkana and Gabra, and Pokot and Turkana
communities. Specifically, in the Parikati case, informant networks included actors from
Samburu, Turkana, as well as Kalenjin, Kikuyu, and Pokot actors. Covert threat
monitoring systems decreased the likelihood of suspicion that minority communities
settled along the border were involved in processes of forming external alliances and
granting access to external Turkana or Pokot militias to use village as a forward bases for
conducting attacks. Providing Samburu militias with accurate information about militia
support, mobilization, and movement and reduced the likelihood that Turkana villages
would be targeted in revenge attacks following acts of violence.
Minority ethnic out-group settlements living along contested and highly
vulnerable borders, in the words of respondents from Sarima, groups may choose to,
“suffer to keep peace”—electing to abandon long-held territory, relocate to very harsh
environments to evade insecure areas, and collaborate with local civic associations to
negotiate informal institutional arrangements for resource sharing and community
policing. Fear of escalation can drive increased vigilance and the emergence of informal
institutional arrangements between groups living in highly insecure conflict zones.
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In Parikati, Tuum, Sarima, Sarimo, and Moyale, groups conducted trade through
youth intermediaries in neutral locations to avoid inter-ethnic group interaction and
suspicion of spying. Based on social norms, youth who have not gone through initiation
rites are not legitimate targets for militias, decreasing the likelihood of opportunistic
attacks during inter-group exchanges. Minority out-groups settled along volatile borders
reported over-accumulating livestock, diversifying livelihoods, dispersing communal
resources for protection across multiple local militias, and developing informal
identification and tracking systems. These strategies decreased the likelihood that a single
family or clan would lose an entire stock to banditry, and thus less likely to mobilize a
militia to engage in immediate revenge attacks following attacks or acts of predation.
Where minority groups face severe threats, forms of protection include circular
encampments, ring fencing, triple ring fencing, or even digging foxholes within all homes
in encampments. When such strategies prove insufficient for ensuring in-group
protection, collective evasion and relocation is the most common alternative. In some
cases such as the Turbi massacre and attacks along the Suguta Valley out-group
communities relocated prior to attacks, indicative of advanced foreknowledge of the
rising threat of retaliation. In the Sarimo case, civilian actors fled from more insecure
areas. With the support of civic organizations, vulnerable out-groups avoided resettlement along more vulnerable border areas.
Following clashes, the compounds of local political leaders and civic
organizations are often open to civilians fleeing from insecurity, as in the cases of
Mandera, Marsabit, and Todonyang. Over time, integrated settlements disintegrate with
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civilians fleeing to urban areas with better government services,314 and militia actors
establishing settlements in abandoned and more inaccessible terrains. Settlement of
militias in areas with poor information networks and no infrastructure lowers the cost of
protecting illegal weapons caches and evading police. Acts of ethno-communal violence
remain more frequent in areas of state fragility, but escalation is not predetermined.
Communal adaptation plays an important role in helping constitute secure spaces in
highly insecure environments.
Table 12: Non-coercive Adaptation

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Clandestine informant networks and threat monitoring
Informal resource sharing agreements
Social disintegration, flight, and evasion via co-ethnic networks
Over-accumulation, resource dispersion, and communal insurance
Diversification of livelihoods
Emissaries for inter-group trade
Local elites and post-conflict resource mobilization

Coercive Communal Protection
Prior cases studies of civic organizations and the prevention of inter-ethnic group
violence found norm change was a key mechanism that reduced the likelihood of
escalation (Fein 1979; Longman 2009; Cameron et al. 2013). From this perspective,
where civic groups promote human rights norms or religious norms around nonviolence,
escalation is less likely due to the fact that militias may adopt non-coercive strategies to
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deal with conflict dynamics. Granted, norm change was a factor in a few cases. Reformed
warriors in West Pokot and Turkana embraced nonviolent conflict resolution norms, and
played important roles in the larger peacebuilding constituency. However, comparative
findings indicate communal adaptation principally contributes to increasing the capacity
of youth militias to use deadly force.
In the words of Samson Leriano, a patron a local militia along the Nyiro Valley
conflict corridor, “we buy arms and we build peace.”315 Due to the long history of statesanctioned violence against pastoralist populations, there is minimal evidence of norm
change toward nonviolent conflict prevention tactics among local militias across the
larger conflict system. State responses to inter-ethnic group violence increased communal
adaptation related to militia support and increasing the capacity of local militias. Under
conditions of sub-state fragility and persistent human insecurity, communities may
embrace non-coercive conflict prevention strategies, without abandoning support for
youth militias to threaten to use deadly force against rival ethnic out-groups as the
primary communal protection strategy.
Participation in local militias requires living under highly insecure conditions in
locations that are distant and disconnected from the large community. At the same time,
militia participation provides an opportunity for youth to attain access to resources
donated to the militia from the larger ethnic community. In the absence of educational or
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Samson Leriano, Interview with the author, Kurungu, Kenya, August 13, 2014.
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other economic opportunities, youth remain willing recruits for local militias.316
Patronage networks within the community provide ethnic militias with arms,
ammunition, military equipment, and increased opportunities for military training. They
are sustained through contributions from the larger ethnic community.
Donations for militias come from wealthy ethnic elites—often very significant
amounts of money that allow youth militias to access to more sophisticated military
equipment and training. Youth militias receive advanced trainings in scouting, tracking,
and tactical arms use through co-ethnic networks of actors with prior experience in state
policing, military organizations, or rebel movements, as in the Marsabit and Mandera
cases. In the wake of conflict escalation in the cases of Samburu, Pokot, Turkana, and
Mandera, communities financed the purchase of arms through pooling of communal
resources. Youth militias gained access to increasingly sophisticated arms through
identity-based trade networks, and elder - youth collaboration increased in order to
strengthen militia skills. Ethnic groups collectively pool resources for armed actors, and
prevent the spread of information about militia activities to enemy groups.
In West Pokot and Turkana, communities formed complex commercialized
raiding schemes to fund and expand militia capacity. In Mandera, illicit intra-ethnic
group trade networks fund and support the expansion of militia capacity. Poaching,
charcoal cartels, and organized crime all fund and support militias. Ports in Somalia are
316

Militia recruits often have personal motives for taking up arms, as well. From a young age, young boys
are very well aware of who their enemies are. Through narrative histories, or very often through personal
experience of having a father or family member killed by another group, young men in these areas grow up
with very clear “enemy images,” which enhances their capacity to conduct very deadly forms violence
against rival groups (Little 1994).
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used to evade high tariffs on goods imported into Kenya. Cross border arbitrage and tariff
evasion also provide resources for militias. Turkana communities developed informal
donation schemes to pay bribes and hire lawyers to protect co-ethnic militia members
from the formal judicial system.
The shift from communal livestock ownership among pastoralist groups toward
private ownership created a new source of resources for local youth militias. Wealthy
elites residing in Nairobi hire private militias to protect livestock and gain access to
scarce water, land, and grazing resources. The Mandera case, for example, suggests that
when the primary patrons of militias do not reside in the area and share risks related to
instability, the likelihood of escalation is higher. Where militia patrons are distant from
militias, there are fewer local-level checks against the use of violence. The Samburu case
is the opposite—where militia patrons are part of the community, and involved across a
broad network of local civic associations, the likelihood of escalation is lower.
Political elites play key roles in supporting and sustaining identity-based militias
as the primary foundation for the protection of communal wealth. Militias not only help
protect elite business interests livestock and other trade activities, in some cases,
including Marsabit, Isiolo, and Moyale, political elites cooperated with elders and ethnic
militias to engineer long-term strategies for territorial expansion and demographic change
as political strategies. Local-level and national-level political actors contribute to
increasing the capacity of ethnic militias to use violence or the threat of violence as a
primary deterrent.
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Politicians use handouts of arms, ammunition, and food supplies channeled
through covert intra-ethnic networks to support youth militias. Deadly raids have been
used to undermine the support base of political rivals. Political actors, in many cases,
condone terrorist-like acts of raiding and violence designed to undermine potential
political competitors. In Marsabit, Moyale, West Pokot, and Isiolo politicians directly
collaborated with youth militias. Seemingly normal resource conflict cloaked elite
strategies for maintaining political power. Political elites are often a key source of
funding and supplies for militias, such that the consolidation of ethnic blocs also occurs
through allocation of resources for communities to acquire weapons and ammunition.
In some cases, social change occurs in the wake of conflict escalation. Elders are
deeply engaged with youth militias, more so than in the past. In traditional hierarchical,
segmented forms of social organization, elders had little day-to-day contact with
warriors. Traditional rituals and informal codes of conduct divided and separated agesets, leaving youth militias with the responsibility of survival and protection of
communal resources. Now, elders collaborate extensively with leaders of youth militia
groups to determine when attacks should or should not occur and they collectively
develop plans to carry out raids and counter-raids. Where youth militias failed in
missions, elders intervened to provide additional support for organizing attacks and
restore status and group esteem after failed attacks.
Overall, under these conditions, large-scale escalation still remains rare due to
internal militia restraints. A significant amount research focuses on the proliferation of
weapons across traditional cultures as a core condition for escalation (Mirzeler and
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Young 2000; Mkutu 2003; Weiss 2004; Ndungu 2009; Wepundi 2012). Findings from
the study, however, do not support this approach. Militias across are Northern Kenya are
increasingly armed, better trained, and consistently learning new military tactics.
Increasing military capacity across traditional pastoralist societies makes it increasingly
difficult to form very large groups that can move freely across broad swaths of territory.
These adaptations make it more likely that armed groups will choose to engage in,
at least, processes of more careful information seeking and thus more calculated attacks
upon guilty parties rather than asymmetrical revenge killings. Very rapid, uncalculated
acts of indiscriminant revenge could lead to very disastrous outcomes for pursuers, like
the Baragoi massacre. Civic groups and threat monitoring networks developed through
coalitions of civic groups compliment the process or restraint, making it increasingly
difficult for larger militias to mobilize. These inter-related factors function as key
restraints for rapid mobilization of large armed groups following conflict triggers.
Table 13: Coercive Adaptations

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Outsourcing violence to co-ethnic militants
Investment in the expansion of illicit markets to fund militia organization
Communal resource pooling for militia support
Resource pooling for bribes, legal system evasion, and evasion of state security
Militia recruiting, reinforcement, and skills training via co-ethnic networks
Elder – youth collaboration and intra-group cohesion
Elite support for ethnic militias

Processes of communal adaptation increase the capacity of youth militias to use
deadly force, with non-coercive communal protection strategies playing a minor role in
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containing rapid revenge attacks against minority ethnic out-groups along highly volatile
borders. Non-coercive tactics reduced the risk of targeting, reduced the risk of in-group
mobilization, and increased the likelihood of inter-group negotiation. Covert informant
networks, in particular, make villages along the border less likely targets of revenge,
which makes it even more difficult for militias to organize attacks against distant and
unknown locations. In this way, local coping restrains rapid mobilization and escalation.
However, with all citizens well armed and in support of communal militias, collective
violence still remains a possibility. It remains the unlikely outcome, but is always a
possibility with ethnic groups constantly working to expand military capacity of local
militias. When coalitions of civic groups break down, escalation becomes increasingly
likely.
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CONCLUSION

In periphery areas of developing states vulnerable to inter-ethnic group conflict,
why does violence sometimes stop and armed groups decide to maintain peace? Do
informal associations have the ability contain violence using non-coercive and informal
modes of conflict prevention? The findings from this study are guardedly optimistic.
Where the state is not capable of providing immediate security or effective rapid response
to threats, coalitions of civic associations can contain violence using informal
institutional arrangements. Within the most intensive inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya,
including along the Pokot – Turkana border, Mandera, and Samburu, local associations
collaborated to take risks to establish and maintain complex, often covert informant
networks for threat monitoring, to convene negotiations with militia actors responsible
for organizing deadly attacks, and to enforce customary rules of restitution for violent
crimes.
Through comparative cases studies, findings indicate civic associations in various
configurations limit escalation between warring communities across the rural periphery
of Northern Kenya. This primary finding, however, is contingent upon key scope
conditions. Drawing from empirical evidence, the study finds that modes of state and
non-state response to local inter-ethnic conflicts affect patterns of conflict escalation. In
particular, the use of indiscriminant force by police and military forces commonly
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exacerbates conflict. The following chapter summarizes key findings related to the main
propositions discussed in detail in chapter six, addresses potential limitations and
challenges related to the research, and closes with implications for peace research in
Kenya, African divided societies, and non-state conflict.

Summary of Findings
The project addresses the puzzle of why some ethnic conflicts escalate, whereas
others do not. Even in the presence of multiple pressures that create very high levels of
conflict vulnerability, violence may escalate, or it may not escalate. In particular, the
primary questions examined are: Why does conflict not escalate when conditions are rife
for allowing it to happen? What are the potential conditions at the state, civic, and
communal level of analysis that help contain escalation of violence within non-state
conflicts?
Six county-level cases studies were conducted to select and analyze fifteen
different inter-ethnic group conflicts along with corresponding responses from local, civil
society, and state actors to try to contain escalation. Comparative analysis of conflict
episodes and corresponding responses reveal patterns of behavior across the cases,
despite the presence of various conflict actors, conflict triggers, and contextual features.
The study demonstrates how informal coalitions of civic organizations prove crucial for
explaining why some conflicts escalate and others do not. It also demonstrates how
interactive effects between state actions and local peace processes help explain why some
conflicts are not contained and re-occur. Conditions that restrain escalation, and the
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factors that breakdown and undermine potential restraints are as critical for understanding
process of inter-ethnic violence as the core drivers.
Across the cases, two factors contained escalation. First, informal coalitions of
civic associations comprised of actors with direct relationships to patrons and leaders of
youth militia units built threat-monitoring networks and provided platforms for
negotiating informal pacts that contained escalation. Second, informal communal
protection strategies reduced suspicion of cooperation with external militias and made
rapid indiscriminant revenge attacks against out-group communities less likely.
Notwithstanding the success of some informal organizational structures, state
actions made it increasingly difficult for non-state organizations to prevent the reescalation of violence. As Christopher Gitari stated, “The story of Northern Kenya cannot
be told without looking not only at state failure to provide security, but at the very long
history of state abuse and the direct use violence against its own population.”317 Coercive
state actions following outbreaks of inter-ethnic violence reduced the capacity of local
peace associations to contain violence and increased the likelihood of escalation. After
state police used excessive force, or coordinated with local peace associations for
gathering information about conflict actors, the loss of insider status reduced the
likelihood of effective preventive intervention through non-state organizations. In some
cases, local peacebuilding coalitions had short lifespans. Previously successful peace
actors shifted into political roles leading to the breakdown and fragmentation of
previously successful associations.
317

Christopher Gitari, ICTJ, Interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, August 8, 2014.
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Table 14: Factors for Escalation and Restraint in Non-state Conflicts
Factors containing escalation
Constraints
• Cohesive civic coalition
o Peace Elite – Militia Trust
o Threat Monitoring
o Informal Pact-making

Factors facilitating escalation
• Coercive state action
• Perception of inequality in state
response
• Symbolic violence
• Fragmented civic coalition
o Breakdown of trust between
Restraints
peace elites and militia leaders
• Communal Adaptation (Coercive and
o Breakdown of informal pacts
Non-coercive)
and institutions)

Civic Coalitions and the Capacity to Contain
Organizing effective and rapid response to inter-group conflicts is a complex
organizational challenge. Not all social organizations are up to the task. In some cases, in
the absence of the state, informal coalitions of local civic associations play critical roles
in conflict prevention. Local associations, in various forms, improve information sharing
between groups, and provide platforms for inter-group bargaining, monitoring and
enforcement of local pacts to contain violence. These actions, at least, reduce the
likelihood of rapid, asymmetrical and indiscriminate attacks against nearby out-group
communities.
Even with the absence of policing in remote regions, the presence of informal
coalitions among local solidarity groups increases the likelihood that accurate knowledge
of conflict events will be communicated to armed actors, allowing for more strategic
responses among armed groups. Interventions coordinated through informal coalitions of
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local peace actors increase the likelihood that bargaining will be selected over rapid,
asymmetrical collective violence. Where cohesive solidarity group coalitions form, threat
monitoring, inter-group bargain platforms, and informal pacts generate resilience to
escalation.
Prior research analyzes the relationship between particular types of civic
associations and ethnic conflict, such as business, religious organizations and political
parties. Effective prevention, however, rarely hinges upon one particular organizational
structure. Multiple organizations are involved in responses to localized, inter-ethnic
group conflict. Local resilience depends upon relationships among multiple civic
associations that align with a particular cause, as in the Moyale and Marsabit cases
where long-term peacebuilding process, improved monitoring, and rapid response to
threats of escalation. Local resilience also is achieved where civic groups align with
resisting the threat of attack from particular violent actors, as in the Samburu, Turkana,
and Pokot cases where local organizations unified and helped form high-risk, clandestine
monitoring systems. Findings from this study, therefore, indicate that the types of civic
associations are less important than the relationships among civic organizations, often
held together by local peacebuilding actors.
In areas highly vulnerable to inter-ethnic group conflict, violence is less likely to
escalate when there is a cohesive coalition of civic associations capable of coordinating
rapid preventive actions directly related to the logic of violence. In these settings the
extent to which local civic organizations are able to contain violence is based upon trust
between armed actors and un-armed interveners. Civic organizations are more or less
295

capable of containing violence in particular locations depending upon the level of trust
between leaders of civic associations and patrons of local militias. In areas where there is
a high level of reciprocity between local civic associations and militias, escalation is less
likely.
Trust between local peacebuilders, militias, and elites patrons is difficult to
maintain and always quite fragile. Evidence across the cases suggests that a class of local
actors, or peace elites, play significant roles in maintaining trust of militia leaders at
critical moments of potential escalation. Peace elites tend to have been employed, at
various times, across multiple civic organizations, including churches, schools, CSOs,
NGOs, political parties, and local government, remain directly connected to local conflict
settings via family or identity-based relationships, and have large networks with peace
actors across multiple civic associations.
In moments of crisis, organizational types and affiliations matter less than
informal coalitions built by local peace elites. Local peace elites draw upon multiple
resources personal, communal, and organizational to contain conflict violence. This class
of actors is thus critical for forming and holding together a coalition of diverse civic
organizations operating within a given conflict setting. Where this class of local actors is
able to maintain a strong coalition, the resources, strategies, and platforms available for
negotiation increases, reducing the likelihood of conflict escalation.
Formal organizational boundaries between different CSOs matter little when
conflict occurs. Roles within formal organizations matter less than roles in society. Key
actors who respond directly and rapidly to threats do so as elders, community members,
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and family members, rather than as CSO or NGO workers. Responses that dampen
violence address grievances based on customary rules of restitution draw upon socially
appropriate compensation schemes and forms of communal protection.
Local peace elites tend to develop trust and local authority based on associational
ties that cut across multiple civic associations, and based upon their status within the
community as relatively neutral actors committed to the cause of peacebuilding. Moral
authority of peace elites gives them power to coordinate and engage in high-risk
responses that other actors cannot. For example, peace elites are able to rapidly
coordinate collective responses to crises, convince communities to donate resources to
cover the cost of informal compensation and restitution after deaths, report accurate
information across broad associational networks making it more likely that information
will cross ethnic boundaries.
In the periphery, leaders of local solidarity groups quickly become embedded
within networks of information sharing and rapid response that impact conflict patterns
and shape what happens at the initial moment of crisis. Mid-level aid workers, NGOs,
and CBOs as implementing partners, even religious and missionary organizations play
important roles within informal systems of local conflict governance, that, at times, have
helped to mange inter-group violence and prevent escalation. In sum, in localities where
peace elites have formed strong informal relationships that cut across multiple civic
groups, violence is less likely to escalate.
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Scope Conditions
Findings from the study indicate that the capacity for informal civic coalitions to
contain escalation depends upon three conditions. First, it depends upon the quality and
severity of violence. Symbolic acts of violence spark the rapid disintegration of civic
organizations and informal threat monitoring networks. Inter-group fear drives actors to
pursue protection through bonding rather than bridging groups. Unexpected acts of
violence that break social norms, such as the murder of aid workers, activists, political
candidates, women and children, or the theft of resources belonging to the poorest
members of a community can trigger the breakdown of informal coalitions, rapid militia
mobilization, and asymmetrical acts of violent retribution. Widespread, rather than
localized violence, then becomes more difficult for informal coalitions to contain.
While civic coalitions may be able to contain localized inter-ethnic group conflict,
they may not be able to contain conflict that spans across larger regions and spills across
borders. As evident in the Turkana – Pokot conflict, the direct targeting of police and
local peace actors greatly decreased the ability of organizations with a lot of experience
in conflict resolution from being able to intervene and prevent violence escalation along
the border, especially with oil discoveries making the conflict far more complex.
Second, the extent to which civic associations are able to contain violence
depends upon the nature of state response to the outbreak of local conflict. Violence is
not pre-determined by state actions. State actions, however, make it more difficult for
communities and civic organizations to contain violence. In areas highly vulnerable to
inter-ethnic group conflict, violence is less likely to escalate when state actions do not
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undermine civic coalitions. Where state agents use indiscriminant force, civic coalitions
are more to fragment and break down. Where state actors co-opted civic associations for
intelligence gathering civic coalitions are more likely to fragment and peacebuilding
actors are more likely to be targeted by armed groups.
Third, when the potential for development gains increases, the likelihood of the
fragmentation of peacebuilding coalitions is more likely. Local peace elites confront new
incentives to shift roles and become political entrepreneurs. Past success in peacebuilding
can, in some cases, led to the collapse of effective organizations. Some peacebuilding
coalitions had short lifespans. CSOs were victims of their own success. The availability
of more resources for peacebuilding activities incentivized corruption. Rising legitimacy
and extensive communal support for leaders of peacebuilding organizations incentivized
shifts into ethnic politics. For these reasons, prior organizational experience does not
clearly predict future success. Success in local peacebuilding efforts can, in some cases,
lead to the collapse of effective coalitions. As peacebuilders gain social status, build
broad constituencies, and shift to become political entrepreneurs, coalitions can break
down and fragment.
Communal Adaptation
Dominant theories of ethnic conflict tend to assume that communities have few
options when weak states cannot protect them and armed actors choose to use violence.
Data gathered indicates that this is not the case. Local communities are not passive
victims in the face of insecurity and state weakness. Non-coercive strategic innovation
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can, in some cases, increase communal capacity to respond to various types of conflict
triggers and shocks, and foster resilience toward violence in the absence of the state.
Under increasingly complex conflict conditions with rising tension and threats of
indiscriminant violence, local protection strategies, both coercive and non-coercive are
adopted. Local communities bear the highest costs of violence, which creates an incentive
to not only rely upon threat-based strategies for communal protection. In some cases noncoercive tactics, at least, made particular out-group communities less prone to
indiscriminant targeting following outbreaks of violence in other locations, creating a
dampening effect.
For example, along the Samburu – Turkana border, Turkana out-groups
developed covert, inter-group threat monitoring systems that functioned to restrain
violent actors from engaging in rapid asymmetrical attacks. Local adaptation reduces the
likelihood of escalation through the introduction of diverse tactics for managing common
conflict triggers. However, acts of violence create conditions of uncertainly which
triggers communal adaptations, both coercive and non-coercive. Patrons of militias
acquire more sophisticated weapons and training, and pursue informal negotiations with
aggressors through elders, or local peace actors such as reformed warriors.
There is a very high level of coping and improvisation during the process of
responding to conflict threats under conditions of uncertainty. Armed actors may use
non-coercive strategies for nefarious purposes, such as sending emissaries to engage in
peace negotiations or peacebuilding programming for the purpose of information
gathering on rival groups. For this reason, communal adaptations and survival strategies,
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alone, cannot explain variation in patterns of escalation. Interactive effects must be taken
into account.
Limitations of the Study
The study faces limitations related to information sources, reliability, and
comparability of qualitative data. First, precise data on fatalities in conflicts in periphery
regions is very difficult to attain. During episodes of violence both armed actors and
civilians lose lives, making it difficult for outside observers to accurately identify who is
who, especially when insecurity remains very high. Attacks also always become political
events with various actors working to control the narrative around violence.
Conflict reports are prone to errors due to police under-reporting in which high
numbers would undermine their authority and garner severe reprimands from
commanding authorities, or over-reporting by groups who use events to make claims of
government failure, victimhood, or to undermine the legitimacy of incumbents or
competing political leaders. Corruption also undermines the accuracy of data on local
conflicts. Under reporting can be purchased. Some actors involved may want to cover up
a severe act of violence to avoid police intervention or severe retribution by another
ethnic militia. For these reasons, following the protocol of UCDP, the study relies on best
estimates within each analytical narrative (UCDP 2015).
The study cannot definitively prove that cohesive peace coalitions are necessary
for limiting escalation. Studies of few cases and multiple variables face the problem of
multi-colinearity (Fearon 1991, 187). Many other spurious factors outside of the
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assessment framework may contribute to escalation or non-escalation. However, to deal
with this problem each case presents evidence of observable preventive action taking
place that are most likely to have played a role in contributing to the non-occurrence of
violence (Rubin 2002). Cases provide observable evidence of actors engaging in actions
intentionally selected to prevent escalation (Rubin 2002). Actors believed the risk of
escalation was high enough to undertake preventive efforts, overcoming the threatresponse problem (George and Holl 1997).
Second, studying ethnic violence runs against the problem of reliability due to
competing interpretations of its causes and consequences from different actors. High
levels intervention and multiple NGOs and CSOs engaged in peacebuilding leads to the
formation of scripts among leaders of organizations who aim to maintain narratives of
effectiveness even when local peacebuilding efforts fail (see also, Eaton 2008a). To
overcome this challenge, during the fieldwork component of the study, I collaborated
with a variety of local institutions, including, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, the
Turkana County Peace Secretariat, Local Elders Networks, District Peace Committees,
and the Pastoralist Integrated Support Program.
In some cases, I was invited by local peace actors to observe peace programs and
interventions to address active violent conflicts, allowing access to face-to-face
interviews with conflict actors who were more critical of local peacebuilding
organizations and programming (see also, Haer and Becher 2011; Mazurana, Jacobsen,
and Gale 2013). This provided me with an opportunity to employ direct participant
observation methods, and to assess and compare various organizational responses to
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conflict episodes that occurred during my fieldwork. Insights derived through participant
observation have proven particularly useful for analysis of the ways in which informal
forms of organizational collaboration occur at moments of crisis.
In each county, I worked with at least one research assistant with linkages to local
security actors, peacebuilding organizations, and conflict actors. All research assistants
had been involved in inter-group negotiations and other peacebuilding processes, and
were trusted as relatively neutral actors in the community. Government officials and local
chiefs were contacted first in each location to present my research permit and ensure
approval. Overall, my research team engaged 327 research participants: 251 in the form
of semi-structured interviews, 42 in the form of focus group dialogues, and 34 in the form
of participant observation during inter-group negotiations I was invited to attend during
the course of the field work.
Third, the study aims to compare multiple conflict events. However, there is
variation in the depth and quality of information attained and variation in the spectrum of
sources I was able to consult for analyzing particular conflicts, responses, and outcomes.
For example, due to the lower level of insecurity, I was able to attain more data on local
adaptation strategies at the village-level in Samburu than I was in Mandera where
ongoing attacks prevented travel to conflict sites. Also, there is far more published
material on conflict related to oil extraction in Turkana than fishing access in Todonyang.
To try to overcome this problem, I draw from a variety of information sources, and
assume that the relatively large number of episodes included in the data set helps to
prevent distortions related to information asymmetry across the cases.
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Empirically, local peacebuilding efforts have expanded across Northern Kenya. In
particular, NGOs and CBOs have shown special interest in supporting customary
institutions for conflict prevention and dispute resolution across multiple conflict settings.
The cases provide a high level of variation on the dependent variable, escalation, as well
as the main independent variable, cohesive coalitions.
Many local peacebuilding organizations assessed their work and published reports
on engaging local institutions in the pursuit of peace. Even though information from
NGO reports is unorganized with mixed findings, at least basic data from very remote
and hard to reach conflict settings is available. Grey material is available on most of the
cases and provides a secondary source for the construction of analytic narratives.
Considering that Kenya remains open for international researchers (unlike Ethiopia, for
example) and relatively safe, research can be conducted in remote, conflict-affected
settings without too much concern for personal security. Kenya, therefore, is a good
setting for analyzing theories of sub-state fragility and patterns of inter-ethnic group
violence.
In the summer of 2014, during the fieldwork, security conditions in Mandera
eroded due to heavy military intervention to curb al-Shaabab terrorist attacks. Insecurity
in the area prevented me from traveling directly to Mandera to conduct research. To gain
insights on the case, I collaborated with the National Steering Committee for
Peacebuilding and Conflict Management and District Peace Committee chairmen to
identify security actors and conflict actors. I also engaged Kenyan scholars working on
the case, and hired two graduate student research assistants to translate and conduct
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follow up phone interviews with peace and security actors in Mandera. Research
assistants based in Nairobi also provided help conducting phone interviews with key
contacts I was not able to meet directly during field trips.
Including the use of ethnographic methods, such as participant observation,
embedded research, and working with actors directly involved in initiating and managing
first responses to outbreaks of communal violence, I acquired data that many studies of
ethnic conflict are not able to capture. Even though many respondents were willing to
speak on the record, considering the level of insecurity in the areas under investigation,
and the nature of data related to protection tactics, publishing some information could
potentially incriminate research participants or put them at risk of being labeled
whistleblowers. Some of the data is sensitive. Some informants feared identifying groups
in their communities who have engaged in violence out of fear of local powerbrokers. To
protect informants and informant networks, many insights and quotations are linked to
pseudonyms, or even composite figures. Moreover, to protect the identity of informants,
data from all interviews was initially handwritten, then typed and uploaded to a secure
cloud-based site to protect personal data and the confidentiality of participants.
Many insights used within analytical narratives were attained through informant
networks built while in the field, comprised of actors willing to speak openly and
critically about illegal armament processes, processes of organization for retributive
attacks, or direct evidence of corruption during responses to conflicts is particularly
sensitive. Voluntary cooperation from respondents was attained through: 1) official
approval from the National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation and
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local officials; 2) my status as a graduate student (rather than NGO or aid worker), 3)
contacting respondents through trusted networks established through research assistants
and personal networks built through initial contacts in Nairobi, and; 4) upholding
confidentiality as per the official IRB protocol.
Overall, Kenya provides a relatively strong setting for analyzing ethnic violence,
informal institutions, and local organizational responses. Communities in Northern
Kenya struggle with inter-group conflict and the risk of violence on a daily basis, and
thus are generally quite willing to engage critically and openly with the topic. Local
scholars, politicians, peace practitioners, and even members of youth militias tend to be
interested in offering insights into the conflicts that impact their communities, even with
external actors. Research participants were, on the whole, open and transparent in
discussions of potentially sensitive topics such as causes of communal violence, attitudes
toward ethnic out-groups, corruption, and the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of state and
civic actors in restraining violence and mitigating conflicts.
Implications for Kenya, Divided Societies, and Non-state Conflict
Compared to its neighbors, Kenya has proven more resilient to outbreaks of interethnic violence. The fact that more inter-group conflicts have not escalated across the
highly vulnerable Northern periphery, the study suggests, is related, in part, to relatively
robust civic organizations involved in day-to-day processes of conflict monitoring, threat
response, and inter-group pact making. Forms of local communal adaptation compliment
civic efforts to dampen the threat of rapid violence escalation. Across multiple conflict
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corridors in Northern Kenya, many conflicts remain on the threshold of tipping toward
violent conflict, but collective violence remains a rare outcome. The strength of
communities and civic associations helps to control and contain violence under harsh and
uncertain circumstances.
Findings from the study, however, imply for Kenya that outsourcing local security
and peacebuilding functions to non-state actors has limitations. Civic coalitions and
informal institutional arrangements work well enough in some conflict settings, but it is
not clear that informal systems transfer other areas to the same effect. In other words, a
particular informal peacebuilding system may only function well for a particular set of
conflict conditions. The major problems that have been experienced with the DPC
institution, originally established in Wajir, across Kenya, support this point. Home grown
and largely organic peace constituencies, may not be able to be reproduced—they may be
epiphenomenal, and unique to very particular conflict settings.
Compounding conflict pressures can overwhelm informal organizational
structures and undermine local peace processes. Across Northern Kenya, local
institutions are under great pressure, especially along international borders, and especially
in relation to increasing developmental interests in previously marginalized areas.
Communal resilience to inter-ethnic violence often breaks down following coercive state
responses to local violence and symbolic acts of violence. Informal institutions may
weaken over time as a conflict persists or spills across international borders. Kenya’s
spectrum of local, informal institutional structures may be able to contain a majority of
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threats; however, political and economic pressures related to rapid political and economic
change in the Northern periphery often overwhelm informal peacebuilding organizations.
Cases selected for the study capture variation with a single state, across an
environmental context similar to the larger Sahel region of Sub-Saharan. Findings likely
are generalizable for other periphery regions where pastoralism and inter-group conflict
are inter-related such as the Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan. The primary
implication for the larger region is that local peacebuilding processes may face similar
scope conditions. Cohesive coalitions of local associations effectively contain escalation
in most cases, yet the use of coercive force of state actors may fragment and undermine
preventive efforts, and create windows for escalation.
Nigeria is a similar case where coercive state responses to local conflicts impact
and potentially exacerbate inter-group conflict dynamics. In particular, dynamics similar
to conditions in Turkana and Isiolo are playing out between the Ijaw and Itsekiri
communities at the local level in Warri, Nigeria. Conflict is escalating in Warri South
West district in relation to competition over access to local political positions with power
to distribute resources from a new Export Processing Zone. Analysis suggests military
intervention to try to control local clashes only further exacerbated the conflict,
increasing grievances around inequality in the state’s response (see, Blyth 2015).
Understanding the interactive effects of state and non-state response to local conflicts
remains relevant across a broad range of developmental states in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Beyond the African context, further comparative work in other regions of the
world with limited state presence, and high vulnerability to inter-ethnic clashes, such as
308

Afghanistan, Indonesia, Myanmar, or Nepal could help to test the robustness of the
approach. Comparing various informal coalitions and patterns violence across multiple
countries would help assess to the generalizability of the proposed relationship between
state and non-state modes of response to local conflicts across different conflict settings.
Under storms of compounding conflict pressures, violence can spread even in
areas with relatively strong civic organizations. Under conditions of state fragility,
persistent human insecurity, and the indiscriminant use of force by the state, relatively
resilient communities still have breaking points. Notwithstanding, local institutions are
critical for fostering resilience to violence. The core actors necessary for effective
preventive actions are peace elites who function as local monitors, local security actors,
and coordinators of rapid response to crises. Where the state is weak and not capable of
providing immediate security, local, informal institutional arrangements are important for
containing violence. Informal coalitions comprised of local peace committees, faith based
organizations, and councils of elders, unified through local peace elites, make violence
less likely to escalate in communities vulnerable to collective violence. Where security is
largely in the hands of citizens, organizational capacity for preventive responses can save
lives.
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Kumsaa, Asfaw. Program Manager, United Nations Centre for Regional Development
(Nairobi: July 18, 2014).
Kut, George. Consultant (former), UNDP Peacebuilding Programming (Nairobi: July 17,
2013).
Lalarar, Regina. Secretary, Samburu Women’s Association (South Horr: August 21,
2014).
Lambert, Augustine. Program Manager – Community Security and Resilience,
International Organization for Migration (IOM) (Lodwar: July 27, 2014).
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2014).
Lenaroshi, Moses. Chairman, Samburu South District Peace Committee (Nairobi: August
14, 2014).
Lenagaur, Jacob. Ex-Chief and Retired Army Major (Tuum: August 19, 2014).
Lengolos, Joseph. Priest, South Horr Diocese (South Horr: August 21, 2014).
Lenkurukuri, John. Chairman, Samburu Central District Peace Committee (Nairobi: July
22, 2014).
Leokoe, Namugie. Teacher, Loongerin Primary School (Loongerin: August 15, 2014).
Lepuleilei, Dominic. Chief, South Horr Ward, Samburu County (South Horr: August 15,
2014).
Leriano, Samson. Samburu Elder and Teacher, Loongerin Primary School (Kurungu:
August 14, 2014).
Lesas, Patrick. Assistant Chief, Loiyangalani Sub-location (Loiyangalani: August 22,
2014).
Lesas, Raphael. Former Chief, South Horr Sub-location (South Horr: August 21, 2014).
Lesidka, Agnes. Local Business Owner and District Treasurer (Tuum: August 18, 2014).
Lipale, Geoffrey. CEO, POKATUSA (Makutano: July 21, 2014).
Locham, Raphael. Project Officer – Community Safety Programme, Danish Demining
Group (Lodwar: July 30, 2014).
Lodinyo, John. Founder, POKATUSA and Advisor to the Governor of West Pokot
(Kitale: July 23, 2014).
Lodukai, Lowa. Turkana Elder (Loiyangalani: August 22, 2014).
Lokinei, Johnathan Losokon. Turkana Elder and Chairman, Parikati Peace Committee
(Tuum: August 18, 2014).
Lolim, Grace. Women’s Peace Campaigner and Activist, Isiolo Peace Link (Nairobi: July
25, 2014).
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Loo, Muga. Program Advisor, Isiolo District Peace Committee (Isiolo: July 16, 2013).
Lorbert, Stephen. Samburu Elder (Uaso Rongai: August 19, 2014).
Madegwa, Lauretta. Program Officer – Justice and Peace, CAFOD Kenya (Nairobi: July
23, 2013).
Makoha, Jacinta. Program Manager, Local Capacities for Peace International (Nairobi:
July 22, 2014).
Mamo, Molu. Cohesion and Integration Officer, Marsabit County Government and
Former UNDP Peace Monitor (Marsabit: September 12, 2014).
Marc, Alexandre. Chief Technical Specialist, Global Center on Conflict, Security and
Development (GCCSD), World Bank (Nairobi: August 7, 2014).
Marmone, Giordano. Anthopologist, University of Paris (Tuum: August 18, 2014).
Mbogo, Jacqueline. Program Manager, Open Society Initiative (Nairobi: July 18, 2014).
Mboya, Tom. Governance Consultant and Founder of Inuka Kenya Foundation (Nairobi:
August 8, 2014).
Members of Borana Militia (anonymous) (Marsabit: September 19, 2014).
Members of Gabra Militia (anonymous) (North Horr: September 17, 2014).
Members of Pokot Militia (anonymous) (Kitale: July 23, 2014).
Members of Police. Police Chief and Asst. Chief, Rapid Deployment Unit (anonymous)
(Kenya: August 18, 2014).
Members of Samburu Militia (anonymous) (South Horr: August 14, 2014).
Members of Samburu Militia (anonymous) (Tuum: August 19, 2014).
Members of Turkana Militia (anonymous) (Parikati: August 18, 2014).
Members of Turkana Militia (anonymous) (Sarima: August 22, 2014).
Mills, Jeff. Analyst – Horn of Africa, International Crisis Group (Nairobi: July 18, 2014).
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Mirgichan, Joseph. Director of the Office of Cohesion, Integration, and Coordination of
Non-state Actors, Marsabit County Government (Marsabit: September 9, 2014).
Missionary, Seventeen Years Experience in Conflict-affected Community (anonymous)
(Kenya: August 18, 2014).
Mlee, Mary. Chairwoman, West Pokot Peace Committee (Nairobi: September 12, 2014).
Mogaka, Stephen. Director, Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV) at Global Center for
Conflict, Security and Development (GCCSD), World Bank (Nairobi: August 7,
2014).
Mohammud, Abdia. Chairwoman, Isiolo Peace Link (Nairobi: August 20, 2014).
Molu, Philip. Assistant Director of Governance, Pastoralist Integrated Support Program
(PISP) (Marsabit: September 10, 2014).
Moses, Aiyen. Chairman, Loima District Peace Committee (Nairobi: July 26, 2014).
Mpaayei, Florence. CEO, INUA Kenya Foundation (Nairobi: July 23, 2013).
Muragu, Michael. Peace Programming Consultant and Former UNDP Consultant
(Nairobi: July 18, 2013).
Mursale, Hussein. Chairman, Isiolo District Peace Committee (Nairobi: August 14,
2014).
Muru, Lemosa. Ranger, Kenya Police Reserve (Tuum: August 18, 2014).
Mushtaq, Najum. Regional Policy Coordinator, the Life and Peace Institute (Nairobi:
August 8, 2014).
Muthama, Thompson. Researcher, Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC)
(Nairobi: July 17, 2013).
Mutuku, Munini. Senior Program Officer, National Cohesion and Integration
Commission (NCIC) (Nairobi: July 23, 2014).
Mwandoro, Samuel. Peace Programs Manager, National Council of Churches in Kenya
(NCCK) (Nairobi: July 16, 2014).
Nasieku, Sylvia. Women’s Representative, Isiolo Peace Network (Isiolo: July 25, 2013).
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Nderitu, Kevin. Program Officer, Peacebuilding, Horn of Africa Development Initiative
(HODI) (Marsabit: September 12, 2014).
Ndung’u, James. Program Manager – Arms Control and Policing, Saferworld Kenya
(Nairobi: September 22, 2014).
Ngala, Joseph. CEO, People for Peace Africa (Nairobi: July 19, 2013).
Nganga, Daniel. Priest and Peacebuilding Officer, Catholic Justice and Peace
Crossborder Programme (Kitale: July 20, 2014).
Ngondi, Joseph. CEO, Climate Change Network Mandera (Nairobi: August 8, 2014).
Njuguna, Esther. Project Officer, Arms Control and Policing, Saferworld Kenya (Nairobi:
September 22, 2014).
Njukia, Alex. Faith and Development Officer, World Vision International Kenya
(Nairobi: July 24, 2013).
Ntinyari, Lydiah. Officer, Kenya Police Reserves (Isiolo: July 25, 2013).
Nyabera, Fred. Program Manager, Arigatou International (Nairobi: July 24, 2013).
Obuoga, Benard Okok. Coordinator – Capacities for Peace, National Peace Initiative –
Africa (NPI) (Nairobi: July 19, 2014).
Ofalo, Davis. Director, Agency for Pastoralist Development (APAD) (July 28, 2014).
Oil Exploration Company. Community Liaison (anonymous) (Lodwar: July 28, 2014).
Oil Exploration Company. Engineer (anonymous) (Lodwar: July 29, 2014).
Oil Exploration Company. Security Officer (anonymous) (Lodwar: July 29, 2014).
Okalu, Barako. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Programme Manager, Pastoralist
Community Initiative and Development Assistance (PACIDA) (Marsabit:
September 10, 2014).
Okole, Guyo. Technical Advisor, Resilience and Economic Growth in the Arid Lands
Initiative (Regal I - USAID), African Development Solutions (ADESO)
(Marsabit: September 11, 2014).
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Olow, Bishar Ali. Chairman, Wajir East District Peace Committee (Nairobi: July 24,
2014).
Omar, Abdow Abdullahi. Chairman, Wajir West District Peace Committee (Nairobi: July
24, 2014).
Omar, Jeremiah. Former Marsabit District Peace Committee Chairman and
Administrative Secretary for the Anglican Church of Kenya, Marsabit Diocese
(Marsabit: September 11, 2014).
Ombaka, Brian. Program Manager, Strategic Applications International (SAI) Turkana
(Lodwar: July 25, 2014).
Ongunje, Philip. Director, Usalama Forum (Nairobi: July 15, 2013).
Owiny, Adonijah. Program Manager, Solidarites International Kenya (North Horr:
September 17, 2014).
Pierli, Francesco. Professor, Tangaza University, Catholic University of East Africa
(Nairobi: August 8, 2014).
Ptonton, Elizabeth. Chief, West Pokot County Government (Makutano: August 2, 2014).
Rono, John. Priest and Program Officer, Catholic Justice and Peace Crossborder Initiative
West Pokot (Kitale: July 23, 2014).
Sasaka, Anthony. Reverend and Peace Program Manager, Chemi Chemi ya Ukweli
(Nairobi: July 18, 2013).
Shah, Rufaa. Chairman, Mandera District Peace Committee (Nairobi: September 1,
2014).
Shamala, Immaculate. CEO, West Pokot Justice and Peace Centre (Kitale: July 23,
2014).
Sharamo, Roba. Team Leader, Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Unit, United
Nations Development Programme Kenya (Nairobi: August 6, 2014).
Sora, Ibrahim Adan. CEO, Community Initiative Facilitation and Assistance (CIFA)
(Marsabit: September 12, 2014).
Suleiman, Isaac. Local Business Owner and Chairman, Loiyangalani Fisheries Market
Board (Loiyangalani: August 22, 2014).
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Taigong, Julius. Director, National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) Turkana
(Lodwar: July 28, 2014).
Tari, Diba. Livelihoods Programme Officer, CARE Kenya (Marsabit: September 13,
2014).
Tuke, Guyo. Consultant, National Pastoralists Parliamentary Group (Nairobi: September
20, 2014).
Tuke, Galmagar. Communications Officer, Sauti Moja Marsabit (Marsabit: August 13,
2014).
Vasquez, Teresa. Head of Office, South Horr Catholic Health Centre (South Horr:
August 21, 2014).
Wairagu, Francis. Senior Researcher, Regional Centre on Small Arms (RESCA)
(Nairobi: July 18, 2014).
Wangamati, Sally. Professor of Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution, Kisii University
(Nairobi: August 8, 2014).
Wario, Sora Adano. Director, National Drought Management Authority (NDMA)
(Marsabit: September 12, 2014).
Warui, Miriam. Peacebuilding Program Manager, CARE Kenya (Nairobi: July 23, 2014).
Wasonga, James. Lecturer IR and Peace Studies, Kenyatta University (Nairobi: July 30,
2013).
Wepundi, Manasseh. Former UNDP Peacebuilding Consultant and Peace Monitor
(Nairobi: July 15, 2013).
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